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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MARITIME TRANSPORT REGIONAL MEETING HELD

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 17 Oct 85 pp 2-4

[Text] Last 15 October, an informal interministerial meeting on the problems of maritime transport was held in the large conference room of the government palace. Placed under the chairmanship of Banyara Yoyama, minister of transport, it had as its aim to inform Chadian operators about the "Chad-CAR-Cameroon Tripartite Agreement for the Development of the Long-Term Under-Customs Storage Zone in the Port of Douala," signed last 6 September in Cameroon's economic capital, and to define the prospects of effective management of the zone by Chadian operators. The meeting also discussed the recent establishment in our country of a "Chadian Shippers' Council" (COC-TCHAD).

In opening the meeting, the transport minister, Banyara Yoyama, explained that since Chad was a landlocked country, some would be tempted to speak wrongly of maritime transport. Now, our country's membership in the Central African subregion, the need for strengthening subregional cooperation, the steady growth of Chadian traffic passing in transit through the port of Douala and, above all, the need for guaranteeing the right of access of landlocked states to the sea and freedom of transit, have led Chad, the CAR, and Cameroon to sign an agreement on the establishment and development of a long-term storage zone in the port of Douala. Mr Yoyama noted that this agreement aims at establishing, as much as possible on the basis of complete equality between the partners, close and continued cooperation in a spirit of international solidarity and at jointly intensifying efforts toward the economic development of the states.

For his part, Madjirebaye Djibangar, director general of transport, indicated that this tripartite agreement of 6 September 1985 between Chad, the CAR, and Cameroon, was concluded after that of 8 July 1983 regarding the transit trade of the landlocked states, the financing contract for the UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa]-TCHAD zone between the EEC and the Cameroon National Ports Office, signed on 27 July 1976, the financing agreement dated 25 June 1982 between the EEC, the CAR, and Chad, regarding the financing of the "UDEAC-TCHAD zone" and, finally, after the 19 September 1981 agreement between the Cameroon National Ports Office (ONPC) and the Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC) with a view to financing the project for creating a storage zone for the landlocked countries (CAR-Chad) in the port of Douala.

This storage zone, called the "UDEAC zone," will operate independently from the rest of the port of Douala and will enjoy international legal status with regard to its management. It remains, however, the property of the ONPC [Cameroon National Ports Office], while being conceded to the Central African Republic and the Republic of Chad for an unspecified duration. Its use will be the subject of long-term commercial leases concluded by ONPC and the operators designated respectively by the CAR and Chad. The zone will be administered by a coordinating committee responsible for watching over the proper application of the agreement regarding the "zone," as well as the contract for occupancy of the port public domain.

The committee will also examine the zone account established by the ONPC on the basis of the operating accounts provided by the different operators; it will settle out of court disputes between the operators and the port authority, as well as disagreements arising from the use of the "UDEAC zone." As for access to the zone, it is reserved for goods originating in and destined for the CAR, Chad, and North Cameroon, and for goods in long-term storage belonging to one of the three states. The agreement stipulates, moreover, that import and export customs operations are carried out inside the "zone" under conditions suitable for facilitating the transit of goods. Finally, the different taxes, tariffs, and levies applied in the port of Douala are subject to preferential rates for the benefit of the landlocked countries, with the exception of the municipal and ship taxes.

Furthermore, the participants at this interministerial meeting were informed of the establishment of a "Chadian Shippers' Council" (COC-TCHAD) with the task of defining and promoting a policy of protecting the interests of Chadian exporters and importers in the field of transportation of goods by sea. COC-TCHAD aims at working to supply our country with diverse products, goods, and commodities, thanks to a schedule of movements of different forms of transport and to the follow-up of their movements. It will also work toward stabilizing or lowering the freight rates and transport costs burdening commercial exchanges, by exercising rigorous action on all the parameters of transport costs, especially maritime.

In order to reach these goals, the council has the power to study all the practical and legal problems directly linked to freight rates and finding adequate solutions, searching for all the solutions that might permit the bulking of freight in order to secure the profitable transport of cargos and the coordination of movements of merchandise for export and import, so as to reduce the costs incurred by the shippers, without prejudice to the national economy, and to protect all of Chad's maritime traffic rights. To that end, the CTT, the maritime conferences, the shipowners, and charterers, as well as the main economic operators in Chad, will have to make available to COC-TCHAD their tariffs and tariff conditions, and pass on all contracts concluded with the shippers, forwarders, or bulkers, as well as the conditions of the system of immediate and deferred discounts. They will also have to inform the council of any contemplated increase in freight rates.

Let us note that membership in COC-TCHAD is held by all the professional exporters and importers, individuals and corporations carrying out their activities in Chad, public and semipublic bodies concerned with import-export problems, and ministerial departments concerned with problems of transport and foreign trade. Finally, at the end of the meeting, Mr Djibangar, director general of transport, invited the economic operators to send their suggestions to his department as early as possible so as to contribute usefully to the next meeting of the tripartite agreement's contracting parties, which will be held shortly in Cameroon.

9434/13046

CSO: 3419/63

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FARMERS USE CROPS ADAPTED TO DROUGHT

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 23-29 Oct 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Abdoulaye Traore]

[Text] The farmers of the semi-arid areas of Africa may soon be in a position to double their production per hectare of "niebe" [an Oulof word for beans]. They can do this by growing a new variety of this plant, the TVx 6484-681-K, production of which has reached as much as 2,211 kilograms per hectare. That is the principal outcome of research work on niebe and corn during the past year in some areas of Africa which have light rainfall.

About 50 African and foreign research specialists met from 15-20 September in Cotonou (Benin) for a seminar-workshop to evaluate the work done since 1979 on research on the cultivation of corn and niebe.

The seminar was organized by the SAFGRAD (Project for the Development of Food Crops in Semi-Arid Areas of Africa), which is a regional research program initiated by the Coordinating Bureau of the Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU/CSTR). Established in 1977, the SAFGRAD initially included 18 African countries. However, at present it is made up of 25 member states.

According to a study by the World Food Council, reported on in FORUM DU DEVELOPPEMENT in its issue of September 1985, research carried on in Africa up to the present has only benefited from 5.3 percent of available agricultural resources. A sampling of countries of Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East has shown that they were devoting 11.5 percent of their agricultural resources to research.

A second observation noted that the African countries which have been engaged in basic research have not kept in touch with each other. In Mali and Burkina Faso work of the same type has been carried out on the same product, although it would have been possible to avoid duplication through cooperation.

Another observation is that the varieties of corn on which research has been done in Latin America or Asia often could not be readapted to the particular conditions of the African countries. Now, a given variety of corn may produce a great deal in a valley in the Mexican mountains and produce very little in a nearby valley. This same variety may be successful in Senegal but be a total

failure in all of the provinces of Benin. This is because, although they are apparently the same, in fact natural conditions vary considerably in the tropics. Often small regions are found, each of which has its own particular characteristics.

Therefore, each time that one goes from one region to another, it is necessary to readapt the new variety of plant. This presupposes the establishment of full cooperation between the national research centers, in order to achieve the best results. This is a task to which the SAFGRAD has devoted itself, while concentrating the bulk of its efforts on test plantings at experimental stations.

Regarding the niebe bean, the 1984 test plantings were carried out under conditions of severe drought. The TVx 6484-681-K, a new variety of this type of bean, gave the researchers a great deal of hope after it was tested under these adverse conditions. It produced 2,211 kilograms of beans per hectare, whereas the average yield of the most commonly used test variety was 899 kilograms per hectare. Tests were made of successive plantings of corn and niebe, millet and niebe, and sorghum and niebe. Unfortunately, these did not give positive results. However, future research will be directed toward the study of planting dates sown on the ground. In this connection Mali has asked that a regional test be undertaken.

Concerning corn, certain promising varieties have been developed. Mario Rodriguez, a Colombian by nationality and the chief of the IITA/SAFGRAD project, spoke in particular of the "Suvita" variety of seed, which has reportedly shown great resistance to drought. With this variety production per hectare has reached 2 tons in areas not receiving more than 800 mm of rain annually. This corresponds to the savanna area of the Sudan in the classification of the semi-arid tropical regions of West Africa.

Among the varieties adapted to this region, mention has also been made of the SAFITA 2 type, which has already been widely sown in Ghana and which will soon be planted on a large scale in several other countries. This variety is distinguished in particular by its very serrated appearance, which makes it tender. From the time it is planted until the harvest it needs 90 days. Meanwhile, the SAFITA 104 variety, which has not yet been widely sown, needs 85 days to reach full maturity.

However, none of these improved varieties is yet resistant to a plant disease called striosis. Now, this disease is spreading more and more in the savanna area of northern Guinea. The chief of the IITA/SAFGRAD project says: "We're getting around this problem by using other varieties developed at our headquarters in Ibadan." These varieties reportedly have genes resistant to striosis.

If the efforts of the researchers bear fruit, the cultivation of corn could leave the stage of small scale plantings (that is, grown immediately outside houses) and would achieve the status of a field crop, thus contributing effectively to African food self-sufficiency.

We may remember that corn is already extensively grown in the savanna area of northern Guinea and is tending to move to the North, from forest areas to the savanna, progressively replacing sorghum and millet. These three crops make up 27 percent of the food consumed by Africans. In its extension phase the cultivation of corn quite simply needs to be supported by research, leading to the achievement of higher economic yields and to the stabilization of the harvests.

5170

CSO: 3419/76

ANGOLA

RAIDS AGAINST UNITA BASES INCREASE; DIAMOND PRODUCTION AFFECTED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 16 Oct 85 p 25

[Text] The capture of 1st Lt Pedro Sakata, chief of the Mobilization Department of the Sixth Military Region of the MPLA, in Kuando Kubango in early October, made it possible for Savimbi's forces to gain detailed information about the tactics to be employed by government forces at the beginning of the second phase of the preestablished plan, drafted late last July.

The MPLA plan to attack Jamba, Jonas Savimbi's general headquarters, and to wipe out the Angolan opposition once and for all, may have been designed by Soviet, Portuguese and GDR strategists.

The Portuguese specialists are reserve officers who have been familiar with the area since they were there fighting the guerrillas who opposed the Portuguese presence.

Thus, the General Staff was formed by officers from these countries and included two FAPLA (Angolan Armed Forces) colonels and two Cuban colonels.

According to our sources, when the Angolan Air Force began to raid the UNITA flanks, it was not expecting the quick intervention of the South African Army, which responded with its powerful air and ground forces, especially the renowned Buffalo battalion, mainly comprising Angolans who had taken refuge in South Africa during the clashes which preceded the independence of the former colony.

Before the FAPLA push, UNITA made a strategic retreat, frustrating the plan which called for the attack on Jamba (UNITA's general headquarters) and the capture of Jonas Savimbi.

However, according to the information we have, Savimbi's forces may have suffered their roughest defeat since 1977 and have barely been able to form new combat battalions in recent months; UNITA may be limited to actions aimed at disrupting the Angolan economy and menacing rural settlements and the sabotage of roads and bridges considered strategic, such as the Malanje, Benguela and Amboim rail lines.

Our informant also assured us that during the engagement, the South African planes had also bombed and destroyed two SWAPO military bases on the Angolan border, resulting in about a hundred dead and a few hundred wounded, some of whom were treated in Luanda hospitals.

A UNITA communique released this week in Lisbon reports that, during the battles, Savimbi's forces shot down four Alouette helicopters as they flew over the banks of the Lomba River searching for other Alouettes which the UNITA forces had shot down earlier, on 6 October, as TEMPO reported in a recent issue.

According to the communique, on 10 October another helicopter was shot down near Alto Chikapa, in the Lunda region. The next day special units exploded a high potency bomb at a Soviet residence in the populous Fatima District of the city of Huambo, killing 12 Soviet soldiers and causing considerable damage.

On the same day, there was an attack on the town of Que, 43 kilometers north of Matala, in Huila Province, resulting in the death of 17 government soldiers and the capture of 31 weapons of various types.

Meanwhile, Luanda is pursuing its actions against the rebels; its combat power has been reinforced by Cuban military detachments flown in recently and by sophisticated war materiel, which was unloaded at the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedes.

Angolan military sources stress that the Luanda government is determined to put an end to the UNITA by 11 November, the 10th anniversary of Angolan independence.

From all indications, there could be face-to-face combat between South African and Angolan troops, and Cuban troops could be present at the front, which has not occurred up to now.

Thus, a war in that area of southern Africa, a war that could spread, may be imminent, barring the unforeseen. That unforeseen could consist in a mass intervention by the South African Air Force, the most powerful in Africa, which is deeply committed to the defense and protection of the UNITA.

Luanda and Diamonds

Angolan authorities already have an extensive report on production activities, drafted by technicians of several nationalities, who focused their attention on the areas of petroleum, coffee and diamonds.

The report states, for example, that during the last 5 years mining activity has declined because of domestic and foreign factors. Among the domestic factors are a lack of organization, a lack of qualified cadres and a shortage of technical material.

Among the foreign factors, the experts noted the international crisis, particularly the decline in export prices and increased costs associated with the state of unrest which had been experienced in various regions of the area for some time.

As the most important tasks in this area, the experts recommend the rational and efficient use of the mineral resources, incentives for prospecting and mining activities and the evaluation of new discoveries. [They advise that] production should be assured at the level of the companies, particularly the

joint companies and those which, because of the specialized nature of their activity, rely heavily on cooperation and state-of-the-art technology.

Thus, the document says, there must be more skilled technical cooperants, with demonstrated experience and especially with a knowledge of the areas in which they will be working.

Considering the lack of skilled Angolan technical cadres and the inadequate technical foundation in the sector, the experts advise recourse to international cooperation with organizations which have offered to assist Angola in training cadres, particularly Portuguese organizations with broad experience in these activities and a deep knowledge of the regions with the greatest concentration of diamonds in the former colony.

It is noted that the situation of DIAMANG [Angola Diamond Company] has been gradually worsening for some time. The recovery phase was halted in several important aspects: a decline in production (from 1.4 million carats in 1981 to 900,000 carats in 1984); a significant drop in the export price; a shortage of technical equipment; increased production costs; the escalating illegal traffic in diamonds; the insecurity in the locale of the production centers and the surrounding areas; and also the service contracts, which are not only counterproductive but extremely expensive.

Among other measures, it is proposed that the government adopt a serious plan for investments, which could be financed with foreign and long-term capital, says the report.

6362

CSO: 3442/40

ANGOLA

HUNDREDS OF YOUTHS REGISTER FOR FAPLA

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] Starting very early yesterday morning, hundreds upon hundreds of pre-recruit youths in the township of Rangel voluntarily reported to the military recruiting station at the basketball field of the TAAG [Air Transportation of Angola] in compliance with the recent military order issued by the Defense Ministry so as to respond in the best possible way to the new racist aggression of which the People's Republic of Angola is victim.

These youths had been gathering long before the scheduled reporting hour (0800), fully aware of the urgent need to defend the country and the ideals of this revolution; they reported to the station, fully determined to participate actively in the effort to strengthen the defense line of the country's sovereignty and independence.

At nightfall, the place was crowded but other youngsters were still waiting their turn outside, sitting on the benches in an orderly fashion and in a calm atmosphere of deep thought and gratitude for the opportunity given them to do their patriotic duty in an organized fashion.

These youths wanted to continue the struggle to drive the enemies from Angolan soil and they also felt the warmth and affection of the future leaders of the people's revolution. Wearing the kerchiefs offered by the Organization of Pioneers of Agostinho Neto, they remained firm and were determined once again to demonstrate their total support for the principles of the party and the commander-in-chief of the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola], Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

We contacted one of the young soldiers assigned to the Luanda recruiting and mobilization center; he was 2nd Lt Antonio Jose Pio de Amaral Gourgel who told us that the work done at this recruiting station was coming along satisfactorily and exceeded original expectations.

"The youngsters reported spontaneously because they are profoundly aware of the role they will play in the defense of the fatherland as the fruit of the great political work that was done and the high level of revolutionary consciousness of our people."

The officer also appealed to the few youngsters who, for various reasons, had not yet reported to join all the others who were going after the primordial objective of the moment which is the defense of the fatherland and the revolutionary gains.

"I am proud to consider myself at this point in time to be a young man on whom the glorious FAPLA and the people can indeed count," Antonio Jorge, 18 years old, told us. "I would like to be an artilleryman (I might say that this would also be my choice) because my hatred is so strong against the South African racists and their openly reactionary servants that I am ready today, this very morning, to do my duty. I think that we young men, primarily, who have friends, brothers and relatives who fell in defense of the fatherland, must be ready at all times, especially at this moment."

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CSO: 3442/17

ANGOLA

ACTIVITIES OF STUDENTS IN POLAND DESCRIBED

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12

[Excerpts] At this time, there are 38 Angolan scholarship students attending Polish universities in the special fields of law, economics, sociology, engineering, medicine, chemical and biochemical sciences and political science.

Poland, with a population of 37 million, in other words, 118 inhabitants per square kilometer, has 31 institutions of higher education, including the universities of Warsaw and Cracow, as well the Motion Picture, Theater, and Television College in Lodz.

The Angolan student in Poland enjoys many opportunities that facilitate his technical-scientific training; this point was made by many students in the group of scholarship holders who are still on vacation in their home country. During the first year, after a period of 9 months of language study, the student can overcome the initial difficulties and at the same time he can attend his course in a place selected by him.

It must be pointed out that the scholarship student in Poland lives in a warm family environment since Polish students as well as professors do not hesitate to give them the necessary assistance and moral support.

During a "rap session" which we had with three Angolan scholarship students, including Paulo de Carvalho, second secretary of the JMPLA [Youth Movement of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Party Youth, we were told that "We have been well taken care of in terms of support, above all by the Polish professors, in spite of the fact that the first two years at the universities are difficult primarily due to the communication problem." They emphasized that the greatest difficulty resided in the study of the Slavic language whose grammar has seven declensions that are very complicated, with variations in consonants and changes in the meaning of the expression.

Like young Paulo de Carvalho, the youngest Angolan student, a year ago in Vratislavia Bratislava, Isabel Deolinda, who is studying pharmacy, said that the school atmosphere which she experienced during the last academic year was positive in spite of the fact that she still has to struggle with the language and especially the pronunciation. In spite of the almost family-like atmosphere, she emphasized that she is homesick and would love to have some of the native dishes of her homeland.

On the other hand, naval engineering student Ntibo Filipe wants to finish his education and return to his homeland so that he might participate in national reconstruction with the help of his technical knowledge.

Extracurricular Activities and the UEP

As a matter of habit, Angolan scholarship students in Poland reserve their free time for political, cultural, recreational, and sports activities promoted by the JMPLA-Party Youth or by the UEP (Union of Angolan Students in Poland). During these activities, the students sing and demonstrate traditional Angolan dances, in addition to activities of a recreational and athletic nature, Paulo de Carvalho noted.

When it comes to student organization, the scholarship student belongs to the UEP which has a secretariat and a delegation in each city where young Angolans are studying as well as subcommittee on culture and sports. In collaboration with the JMPLA-Party Youth, the UEP has the mission of keeping students informed on the country's political and social-economic situation and also to maintain discipline and dynamism in their studies, the youth official added.

It must be emphasized that the presence of a secretariat of the JMPLA-Party Youth in Poland, established last December with 14 members, is an experience that is contributing to the political education of the Angolan scholarship students.

With four branches, especially in Warsaw, Lodz, Gdansk, and Poznan, the party's youth organization participated in the Fourth Congress of the Socialist Union of Polish Youth and also put together the organizing committee for the preliminary festival in support of the World Youth Festival during which it demonstrated traditional Angolan dances.

It must also be emphasized that the group of Angolan students in Poland were supposed to participate in the international encampment held in 1984; but this did not happen because the event coincided with exam time but they will certainly participate during this academic year.

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CSO: 3442/17

ANGOLA

WORKERS ELECT ADDITIONAL INDUSTRY MINISTRY PARTY MEMBERS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12

[Text] As of yesterday, the Ministry of Industry has another 13 party members who were elected during a worker meeting held in the 1 May Motion Picture Theater in Luanda.

During the meeting, which was held in the context of the party expansion drive, the workers of various departments in that ministry--105 of them--had an opportunity for a critical review regarding the content of the membership requirements and biographical sketches and they had a chance to express their opinion for or against the admission to the party of the individuals who were elected yesterday.

In general, the opinions expressed were mostly favorable although attendance at the meeting was not what one might have wanted it to be; still, it was reasonable. We think that the fact that the applications had previously been analyzed by the ministry's party structures perhaps influenced the favorable opinions because these were persons who already met the requirements for joining the MPLA-Labor Party.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of the workers present at the beginning left the auditorium before the end of the meeting and that caused the chair to suspend them; this is why the applications of another seven individuals who want to be party members were not analyzed. This attitude, which is partly due to the delayed start of the meeting, has caused us to conclude that a great sensitization effort will have to be made in the future among the workers of the industry ministry.

The meeting's head table was made up of vice ministers of industry, specifically, Justino Fernandes and Galvao Branco, as well as by the coordinators of the two party cells and the JMPLA [Youth Movement of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Party Youth, respectively.

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CSO: 3442/17

ANGOLA

BRITISH ENERGY DELEGATION TO VISIT

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] Parliamentary Undersecretary in the British Energy Department and member of government of Great Britain Alistair Goodlad is expected in Luanda today on a 3-day visit to Angola.

The British government official, who has already visited Botswana and Zimbabwe, is accompanied by a team of businessmen from the petroleum and energy sectors who are to talk to Angolan officials, especially those at SONANGOL [National Fuel Company].

During its stay in Angola, the British delegation will visit the installations of Cabinda Gulf Oil in Malongo as well as the technical and administrative units of the SADCC [Conference for Development Coordination in Southern Africa], energy sector.

In the United Kingdom, Goodlad said that "British engineering knowhow in the energy field is the best in the world and this is a wonderful opportunity for bringing this message to countries which will certainly benefit greatly from our experience and technological expertise."

"I am very satisfied," said Alistair Goodlad, "by the fact that I am heading a team that represents some of our best companies on such a big international market. Energy is the life blood of industrialized nations and we have much to offer to the rapidly growing economies.

Great Britain has the good fortune of having various options in the energy sector. We have coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy and, consequently, we have engineers, scientists, and businessmen who are capable of furnishing equipment, expertise, and training that are so necessary to the developing world.

"I am determined to build something more through the contacts that have already been established between our countries regarding the energy sector. I am also eager to make sure that the opportunities available under the Lome Convention will be completely recognized. Through the Convention, the European Investment Bank has already given loans intended for energy production. This bank now has the power to finance projects relating to the energy sector," Alistair Goodlad said.

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CSO: 3442/17

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

GDR SHOWS SOLIDARITY--Berlin-- The people of democratic Germany are participating in meetings organized by the solidarity committee of the GDR to restate support for the Angolan people in its just struggle against the South African invaders. Since Friday, that organization, in almost all provincial capitals of the GDR, in conjunction with labor unions and other mass organizations, has been staging mass meetings to condemn the renewed aggression perpetrated by the troops of Pretoria against the territory of the RPA [People's Republic of Angola]. In open violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Angola, the South African soldiers, with air support, penetrated about 700 kilometers into the interior of the RPA, spreading death and destruction, under the pretext of "pursuing" SWAPO guerrillas, according to a report read during these meetings. "We, the German democratic citizens, demonstrate our forceful repudiation of this cowardly act and we demand the withdrawal of the invaders beyond the boundaries of that African nation so that the Angolan people may continue construction of its new society," the document emphasizes. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12] 5058

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES SENTENCED--The military court of the 7th Political-Military Region, which covers the provinces of Benguela and Kuanza-South, recently, in the city of Benguela, sentenced the criminals Hombo M'Gambu, 47, and Caluvela Javela, 52, to sentences of 19 and 22 years at hard labor, respectively, for crimes of armed rebellion, economic sabotage, and espionage. ANGOP [ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY] learned from an official source. It must be emphasized that the criminals who have thus been sentenced collaborated actively with the armed counterrevolution in the pay of the racist regime of Pretoria; they belonged to a "technical explosives group" whose mission was to lay mines and place explosive devices on lines of communication, in economic establishments, and public places. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12] 5058

PRIORITY AREAS FOR AGRICULTURE--The provincial agriculture delegation of Benguela recently, during the meeting, designated the areas of Northern Hanha, Canjala, Camuvi, Bocojo, Cubal, Gama, Carivo, and Caimbambo as priority areas for agricultural and livestock activities in the state and cooperative sectors. The participants, who had gathered in two study committees, under the guidance of Provincial Agriculture Delegate Amilton Lopes, following an analysis of the current situation in the sector, concluded that

the low output levels are due to the shortage of equipment, the poor quality of seeds procured, and insufficient technical-material support from the central departments of the ministry. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12] 5058

OPM DELEGATION IN LUANDA--Fehtia Bettakhar, secretary-general of the OPM (Pan-African Women's Organization) yesterday, Tuesday, arrived in Luanda for an official 5-day visit to the People's Republic of Angola. Fehtia Bettakhar's trip to Angola is a part of the preparations for the Sixth Congress of the OPM, to be held next March in the Angolan capital. The schedule of the OPM leader among other things includes meetings with Secretary of the Central Committee for Organization Lucio Lara and Minister of Foreign Relations Afonso Vandomen "Mbinda." During her stay in Angola, Fehtia Bettakhar is scheduled to meet with the (southern) regional secretary of the OPM and with members of the secretariat of the OMA (Organization of Angolan Women). [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 25 Sep 85 p 12] 5058

CSO: 3442/17

BOTSWANA

MASIRE COMMENTS ON COOPERATION WITH FRG

MB181256 Gaborone Domestic Service in English 1110 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] The president, Dr Quett Masire, has invited German companies to consider investing in Botswana for a fair return. A statement issued by the Office of the President following what has been officially described as a successful working official visit to the FRG said Dr Masire also briefed representatives of trade and industry on incentives that are available to foreign private investors in Botswana.

The president returned to Gaborone yesterday from West Germany. In Hamburg before his departure, Dr Masire noted the budding relationship of cooperation between the city state of Hamburg and Botswana. He expressed the hope that his visit to Hamburg would give another impetus to this relationship.

According to the statement, the government delegation noted with satisfaction the continued support which the (Friedrich-Ewart) Foundation gave toward development in Botswana. The delegation expressed particular appreciation for the foundation's support to the Southern Rural Development Association through which application for appropriate technology in the rural areas was a priority. It was agreed that more support to this end and other projects will be given by the foundation. Dr Masire and his delegation said that they were fully satisfied with the reception and hospitality that had been extended to them by the government and the people of the FRG. They also expressed full satisfaction with the visit itself. The two governments agreed on all aspects of their discussions the president held while in West Germany. The discussions centered mainly on bilateral relationship and cooperation and development.

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CSO: 3400/539

BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

GDR AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS--The president, Dr Quett Masire, says Botswana and the GDR enjoy good relations of friendship and cooperation. Dr Masire said this when accepting letters of credence from the GDR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Mr Peter (Hoschecker), this afternoon. He said the Governments of Botswana and the GDR believe in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful coexistence with their neighbors. He said the two countries also share the same concern about the increasing probability of a nuclear holocaust, owing to the mounting nuclear armaments in Europe and elsewhere. On Southern Africa, President Masire said Botswana appreciates the moral and material support the GDR gives to liberation movements fighting against racial discrimination and colonialism. For his part, the ambassador, Mr Peter (Hoschecker), said the relationship between his country and the Republic of Botswana had a solid basis.

[Excerpts] [Gaborone Domestic Service in English 1611 GMT 26 Nov 85 MB]
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CSO: 3400/539

BURKINA

ROLE OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION SPEECH SINCE 1983 NOTED

Progress, Prospects

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 2 Oct 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Salia Zerbo]

[Text] When the Political Orientation Speech (DOP) was delivered to our people by comrade Capt Thomas Sankara, chairman of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) and president of the republic, the hearts of militants in the People's Democratic Revolution (DPR) were promptly galvanized further. In the countryside and in the cities, great hopes began to break over the horizon. Unlike the policy speeches of the reactionary regimes, the DOP called on the people themselves to assume their responsibilities and become involved in the big battles to free themselves of imperialism's tentacles. By stressing the August revolution's democratic and people's character and its scope, the DOP provided all the land's children with a clear perception and precise definition of the content of the revolution as early as 2 October 1983 so that they could guard against "the dangers of deviation and the excesses that might be detrimental to the victorious march of the revolution." And it was by following the guiding principles of the DOP that our people strove to organize after that historic evening of 2 October 1983 so as to carry on the struggle on several fronts. Today, still faithful to the revolutionary principles set forth in the DOP, RDP militants belonging to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's) are pursuing untiringly the battles to liberate peoples victimized by oppression and exploitation throughout the world.

Today, 2 October 1985, marks the end of 2 full years in which the DOP has been implemented in Burkina. Making a detailed report is not one of our intentions here, but it seems indispensable to take a brief critical look at those years. After 2 years of the RDP, it is comforting to note that the DOP has penetrated every corner of Burkina. Proof of this is that there are CDR's in all those corners of the republic. Because let us not forget; the precondition for implementing the DOP is closely linked to the actual existence of the CDR's. But while their existence is the primary condition for implementing the DOP, it goes without saying that the DOP remains the principal beacon for guiding the RDP's militants. That is why the DOP still has value as a first-class practical guide in both the departmental and the geographic CDR's.

On the basis of the DOP, the CNR and the militant people of the Republic of Burkina have engaged in great battles and won significant victories in the past 2 years. Big transformations have taken place in the socioeconomic field, for example: the opening of numerous construction sites (the Sourou and Kompienga Dams, railroad construction, the 4 August houses, the Year II and Year III housing developments, and the development of shopping centers in Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, and elsewhere). Many schools, lycees, and secondary schools have been built. Salutary rent measures have seen the light of day during the past 2 years and halted the speculative surge of the "sleep merchants." Vigorous measures concerning property ownership have also been adopted. Agrarian reform has gotten underway.

As regards the improvement of moral standards in social life, the former judicial apparatus has undergone major upheavals through the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Tribunals and other courts that are highly revolutionary in nature. To permit the effective exercise of power by the people, the territory has been divided into 30 provinces. The economy proper has experienced and is experiencing thoroughgoing changes (diversification of trading partners, the restoration of dynamism to Burkina's existing factories, the appearance of new industrial units, the reorientation of agriculture, and so on).

In accordance with the guiding principles of the DOP, the national army has also undergone major changes over the past 2 years (a greater emphasis on political training for the military, the return to the land by the latter, their closer relations with civilians, and so on). Parallel with that, and thanks to intervention by the National Secretariat General (SGN) of the CDR's and the High Command, civilians have been initiated en masse into the use of weapons as part of the program for people's defense.

Publication of the DOP marked the hour of liberation for the Burkinabe woman. The result today is that Burkina's women are everywhere in the vanguard alongside the men in the various struggles undertaken. During these early years of the RDP, they have witnessed the decline of the feudalism that once kept them victims in their homes.

The DOP also heralded the advancement of our cultural heritage. Attesting to this are the national culture weeks and the establishment of a national artistic group.

From the DOP, the Burkinabe people have adopted a new policy on the diplomatic level: great openness to other peoples, the adoption of a dignified attitude in international summit meetings, the denunciation of injustice, apartheid, imperialist aggression, solidarity with all oppressed peoples, and so on.

With the publication of the DOP, the doors were opened for the ideological and political preparedness of our people. Hence the appearance of many training schools in those fields.

To sum up, we can say that the many achievements by the CNR and the people, the multiple transformations in the various sectors of the state apparatus

that have been completed or are underway, and the major socioeconomic, military, and political changes in our society are the direct result of implementation of the DOP of 2 October 1983 in the field.

While the 2 years of life under the DOP are satisfactory, they also show some shortcomings. So far, the RDP's militants in the CDR's have not all demonstrated a clear understanding of the DOP, and there are several reasons for this: illiteracy among some and a temptation to deviation among others through failure to respect the principles of democratic centralism. It was precisely because the DOP had been poorly interpreted or even violated by certain individuals that anarchistic and putschist acts by those individuals came up at certain moments in the history of the RDP. This led to phases of political clarification even during the first year of the August revolution. In addition, the deceitful national reactionary forces, in alliance with imperialism, have not failed to falsify the DOP in certain uninformed circles by presenting dishonest interpretations of its content. That explains why the need for permanent and intensive propaganda has imposed itself on sincere RDP militants during these 2 years of revolution in the countryside and the cities to thwart the subversive activities of the reactionary bourgeoisie, anarcho-syndicalists of all stripes, and so on.

In the light of the DOP, the people have blazed trails leading to great victories during these 2 years. It is clear, however, that many objectives laid down in the DOP remain for them to carry out. They must therefore redouble their courage, self-sacrifice, and vigilance and make many more sacrifices to achieve those objectives. At the same time, the training of young pioneers of the revolution must be intensified because complete achievement in the future of all the objectives laid down in the DOP will depend on the revolutionary education received by today's young people.

Statements by Revolutionary Cadres

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 2 Oct 85 p 4

[Statements regarding the revolution by various cadres as recorded by Alassane Traore, Jr.]

[Text] On 2 October 1983, the CNR published the main outlines of our revolution in the form of the DOP. The DOP has therefore constituted the guide for our actions and a guarantee against political and ideological aberrations. It is through the channel provided by the DOP that changes have taken place in the political, ideological, social, economic, and other fields. The major thrust of our revolution as defined in the DOP has been followed by the political leadership bodies and the revolutionary authorities in all the words of command they have issued.

What can be said about the DOP's implementation and the results achieved? Political leaders give their opinions below.

Comrade Gilbert Kambire, chief of political training for the SGN of the CDR's: "I am going to talk about the results of implementation of the DOP at two levels. From the standpoint of the assimilation of our policy, it must be said that generally, study of the DOP has been insufficient among militants. As regards the geographic CDR's, more emphasis must be placed on the tasks of ideological and political training: leading the militants to understand what the RDP expects of them. Otherwise, the work of radically changing our society will not be as effective as desired.

"In the government departments, on the other hand, the comrades have profited from revolutionary theory, since they are able to obtain a copy of the DOP, study it, and understand it. Moreover, School 11 OI has marked a qualitative step forward in this area. It is advisable, nevertheless, to train political instructors in national languages to facilitate assimilation by the masses and the work of political explanation. From the standpoint of actual implementation of the DOP, successes have been achieved and the revolution has been consolidated so as to protect the purity of the policy laid down. People's government is increasing, and the major changes that have occurred in various fields are only enriching the struggle. Incidentally, it is the duty of every militant to make the DOP known among the masses."

Comrade Sgt Alain Ilboudo, high commissioner of Kadiogo: "After 2 years of implementing the DOP, we are entitled to be satisfied. The task of consolidating the state's power is complete: attempts at destabilization have been frustrated, and we have seen an increase in the power of the CDR's. That concerns the political area. Economically, vital projects have been started to bring the economic situation up to par with the political situation: proof of this can be seen in Sourou, the PPD, and the battle to build the railroad.

"Socially, efforts have been made to alleviate the problems of the masses. Administratively, the neocolonial apparatus is being increasingly dismantled, and the administration is in the process of decentralization and devolution. All these actions are in direct implementation of the DOP. Deficiencies, excesses, and errors may have been noted, but they are inherent in any new beginning. Above all, they must not be dramatized to present an erroneous image of the RDP. It is proper to stress implementation of the DOP, which is correct in terms of the current phase of our struggle."

Comrade Norbert Tiendrebeogo, delegate for Sector 1: "Implementation of the DOP has been effective in the actions taken to date. The problems of land and rent have been solved. Politically, the opening of schools for ideological and political training shows that the authorities are clearly aware of the low level of ideological and political awareness among the militants. The latter have made appreciable efforts to maintain the purity of the DOP by struggling against deviationism and anarcho-syndicalism. Replacing the evenings of debate with lectures is a qualitative step forward, and moreover, the lecturers are referring more to the DOP in their talks than they did at the start of the RDP. Shortcomings may have appeared here and there, and flaws remain at several levels. But the problems will gradually be solved, and implementation of the DOP, which is in keeping with the current phase of our people's struggle, will make it possible to overcome the inadequacies."

Comrade Alima Traore, head of women's mobilization and the organization of women: "The policy on women as defined by the DOP is realistic because it takes the Burkinabe woman's basic problem into account: her enslavement by the established social order. By deciding to change the social order, the CNR is helping to resolve the situation of women. The steps taken in keeping with the spirit of the DOP give women more responsibility and put them on the same level as men in the fight for a new Burkina. Women's participation in major decisions, their appointment to positions of political responsibility, and their participation at big construction sites are eloquent examples of this.

"Structures have been set up to raise women's consciousness and mobilize them to participate in the big battles. But one thing is to be noted: women fear responsibility. They must be led to understand the importance of the struggle underway and of the responsibilities to be assumed. Establishment of the Burkina Women's Union (UFB) offers new possibilities for the emancipation of women and gives them even more responsibility. In fact, it is necessary to channel the strength of all women in Burkina so that they will take completion of the big projects and the struggle of the Burkinabe people to heart."

Comrade Lt Laurent Sedogo, head of the Political Orientation and Production Division (DOPP) of the FAN [National Armed Forces] High Command: "The major decisions made by the CNR fall within the scope of the DOP. Revolutionization of the state apparatus has undergone significant changes: in the army, the integration of the army with the people, the productive army, and the gradual elimination of the parasitic army are realities that can be seen. With the setting up of the departmental CDR's, we are seeing the gradual disappearance of laxity and administrative sluggishness--in short, thorough changes are underway, and implementation of the DOP in our fields of activity is bringing transformations favorable to the people.

"In another connection, establishment of the Burkina Women's Union is a big step that associates women more closely with our people's struggle. All those points attest to the just character of the guiding policy drawn from the DOP."

Comrade Clotere Ouedraogo, head of university CDR's and youth movements and associations: "Thanks to the DOP, the students began working with pickaxes as well as with pens, thus responding to the many words of command issued by the CNR. Their participation in the battle of the railroad and their departures for Wayen attest to that. We must also note the ideological and political training courses that the students are going to teach in secondary schools. The word of command for students to be effectively active in the sector and village CDR's and so on illustrates the changes that have occurred within the university. Youth movements and associations have dropped their completely apolitical attitudes to take part in the struggle by the Burkinabe people. And the CDR's in foreign universities are real fighters for the RDP."

Comrade Jean-Paul Kontogome, head of CDR's in schools and vocational training establishments: "We have been active for only 5 months because of delays in setting up CDR offices in the schools. The pupils have nevertheless been active in accordance with the DOP (in railroad construction and at the Tapoa collective field). They have combated opportunists of all kinds. Ideological

and political training courses have been introduced at the ENAM, the INJEPS, and the Treasury School. We will have to put an end to outlandish "revolutionary weeks" and internal regulations that are not adapted to the desired new type of school that is now in the process of being defined."

Magazine's Coverage of Anniversary

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 11 Oct 85 p 3

["Letter From the Editor"]

[Text] The Political Orientation Speech 2 years later.

That sums up the contents of this issue, No 904, of CARREFOUR AFRICAIN. And for good reason! The keynote of this second anniversary is a critical appraisal of the way in which that basic guide for our people's democratic revolution has been implemented.

To mark this anniversary, various events were held in Ouagadougou and all of Burkina's other provinces. CARREFOUR AFRICAIN brings you the special moments of that day--2 October 1985--in feature articles and a photographic panorama.

In this issue, you will also find the important message from the comrade chairman of the CNR and president of the republic. In his message, the comrade president first reports on the lessons learned from 2 years of implementation and then issues three appeals: an appeal to exiles, an appeal to emigrants, and an appeal to those who have been dismissed from their posts. The importance of those appeals demands that as revolutionaries, we ponder them, assimilate them, and incorporate them into our behavior.

Also on this second anniversary, CARREFOUR AFRICAIN takes an exhaustive look at all the victories won during these 2 years in the light of that guide for action, the DOP. In view of the opportunistic deviations that threatened to challenge the glorious march of our revolution, it also addresses the question of the topicality of the DOP as the only just policy in conformity with the current phase of our people's struggle.

The children's revolutionary days were held last Saturday 5 October and Sunday 6 October in Ouagadougou. Those revolutionary days, which fit in logically with World Children's Day, actually constituted the finale to the creativity weeks held throughout the country. CARREFOUR AFRICAIN brings you a report on those days and a list of the winners of the Creativity 85 competition.

Lastly, the day of solidarity with political prisoners in South Africa and Namibia was held in Ouagadougou last 11 October. Pending a full report on that event, CARREFOUR AFRICAIN describes to you the militant life of the most famous of those prisoners, Nelson Mandela.

11798

CSO: 3419/53

BURKINA

STUDENTS IN HAVANA CONDEMNED FOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS

Ouagadougou SIDWAYA in French 20 Sep 85 p 11

[Statement by the COMISEC of the Ministry of Public Health on Students Engaging in Counterrevolutionary Practices in Cuba]

[Text] We have been informed by comrades' letters about the actions of our colleagues who were assigned last year to train in Cuba as anaesthetist assistants and operating assistants.

It is evident from this information that some of these trainees are engaging in counterrevolutionary practices:

--False claims: these people hungry for easy money demand an increase in the 20,000 CFA francs monthly allowance given by the Cuban government, this despite the spirit of sacrifice that motivates every Burkinabe revolutionary, and even more since these trainees in Cuba enjoy a most enviable status: lodging, food, paid training, work equipment provided (hospital coats), plus the allowance of 20,000 CFA francs per month by our Cuban comrades, supplementing their Burkinabe monthly salary.

--Tendentious statements about the Burkinabe revolution, thus tarnishing the friendly relations that bind us to the militant Cuban people and betraying the confidence that the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) places in every Burkinabe who is abroad.

In the light of all this, we members of the democratic and popular revolution in health, organized in our sector Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), cannot tolerate such actions. Having decided to tear out this pernicious growth from our ranks, we recommend the following:

--That the Ministry of Health immediately recall messrs Ouedraogo Abdoulaye and Meda Maurice, thus ending their training in Cuba. In fact, these nurses, who are real double shell tortoises, are well known to all. Members of SYNTSHA [expansion unknown], and sharing the ideas of the Upper Voltan Revolutionary Communist Party (PCRV), they have never concealed their aversion to the People's Democratic Revolution (RDP), but like all those of their ilk, they have learned by heart the DOP [expansion unknown] and the CDR statute in order to get by the barrier of the ideological test, and have repeatedly bowed and kowtowed. Indeed, prior to their departure the minister of health

received them to impress on them their role as ambassadors, profiting from the behavior they should have shown in Havana to promote relations between Cuba and Burkina.

Further, a few months after their arrival in Havana, their actions prompted the sending to Cuba of the secretary general of the Health Ministry. During these two conversations, our students behaved as good as gold.

--That the Ministry of Health, in cooperation with the Burkina Embassy in Havana, undertake to detect the other counterrevolutionaries, and that the same fate be reserved for them. This is an occasion for us to reaffirm our satisfaction at the clear-sightedness of the CNR in regard to our participation in evaluating representatives and in getting our opinion on missions and training outside Burkinabe, for the ideological test alone cannot provide an insurmountable barrier to notorious opportunists and inveterate careerists.

Let all health agents take this as an established fact: subversion and counterrevolution will not be tolerated.

Fatherland or death, we will win.

9920

CSO: 3419/55

BURKINA

MEASURES COMBAT EXPLOITATION BY PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 27 Sep 85 p 6

[Text] At its meeting on 19 September 1984, just a year ago, the cabinet decided to decrease schools costs and supplies, widely establish people's day care centers, and introduce an outfit, a uniform for students, with this latter measure to be effective in the second quarter of the past year.

Though it was possible to implement the former decisions, the wearing of uniforms had to be delayed until this year because of economic realities, which everyone experiences.

These bold decisions reflect a political determination: to increase the people's knowledge, that knowledge which for decades was as a matter of pride synonymous with power.

The neocolonial school had become a breeding ground of injustices and frustrations of all kinds.

While the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie discussed the color of "jeans" and the "Pierre Clarence" shirt to wear, and the "Caron" to spray to "mystify" admirers, the poor child wondered where to find the pennies to wash his one drab outfit, while struggling to keep the candle alight over his schoolbook.

However, this decision would have been rather incomplete, like a sword thrust in the water, if it had not been aimed at the essential point: if not end, at least progressively decrease the unjust profits of the institution founders, gained off the backs of the people, and this without any guarantee of the quality of the education provided.

The cabinet's decision enables the people to have control over a kind of "robbery." In the meanwhile, this decision has been beneficial. The school fee, which was 15,000 or 20,000 francs (CFA, of course) for primary schools was changed to 10,000. The first stage of secondary school, which was 60,000, was decreased to 40,000, and the second stage, formerly 75,000 to 80,000, is now 45,000. This has eased the burden for fathers of families, giving them the possibility of enrolling other children.

Without a doubt, this measure has many benefits, and we know on whom the burden falls!

The interests of the founders of private establishments, the big businessmen, were affected. In fact, however, the only burden is on the excessive profit of the school center owners. The teacher salaries were not changed at all and were to be guaranteed.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Ministry of National Education developed good measures to ensure real means of control.

Thus, on instruction of the Ministry of National Education on 4 January 1985, people's management committees were to be established in each private establishment. And there are many such establishments in Burkina:

--Private primary schools: 102;

--Secondary establishments (general education): 43;

--Technical establishments for 1984-1985: 14.

The role assigned to these people's committees was to keep an eye on the earnings of the establishment, and perform a role of inspection and vigilance.

This decision was received differently by various institution founders, since 4 months after the minister's decision at that time (that is, by April of the same year), certain establishments had not yet complied.

This caused the state to requisition some establishments and take over management of them.

Thus, in addition to the Montaigne lycee that was brought under National Education Ministry control at the end of the 1983-1984 school year, Louis Pasteur came under state management in February to March 1985, and Newton in April to May of the same year.

The primary reason, apparently, is a management matter. The absence, or late formation, of people's management committees in some establishments reportedly enabled numerous founders to operate as virtual gangsters or highway robbers; and such scoundrelly attitudes are to be deplored.

Thus, the founder of Montaigne, like a "Dalton," ended up beyond the border with the cash box.

The founder of the long-established CET, instead of using the money paid by parents of pupils (who had sweat blood and water); instead of using them to quickly solve the problems of the establishment, did something else with them.

He used the money to invest in real estate, in construction. He invested in buying supplies for use in speculation during the period between harvests.

In final analysis, the people's money in the private education sector had been diverted. It had been diverted from its original purpose; it had been diverted to other sectors with no apparent relationship to teaching as such, by clever "fast operators" motivated by the desire for easy money, quickly,

using the pupils and parents as the milk cow, easy prey to the predators.

These "misters," these "sirs," who had confiscated the knowledge (the key to power) argued the high cost of living, the price increases...as the price for knowledge without guarantee of quality. With such practices, the end of the tunnel of the miseries of our people was not an early prospect.

Anyway, the government has halted this Sisyphean vicious cycle by taking adequate, drastic measures. Thus, the school population will increase from 21 percent to 30 percent in 1991 at the end of the 5-year plan.

Merely words. No, not at all. There is evidence. To the previous total of 1,435 primary schools, 424 new schools have been added, built by the RDP members as part of the people's development program; or an increase of 28 percent in only a year (and with more being constructed)!

Lessons of a Year of Management

Asked to evaluate the year of management by the people's management committees, Comrade Sanou Daba Adrien, secretary general of national education, presented a mainly favorable picture. Favorable in that they have made it possible to avoid the mistakes of the past: favorable because it has given more responsibility to the members of the committees in checking on earnings, integrity in recruiting, and strengthening and reinforcing the reflexes of the revolutionary way of life.

Nevertheless, it is necessary that these same members behave more as actors than observers, because in the beginning many of them did not well understand their function, which resulted in some abuses: at Bobo Dioulasso in particular, and specifically at Immaculate Conception.

Following these problems, the members spontaneously established what is being called a coordinating committee of people's development committees to serve as a protector for the people's management committees. The committee has proved to be a useful tool. It has served as a vehicle for investigations, and regularly reports to the ministry, which has found it to be an indispensable channel for communication. This experience will be generalized.

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CSO: 3419/55

BURKINA

NEW WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION FORMED

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 18 Oct 85 pp 27-28

[Directive from Capt Pierre Ouedraogo, national secretary general of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, establishing the Burkina Women's Union, no date]

[Text] The revolution of August 1983, as defined by the Political Orientation Speech (DOP) of 2 October 1983, professes to provide the solution to social contradictions in the current phase of the struggle by the Burkinabe people.

On the basis of the teachings of revolutionary theory, which state that there can be no true revolution with the mass participation of women, the National Revolutionary Council is sparing no effort to create the necessary conditions for true participation by Burkinabe women in the People's Democratic Revolution. That is why women and girls stand alongside men in the front ranks of the struggle to achieve the objectives of the revolution.

It is also in that context that one must understand and appreciate the women's recommendation during National Women's Week, held in Ouagadougou from 1 to 8 March, relative to the establishment of their political organization.

Such an organization forms the framework from which women will draw a feeling of confidence and pride and reinforce their revolutionary conviction. The Burkina Women's Union (UFB) issues from the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's), which are the people's authentic basic organization in the exercise, control, defense, and consolidation of people's government.

As a revolutionary organization, the UFB has the following objectives:

1. To unite women by organizing them and preparing them to participate specifically in the achievement of the revolution's objectives.
2. To encourage them so that they will work to eliminate all obstacles to the real emancipation of women.
3. To turn women into a decisive force in the struggle for the coming of a new society free of all forms of exploitation.

I. Temporary Provisions

The setting up of UFB structures concerns women in the basic geographic CDR's, the departments, and the provinces. Because of this, all cells and coordinating units existing at those various levels are dissolved effective on the date of publication of this directive.

Minutes of dissolution, including among other things a list of property, will be drawn up and filed with the high commissioners. However, officers of the dissolved organizations will continue to handle current business until the new structures have been completely set up. During that period, they will keep the high commissioners or the National Secretariat General of the CDR's informed of any exceptional problems encountered by them before the new elections are held.

II. General Provisions

A. Structure of Organization

The UFB has a four-level structure.

The first level is the committee.

It corresponds to a village, a sector, or a city not classed as a commune or administrative center of a department.

The committee therefore comprises all the women in a village or sector.

The second level is the subsection and corresponds to the department. The subsection therefore includes all the women in a department.

The third level is the section. Its territory covers the province.

The fourth level includes all women in the Republic of Burkina. It is the national structure.

The leadership of each structure is the responsibility of officers elected at a general meeting.

B. Elections

a) Eligibility

To be eligible, a candidate must meet the following requirements in addition to the requirements set forth in the bylaws of the CDR's:

She must be an assiduous militant in CDR activities.

She must be at least 16 years of age.

She must have good morals.

b) Installation of Officers

1. Committee

The committee's officers are headed by a secretary general, who is responsible for women's mobilization in the CDR of the village, sector, or city not classed as a commune.

In addition to the secretary general, the other officers are the following:

A secretary in charge of organization.

A secretary in charge of education.

A secretary in charge of information, propaganda, and culture.

A secretary in charge of economic affairs.

A secretary in charge of finances.

While the secretary general of the committee is responsible ex officio for women's mobilization, the other officers will be elected democratically at a general meeting of all the women in the village, sector, or city not classed as a commune [sentence as published].

It is imperative that elections at this level be concluded by 30 October 1985.

2. Subsection

The committee officers in the administrative center of the department and the secretaries general of the other committees in the same department elect from among their own members the officers of the subsection of women in the department.

The subsection's officers are the following:

A secretary general.

A secretary in charge of organization.

A secretary in charge of education.

A secretary in charge of information, propaganda, and culture.

A secretary in charge of economic affairs.

A secretary in charge of finances.

Comrades elected as officers of the subsection are replaced on their original committees. The results of these elections must be submitted to the respective high commissioners before 20 November 1985.

3. Section

The officers of the subsections of women in departments of the same province elect from among their own members a board of officers consisting of the following:

A secretary general.

A deputy secretary general.

A secretary in charge of education.

A secretary in charge of economic activities.

A secretary in charge of information and propaganda.

A secretary in charge of finance and materials.

A secretary in charge of legal and family affairs.

A secretary in charge of sports and culture.

The section also has a permanent secretariat consisting of the following members:

The secretary general.

The deputy secretary general.

The secretary in charge of information and propaganda.

The secretary in charge of finance.

The minutes of the elections held at this level are to be submitted no later than 15 December 1985.

4. Union

Installation of the union's officers will be regulated by a future directive.

III. Special Provisions

These provisions govern the following specific cases:

A. Kadiogo Province

Since Kadiogo Province consists of one commune and 10 villages, the officers of the 30 sectors and the villages will elect from among their own members the officers of the section, which, like the other provincial sections, will have a permanent secretariat.

B. Market Women

The women in each market will constitute a women's cell under the authority of the officers of the committee in the locality where the market is situated. Officers for these cells will consist of the following:

A cell leader.

A leader responsible for organization.

A leader responsible for finances.

Women comrades,

With the publication of this directive establishing the UFB, which is your organization, one of the recommendations adopted by you during National Women's Week is being specifically implemented.

You therefore bear the heavy responsibility of keeping it alive and making it grow through exemplary participation in all these activities and through aware implementation of these words of command.

Capt Pierre Ouedraogo
National secretary general of the CDR's

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CSO: 3419/72

BURKINA

BRIEFS

CHINESE BOOK EXHIBIT--The Mohamed Maiga Press Building has since Monday morning been exhibiting a display and sale of Chinese books. The exhibition is part of the events commemorating the 36th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The official opening was presided over by Comrade Watamou Lamien, minister of information and culture. Also present were Minister of Higher Education Issa Tiendrebeogo and His Excellency Feng Zhizen, the PRC ambassador. The exhibition, which will end on 29 September, included at the opening Chinese books, and books by Karl Marx, Lenin, F. Engels, Mao Tse Tung, and Deng Xiao-Ping. These books will enable the People's Democratic Revolution members to expand their political and ideological knowledge and to profit from the struggle experience of the Chinese people. [Text] [Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 27 Sep 85 p 6] 9920

CSO: 3419/55

DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

NEW INFORMATION POLICY--The Djibouti cabinet approved on October 29 a draft law providing for the establishment of a general secretariat for information, with the aim of establishing "a centralised, coherent and operational structure for all Djibouti's media". Responsibility for the information sector, which up to now has been in the hands of the head of the president's office, Ismael Omar GUELLEH, will pass to the new general secretary, expected to be Ismael TANI, director of the Nation de Djibouti newspaper. Text Paris
THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 9 Nov 85 p 57 /12851

CSO: 3400/466

ETHIOPIA

DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS SLAM POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS

Paris LIBERATION in French 5 Nov 85 p 23

[Article by Pierre Haski]

[Text] Since the beginning of the year, a half million famine victims from northern Ethiopia have been relocated to the richest provinces in the south. This operation has reportedly cost tens [of thousands] of human lives, according to Doctors Without Borders, which is calling for an international investigation.

An international investigating commission should go to Ethiopia, says Rony Brauman, president of MSF [Doctors Without Borders], now that new accusations are being levelled against the Ethiopian policy of forced population resettlements. In making this appeal, the MSF president is taking a risk: his organization has already been threatened with expulsion from Ethiopia, after a number of conflicts with the authorities in Addis Ababa.

The SUNDAY TIMES of London on Sunday published an important report entitled "Cover-Up," and by doing so, stirred up a fresh controversy in the field of international aid (see yesterday's issue of LIBERATION). According to this account, based primarily on a secret report from the League of Red Cross Societies, and on an estimate made by the Irish organization Concern, this paper claims that between 50,000 and 100,000 people have died in Ethiopia because of the government's policy of population resettlements.

Without insisting on any precise figure, Rony Brauman yesterday told LIBERATION that the government's resettlement policy has caused "tens of thousands" of deaths. According to Brauman, the Ethiopian peasants, most of whom are hauled away by force to be relocated in the south of the country, are taken away "without any concern shown," while they are in a "psychologically weakened state, and that does have an impact." Finally, they are taken to regions "lacking any facilities to deal with them." And what's more, regions which are alien to them in ethnic terms. In short, he adds, "here we have all the ingredients for a terrible cost in human lives."

Since the start of this policy early this year, Soviet Antonov transport aircraft--and now Libyan aircraft as well--have flown back and forth between northern and southern Ethiopia, moving half a million Ethiopians from the northern provinces of Eritrea, Tigre, and Welo to the "promised lands" in the south. This is an ambitious program which should in principle affect three to four times that number of people, or possibly even more. While many western agricultural experts accept the official line that the land in the north can no longer feed the millions of peasants who are famine victims, everyone is opposed to the method being used.

Here is one example. Friday, 25 October at the Korem camp in northern Welo province: the night is not yet over when, according to the president of the MSF, which has a large staff working in Korem, the Ethiopian militia arrives in force. The camp is surrounded and some 6,000 refugees are caught in the trap. About 20,000 others, according to Rony Brauman, fled to the mountains around the camp. That figure includes a quarter of the patients in the MSF's hospital, to whom fear gave a new source of strength. Of the refugees huddled together, 600 are selected and taken away--at gunpoint, he claims--to the transit center at Dessei, in trucks requisitioned from the British Save The Children Fund. Two truck drivers who refused to take part in the operation were arrested. The United Nations, which went to Korem after the MSF's complaints, prefers to accept the official version of "voluntary resettlements."

From the Dessei camp, which Rony Brauman says has "abominable" conditions--he claims that 30 people die there every day--the 600 refugees will be taken south, to these resettlement camps where a better life is supposed to await them. According to the Ethiopian officials, green valleys watered by rivers are just waiting to be farmed there. An Ethiopian propaganda film shows tractors and wheatfields. But in fact, with a few exceptions, these camps--there are supposed to be about 200--have no resources at all. It will take years to get this land to produce anything.

The MSF and Ethiopia were already at loggerheads about another issue: since June, the humanitarian organization, one of the first to go to Ethiopia, has been appealing loudly for a feeding center for children to be opened in Kelala, where an MSF medical team has been set up using funds from Singers Without Borders. Given the absence of any official response, and under pressure from its people at the site, the MSF decided to "go public" and speak out, feeling that if "minimal conditions for real humanitarian actions are no longer being respected," keeping the organization in Ethiopia might have to be reassessed. "We won't keep you here," the Ethiopians answered.

Should they argue in public like this? "We can't cover up everything forever under the pretext that we have to save what can be saved," answers Rony Brauman, who is afraid that Ethiopia may become a "future scandal." "I'm waiting for the next famine to strike in the south," he says.

Should they help and keep quiet? This eternal debate surrounding aid to Ethiopia is particularly sensitive, as everyone agrees that aid must continue for these people who will still need at least 1 million tons of grain in international aid this year. An independent investigating commission would help to relax the atmosphere, but the chances of getting Addis Ababa to accept it are almost zero.

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CSO: 3419/88

ETHIOPIA

ROW OVER RESETTLEMENT TOLL REPORTED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 9 Nov 85 p 7

[Text]

Fierce arguments have followed this week's publication by the London Sunday Times of details of an investigation alleging that between 50,000 and 100,000 Ethiopians have died as a result of the population resettlement programme, and allegations of forced removals by the French humanitarian Médecins sans Frontières organisation and the United States Cultural Survival agency, based in Boston and operating in Sudan.

The Ethiopian authorities have complained that the figures mentioned are greatly exaggerated, but have admitted that the very difficult situation resulting from famine has caused many unavoidable deaths.

I.O.N.- These reports, which inevitably have a political slant to them, come some two weeks after a meeting in Addis Ababa of Ethiopia's National Committee for Central Planning, during which the committee's vice-chairman, Addis TEDLA, gave official figures relating to the resettlement programme. He said that 580,000 people had been moved to the southwest of the country; they had the services of 631 medical and health personnel, 120 of them foreigners, and were given 900,000 tonnes of food aid. While the programme is continuing, the aim is for the first arrivals to be self-sufficient in 1987. It is planned to put 230,000 hectares under cultivation in the resettlement zones, with the help of 1,836 tractors and 200 bulldozers. During the course of the committee meeting, head of state Colonel MENGISTU Haile Mariam expressed his "admiration" at the results achieved.

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CSO: 3400/466

ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

BELGIAN TRUCK ORDER--The Belgian vehicle builder Jonckheere will deliver 50 trucks to Ethiopia within the next few days. This order, worth five million dollars, is a breakthrough for the company in a sector which was hitherto reserved for Fiat and Borsani. An order for 100 buses could follow. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 16 Nov 85 p 4] /8309

EPLF CLAIMS SUCCESS--The Eritrean People's Liberation Front has said in a communique issued in Paris that fierce fighting took place between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces on November 9, 10, and 11. On the northeast Sahel front, the EPLF said, the Ethiopians were not able to break through the Eritrean defences on both banks of the Alghena River. On the Halhal front a strong Eritrean counter-attack forced the Ethiopians to retreat. Finally, on the Naofa front, the Ethiopian attack was preceded by a heavy raid by MiGs and Sukhoi fighter-bombers, and ground-to-ground missiles, the EPLF said. According to the communique, Ethiopian officers opened fire on their own troops from behind to stop them retreating in the face of Eritrean resistance. Hundreds of Ethiopian soldiers were said to have been killed in this manner. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 16 Nov 85 p 4] /8309

RESETTLEMENT AREA VISITED--Continuing its working tour of northern [as heard] regions, a high-level delegation led by Comrade Fikre-Selassie Wogderes today visited the (Pawe) resettlement area. On arrival at (Pawe) the team of sector coordinators and executive ministers on the National Committee for Combating Natural Disaster, which is led by Comrade Fikre-Selassie Wogderes, Politburo member of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, was welcomed by the WPE second round campaigner cadres in the region and representatives of government and mass organizations of the province. In his speech on the occasion, Comrade Fikre-Selassie called on second round WPE campaigner cadres and development workers to work hard for greater achievements. In his speech to the team, the WPE first secretary of the second round of WPE campaigners of the scheme affirmed that they would make the necessary sacrifices for the realization of an undaunted and prosperous people's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. [Excerpts] [Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic 1700 GMT 11 Nov 85 EA] /12712

AGREEMENT WITH DPRK--A six million birr loan agreement envisaging the provision of equipment and gear of various kinds for the proposed boatyard on Haleb Island [south of Asab Port in Eritrea] was signed today between Revolutionary Ethiopia and the DPRK. Under the agreement, complex equipment export-import [last four words in English], a DPRK company, will provide the equipment and goods for the boatyard. The agreement on the interest-free loan, repayable in 7 years, was signed on behalf of Ethiopia by Comrade Commodore Zeleke Bogale, administrator general of the Maritime Transport Authority. Comrade (Om Hung Nam), head of the DPRK delegation, signed on behalf of the company. [Excerpt] [Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic 1700 GMT 8 Nov 85 EA] /12712

CSO: 3400/432

GHANA

COPRA INDUSTRY VIEWED

Export Figures To GDR

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 30 Oct 85 p 12

Article by Fiifi Mensah: "GEC Makes ₦62m From Copra Exports"

Text THE Ghana Export Company realised ₦62 million from its export of 1,434 metric tonnes of copra to the German Democratic Republic (DDR) during the first nine months of this year.

The company has also got ready 600 tons of copra from its seven service centres for export to fetch about ₦25 million.

Disclosing this at a meeting of copra farmers in Sekondi yesterday Dr. E. G. A. Don-Arthur, Western Regional Secretary said the farmers also earned 200,000 US dollars to be used in procuring essential inputs for their farming activities.

The Regional Secretary emphasised that the export drive for copra would have been higher if adequate funds had been released to purchase the copra from the farmers.

He appealed to the farmers to seek to make the local prices of copra tally with those on the world market since the price paid locally for the copra is higher than the world market price.

Dr. Don-Arthur announced the creation of an ad-hoc committee comprising representatives of the farmers, the GEC and the Bank of Ghana to deliberate and evolve a new price for the copra that will make it attract more buyers overseas.

West Shows Renewed Interest

Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English 31 Oct 85 p 1

Text BRITAIN, Italy and Pakistan are interested in Ghana's copra, Dr. E. G. A. Don-Arthur, Western Regional Secretary, disclosed at Sekondi on Tuesday.

Addressing an executive meeting of the Union of Western Region Copra Farmers Services Centre, he said the copra industry had largely been sustained by exporters because the traditional buyers no longer bought them due to the exorbitant prices.

The Secretary commended the people for exporting 1,434 tonnes of copra between January

and September this year, which fetched them a profit of ₦62 million.

Dr. Don-Arthur appealed to farmers to face the realities of the country's economy and the favourable world market and raise their production targets.

He appealed to them to review their prices to enable them to find market for their produce, pointing out that the low price on the world market had led to some importers buying copra from other countries although Ghana had enough copra to meet the importers' demand.

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CSO: 3400/411

GUINEA

RELATIONS WITH CATHOLIC CHURCH IMPROVE

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 23-29 Oct 85 pp 20-21

[Text] Should we regard the recent resumption of pilgrimages to Rome and Jerusalem, in this case of about 500 Catholic Guineans, as the end of a "nightmare," in the words of Monsignor Tshidimbo, which the Catholic Church in Guinea experienced during the 26 year reign of Sekou Toure?

Many observers reply in the affirmative to the above question for two reasons: first of all, for more than 3 years Catholics were not permitted by the government to make their pilgrimages. Secondly, General Conte, the new president of Guinea, has repeatedly stated that he will carry out "a new policy which is respectful of man." It is believed that the present authorities in Guinea need "to show a difference" on this matter, compared to the government of the first republic of Guinea.

The first republic in Guinea encountered serious difficulties in terms of relations between church and state. These conflicts were explained by the fact that, in the eyes of Sekou Toure, the church in Guinea should serve the national revolution. Sekou Toure said in 1979, at the time of the consecration of the present archbishop of Conakry, that "serving God means continuing to fight against injustice and arbitrary government, of which imperialism, in the shape of colonialism and neocolonialism, is the ultimate form." Although the statement by the "Great Syli" (another name for the former president of Guinea) is partly true, this phrase was not softened by any modifications, nuances, or indications of exceptions.

Words like "injustice," "arbitrary government," and "neocolonialism" meant what Sekou Toure wanted them to mean. The expulsion of Archbishop Melleville from Conakry, 2 years after independence, was a perfect illustration of this point. This expulsion occurred after the state suppressed private schools and Catholic radio broadcasts. In 1967, under a government decree, other foreign priests were to be treated in the same way. In 1970 Monsignor Tchidimbo, the successor to Archbishop Melleville, was arrested for "moral" participation in a plot aimed at overthrowing the regime. He was released from prison 9 years later and was replaced by Monsignor Sarah as archbishop of Conakry.

Some time after the announcement of the coup d'etat of 6 April 1984 the Catholic Church in Guinea, speaking through Monsignor Sarah, expressed its

support for the regime of President Conte. The archbishop, reassured by the expressed intention of the new authorities to "guarantee peace, concord, and national reconciliation," stated that the church "wished to express its solidarity with all of the efforts and the struggle to rehabilitate the people of Guinea in their dignity."

After 1 year under the Conte regime the Catholic Church, although a minority of the population, has demonstrated great vitality. (About 1 percent of the people are Catholics, compared to 75 percent who are Muslims.) The institutions established for the training of lay persons (community leaders and catechists) and priests "are functioning," to the great satisfaction of everyone. The most recent statistical data available indicate that in the three ecclesiastical districts of the country (Conakry, Kankan, and Nzerekore) there are 43,040 Catholics, including 19 African priests, one foreign priest, one non-African brother, 26 African religious, and 24 students in the major seminary.

After having firmly maintained its attachment to the Holy See and to the universal church, the Catholic Church in Guinea is opening up another path in its long journey of faith. For more than 20 years it has gone through difficult times which have taught it to work for the deepening of its message of hope. The coup d'etat of 6 April and the developments which followed it make it possible to think that the Guinean state and the local Catholic Church have reached a major turning point. Monsignor Sarah, who has invited all Guineans "to be patient in the tiring wait for the fruit hoped for from the coming of the new regime," knows that the same attitude is also valid for Catholics.

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CSO: 3419/76

GUINEA

SOVIET CULTURAL ACCORD SIGNED

Conakry HOROYA in French LO 10 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] A cultural cooperation agreement for 1986-1987 was signed last week in Moscow by Ibrahim Fofana, Guinea's ambassador to the USSR, and Edouard Sarkissov, vice president of the USFA (Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

The signing took place before a delegation from the Guinean Ministry of State for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation headed by Ousmane Camara, director of non-governmental organizations and international conferences, and representatives of several Soviet administrative agencies and public organizations.

The program includes several bilateral activities, such as Soviet-Guinean discussions and exchanges of artistic ensembles and photo exhibits.

The USFS will contribute to the publication of Guinean literature in the USSR and will provide study grants.

"Africans are aware that the USSR is a faithful friend and a courageous fighter for peace and friendship among nations," Ibrahim Fofana stated after the ceremony. "The signing of this document," he continued, "is a new expression by the USSR of its cooperation with Africa. I hope that the activities brought about by this program will not only permit us to know each other better, but also serve as an example of Soviet-African cooperation." In closing, the Guinean diplomat expressed his pleasure that Soviet-Guinean friendship, which has endured more than 25 years, is always characterized by continued development.

8735/12790
CSO: 3419/39

GUINEA

CLOSE COOPERATION WITH NORTH KOREA NOTED

Conakry HOROYA in French 10 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Cooperation between our country and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea has entered a new phase with the planning meeting which opened in Conakry Saturday, 12 October, at the Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, between our government and an important Korean delegation headed by Ri Djou Seun, vice minister and adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs. The Korean delegation includes, among others, Kim Nyen Hyeun, an agricultural expert; Djeun Houng Sin, an assistant director in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs; O Ho Soun, an education expert and a director in the Ministry of Higher Education, Djeun Yeung Kil, agricultural expert and an assistant director in the Ministry of Agriculture; Kim Yeung Tchan, construction expert and chief engineer, and Ri Kwang Ho, interpreter.

The Guinean delegation, headed by Capt Tiana Diallo, secretary of state for waters and forests, includes cadres from seven ministerial departments: rural development, national education, social affairs and labor, territorial management, industrial development and the Secretariat of State for Energy.

The purpose of the meeting includes, in the field of agriculture, development of 1,000 hectares at Sonfonia and 3,000 hectares at Forecariah, the study in both cases of how to apply successful results from the agronomic research center at Kilissi and the planned establishment of a 2,000-hectare farm;

--In the field of national education: construction of a Higher Institute of Agronomy at Sonfonia to train agronomic cadres from Africa and the West, and of a day-nursery and a training school for mothers at Conakry;

--In the area of territorial management: construction of dwellings at Conakry and the formation of a general urban plan for reconstruction of the capital;

--For industrial development: study of the possibilities of the mixed use of the ceramic factory at Matoto (renovation and expansion).

It must be recognized that Guinean-Korean cooperation already shows a commendable balance: the agronomic center at Kilissi and the Palace of Nations, to mention only two items. The current work meeting will no doubt strengthen this cooperation which, Capt Tiana Diallo has said, has always been good.

During the session the chief of the Korean delegation, Ri Djou Seun, gave two factors which motivate the consolidation of the ties of cooperation between our two countries. First, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and Guinea are developing countries. Second, they belong to the Nonaligned Movement. He then took the occasion to rejoice in the support which the Guinean Government continues to give his country in the struggle for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Finally, he emphasized that Korea is focusing particular attention on the efforts already made by the Military Committee for National Recovery, particularly in the struggle for self-sufficiency in the area of food supply.

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MALAWI

ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ANALYZED

Paris POLITIQUE AFRICAIN in French Sep 85 pp 61-65

[Article by P. L'Hoity]

[Text] A country that is unabashedly capitalist and conservative in a regional environment affects socialist-leaning practices, or, at least, talks socialism. Malawi, back in 1964 when it became independent, opted for the long, hard road of development through agriculture. Despite the bottomless under-development in agriculture and industry it inherited from British colonization, its land-locked position and its lack of any minerals worth mining, this country, right up to 1976-77, routinely reported annual economic growth-rates of 6 to 7 percent. Its farm production today is more than it needs for domestic consumption, while its neighbors' crops have failed. Malawi, which established diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1971 (although this policy of "dialogue" has had its ups and downs), is now a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and of the Preferential Trade Zones of East and Southern Africa. It has good relations with its African neighbors and, by dint of paradox and pragmatic policies, has managed to retain a modicum of economic and political independence in a region where pressures in these areas are fierce.

Over its 20 years of independence, the country has often showed all the earmarks of a "bad example" in its regional environment, and done it both in its domestic policy and its foreign policy. Here, although several historical and structural factors have played a part, very great importance is properly attributed to the role of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the man who, after "crushing" the Central Africa Federation early in the sixties, took over as head of the government, which he remains today.

Internal political developments were shaped by the search for a practical solution to the problem posed by President Banda's authoritarianism: how can you foster lively political interplay, and enjoy all the fruits of such activities, without running the risks and enduring the frustrations stemming from the ubiquitous political presence of Dr Banda? Most of the members of the political class have both grasped and defined the rules of the political game. Thanks to unconditional support for the president's government and for some of those close to him, they have managed to enhance

their own political and economic privileges. The occasional mavericks among them, often men in high position, who wanted or seemed to break the rules were put "out of power," hitting the road to their home villages, to prison, or to exile---those of them, that is, who did not meet with fatal accidents. (Footnote 1)(In June 1983 (secretary general of the Malawi Congress Party) A. Gadama (party chief for the central region), and two other political figures died in an automobile accident: they formed an opposition lobby to the president, or at least to his possible successor, J. Tembo.) For his part, H. Banda has managed, thanks to the historical circumstances surrounding the advent of independence, to unite the nationalist factions and to mobilize the population, although it took the exile of progressive politicians and some whipping into line for a portion of the population (teachers and minor functionaries for example).

The single party, Malawi Congress Party (MCP), provides the overall permanent leadership for all levels of society. The efficacy and organization of the MCP, whose structures reflect the Marxist-Leninist model, enable it to practice mobilization and repression, patronage and coercion. Though it sometimes looks that way and leans that way, the regime is not basically totalitarian. The performance of the MCP (which apparently arouses envy among leaders of neighboring countries) is nevertheless rooted primarily in fear, pervasive fear at all levels: in the villages, in the administrative offices, at the university, and in the government. Among the young, in particular, participation in MCP activities is coerced by the fear of denunciation, of losing a job, or of bureaucratic harassment. Arbitrary arrests, while not pervasive, are by no means rare. The dominant ideology, in short, is broadly conservative and pro-Western. The regime has contrived to add to that somber mix some pretty pastel "African-slanted" watercolors: many aspects of traditional life have been encouraged, not to mention revived. Using a canny blend of conservative rural culture (especially among the Achewa, the country's biggest ethnic group) and Protestant puritanism inherited from the missionaries, the government manages somehow to fend off, one way or another, the "perverse" influences of the Western world.

Since independence, Malawi's foreign policy has evolved in response to quirks in the economy and geopolitical considerations, invariably dealt with pragmatically. Back in 1964, when several "dissident" ministers opposed to the independence government found asylum and a hearing in Tanzania and Zambia, and when relations between those countries and Malawi were tense, Banda decided that his interests lay mainly to the south of the Zambezi River. While relations with Rhodesia have not really expanded, ties with South Africa have been tightened. In 1971, the countries exchanged ambassadors and, due to his apologia for the "dialogue" thesis and to the presence of his military attache at Lolongwe, South Africa provided Malawi with financing loans and technical assistance, not to mention promising political and moral support in the conflict with its African neighbors. In Mr Banda's view, this kind of "deal with the devil," (his own expression) would allow him to reduce his economic dependence on Britain and Britain's political influence. Closer to home, Banda has always argued that ideological differences would fade away at the sight of economic constraints and realities, as well as military and political reality, both of which are a heavy burden for Southern African countries,

particularly those that have no access to the sea: from this point of view, recent developments in relations between South Africa on the one hand, and Mozambique and Angola, on the other, would not seem to find him wrong. Similarly, Malawi has not become the "Bandastan" some opponents claimed to see ahead. South African aid has never looked anything like an economic gift and therefore Malawi has successfully clung to its autonomy in the area of policy-making. Its alliances have been diversified, according to the government's pragmatic priorities and its concern with adapting to changes in the geopolitical context: Malawi belongs to the SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference] and to the preferential trade zones of east Africa and southern Africa. Its sources of aid and financing are not confined to South Africa and Great Britain, but include other European states, as well as the United States, Israel, and Taiwan.

With the gradual weakening of the opposition movements in exile, relations with Tanzania and Zambia have been steadily improving, even though minor territorial disputes have persisted until very recent times. Relations with Mozambique are normal today. FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] has long looked with suspicion at this neighbor that maintained a special relationship with Lisbon since the middle of the Sixties. Similarly, a number of Mozambican officials were claiming that weapons destined for the National Resistance of Mozambique (RNM) were filtering in through Malawi. Nevertheless, since the Nkomati agreement was signed with Pretoria, President Machel has come to Malawi to give his blessing to good relations between these "brother countries", and even suggested doing away with the requirement for passports for each other's nationals to cross the border from one country into the other. Lastly, Malawi has made major gifts of maize to help Mozambique.

At the economic level, the country is wide open to foreign investors, but here again there are some practical strings attached. Again, though, this position is not without practical limitations. "Foreign businessmen are not missionaries," said Banda, adding that "We are not a banana republic." The investment laws are generous, but not outrageously so; the state encourages joint ventures involving the public and private sectors and, either in this mode or through direct interventions, today it plays a leading role in most sectors of economic activity. A whole segment of the middle and upper political class has thus been enabled to get a start on capital formation, or simply at getting rich, on this economic role the state is playing.

The emergence of a Malawite middle class is, in and of itself, a prime example of the paradoxes that often stem from the readjustment the government loves to toy with. The process of that emergence was based largely on the proliferation of tobacco plantations which, from the late sixties until 1977, provided the country and the burgeoning Malawite capitalists with a respectable volume of resources from which to draw. Manpower requirements have kept pace with the growth of plantations.

Various measures, most particularly the manipulations to hold down prices paid small growers by the Malawi Marketing Fund, opened the way to a shift from the farm labor force to steady salaried work on the plantations. Driven by an access of optimism as to the potential of expansion, the authorities then decided to put a stop to the migration by Malawite workers to South Africa, even so far as to offer free transportation home for workers already settled there. A "paradox" stemming from a very pragmatic analysis, one which those who were turning Malawi into a manpower pool for South Africa had considerable trouble explaining. As it turned out, this phenomenon lasted only from 1975 to 1977 (that was when the outlook for profitable expansion of tobacco farms collapsed), but it was an indication of the power of the government's economic strategies (at whose core lay the creation of a national middle class) and of their effects; in its own peculiar way, Malawi was aiming at one of the prime goals of the members of the current SADCC; reducing economic dependence on the South African neighbor.

The international economic recession and the effects of overly short-term policies at the national level plunged Malawi into a serious crisis, beginning in 1979. With help from the International Monetary Fund, which considers Malawi a "model pupil," the government buckled down to the problem of economic recovery, which once again reflected the pragmatism the leaders, particularly President Banda, known so well how to bring to bear. Prices paid, growers of cash crops were increased, surpluses in plantation crops were limited by sundry measures (cutting back on access to capital and land, an end to monopolies on growing certain grades of tobacco), while steps were taken to discipline public-sector operations. The pressures placed on the economy by the drive to form a national middle class, and their social costs, threatened the political balances that insured the government's stability. By putting the brakes, even temporarily, on this process, the government demonstrated its realism and showed its independence vis-a-vis that still-fragile nascent class: this is the paradox of an emerging class heavily dependent on the good offices of the leadership of a state in which it had nevertheless invested in different ways.

Today, while the economic situation is slowly improving, a great many uncertainties persist as to the outcome of the conflicts of interest triggered by the economic crisis. The people poised to take over from President Banda, still active but nevertheless very old, are themselves the storm-center of mounting tensions visible within the political class. Drawing on the experience of these 20 years of independence, will the Malawites and their leaders be able to control the political and economic readjustments that will inevitably surround President Banda successors?

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MOZAMBIQUE

STATE, POPULAR POWER SINCE WINNING INDEPENDENCE STUDIED

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[Article by M. Cahen]

[Text] "When a policeman makes an arbitrary arrest, that is not the government. When citizens are jailed and kept 3, 4 or 5 months in detention before being released without trial, that is not the government. When a citizen is attacked or beaten, it is not in the name of the law and the constitution. It is not in the name of the government that the policeman strikes, but in his own name. The police are behaving in all of our cities in a manner worse than the colonial police." (Samora Moises Machel)¹

While Mozambique has attracted attention since 1984 mainly as a result of the spectacular nonaggression and good-neighboring relations pact signed with South Africa in Nkomati, one cannot therefore regard this dramatic episode as a procedure having to do mainly with the realm of international politics. Nkomati is but the form adopted at a given moment by the trend toward increasing Mozambican dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

Nkomati acutely raises all of the problems of building "socialism" in southern Africa. But, on pain of converting this word into a very vague philosophical concept, it is necessary, in order to analyze the transition process, to attempt to measure the degree of mastery of the resources for trade and production through socialized ownership, and to assess the control of the political leadership of the country which falls to the "worker-peasant alliance." It is desirable, in other words, to raise the question of the indissociable relationship between economic democracy and political democracy.² Using this method, one can discuss the subjects of political democracy and the state, although the whole of Mozambican economic and social policy cannot be taken up here. And, through an analysis and partial conclusions, an effort can be made to understand the problems which democratic rights pose, as an important factor in the economic process, among other things.

When Mozambique won its independence on 25 June 1975, its economy was still marked by the intensive growth of the 1960s, which had slowed down at the beginning of the following decade. The Mozambican economy had swung toward industries to replace imports and the provision of railroad and port services to the hinterland. Sixty percent of the foreign exchange resources came from trade with South Africa, which must have alleviated the concern of the leaders in Pretoria when a "black republic" developed on their frontier.

Mozambique held several trumps. The value of its manufacturing production placed it among the eight most industrialized African nations. It had available a rather large work force (about 100,000 workers, in the strict sense of the term, and a much larger proletariat) in industry. For several years, two-thirds of its production had been oriented toward the domestic market. It thus had an infrastructure which was not negligible and relatively well-developed productive forces in the consumer goods sector.³

Despite their military successes in the province of Tete in 1972 and 1973, and then in Manica and Sofala in 1974, the leaders of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) had not expected to win power so soon, and they were still talking in 1972 about a decade of armed struggle.⁴ The FRELIMO could mobilize 12,000 men, which was substantial for guerrilla warfare, but very little for the building of a state and a nation with 10 million inhabitants. In 1974 and 1975 it enjoyed undeniable popular support, but it was diffuse and poorly organized. Precipitated by the provocations in Maputo and Beira,⁵ the exodus of the colonials, which was inevitable in the end, given their particular socioprofessional characteristics, was to lead to a veritable economic cataclysm. The closing down and sabotage of enterprises, and above all the departure of middle-level cadres of all kinds, made the objective conditions for the building of the first "worker-peasant" state in southern Africa particularly difficult. Recourse to "popular" rather than "technological" solutions, forcefully reiterated in slogans and speeches, was a necessity. The massive and organized participation of all the exploited strata would be decisive. However, it was the reverse which occurred.

The State-Party

Without embarking on a purely juridical study, we should review certain of the FRELIMO's political and organizational concepts. Its "unity of leadership," the fusion between the party and the state and "democratic centralism" have their effects on all sectors of Mozambican society. The constitution institutionalized the power of the FRELIMO. In accordance with Article 3, "the People's Republic of Mozambique is guided by the political line defined by the FRELIMO, which is the leading force in the state and society. The FRELIMO establishes the basic political guidelines for the state and directs and supervises the activities of state bodies in order to guarantee that the policy of the state is consistent with the interests of the people."⁶ These provisions seem as "orthodox" as they are banal, but beyond their organic nature, they incorporate a basic political concept. The president of the republic is the president of the FRELIMO (Article 53), and the party controls the state on all levels, although neither the functioning of the party nor the

election of its president are codified in the constitution. As a result, the implementation of the constitution depends to a very great extent on rules which are not included therein.

The fusion of the party with the state is not the first result of a human problem, in other words the lack of cadres and the frequent holding of multiple party and governmental posts. The problem of cadres was indeed acute, and when independence was won, 5,000 of the 15,000 members of the FRELIMO were suddenly installed in the state apparatus, the balance being scattered throughout the country after the 17 December 1975 rebellion. This situation created operational problems for the party itself, in the end. As the 4th Congress was to admit, "it was necessary to ensure control of the state.... Government structures...absorbed cadres, to the disadvantage of the party apparatus."⁷ It was also for this reason that Marcelino dos Santos and Jorge Rebelo were released from their state posts in April of 1981, so that they could devote themselves to the party.

A very great effort was made in all of the ministries to provide cadre training. In the provinces, political and administrative leadership was provided by the "absolutely trustworthy cadres forged during the armed struggle."⁸ But the filling of the 100 district leadership posts, kingpins in the state and party apparatus, was a need of extreme urgency. The 1 May Training Center established in Catembe in 1977, was, after many vicissitudes,⁹ converted in August 1980 into a State and Law School, the main task of which was to provide 90 of the 110 administrators with further training.

The dangers inherent in the physical accumulation of multiple governmental and party posts, inevitable in the initial phase, were in themselves entirely susceptible to elimination, given the prospect of a clear delimitation of jurisdictional areas. The problems resulted from the theoretical principle according to which "the FRELIMO Party directs the Mozambican people...defines the policy of the state...commands the armed forces of Mozambique...creates the democratic organizations which, under party guidance, guarantee the participation of and incorporate the broad masses in the process of transforming society."¹⁰ The leadership of the country by the worker-peasant alliance is therefore never defined other than in terms of its representation by the FRELIMO, which itself is the guarantor of mass participation and integration.

This obviously renders the freedom of opinion, assembly and association which the constitution proclaims (Articles 27 and 33) very formal, and in fact establishes the concept of crime of opinion (Article 36): "The state prohibits the abuse of individual rights and freedoms in violation of the interests of the people. The state severely punishes all acts of treason, subversion, sabotage and in general, all acts committed contrary to the goals of the FRELIMO and the revolutionary people's order." Thus the constitution allows no opportunity for peaceful criticism of the party orientation, and contains the seeds of serious indifference and profound social rot.

The single party principle has as its basic corollary the principle of unity of leadership. It has often been said that this was a question of a de facto situation created by the counterproductive example of Angola, which has been

plunged to this very day in a terrible civil war. However the situation offered less risk in Mozambique, since modern nationalism has only produced one single mass movement, the FRELIMO.

It is true that between 25 April and 7 September 1974, a burst of little puppet, police, fascist, federalist, local, regionalist and indeed, progressive and revolutionary, groups emerged, bearing witness to the sudden political awakening of the various sectors of the colonial and African elite.¹¹ Their existence was immediately challenged by the desire of the FRELIMO to be recognized as the legitimate, and above all as the only, representative of the Africans. Lacking any social base, these groups were swept away by independence. In principle, this should not have pointed to a prohibition on all discussion on orientation and the development of any legal movement other than the FRELIMO. But this situation rapidly led to the subordination of and general passivity on the part of all the organized forms of political and trade union life and the "mass organizations."

Although the only one, could the party allow within it the expression and development of future discussions and factions?

...And the Party-State

What could be more ordinary, at first glance, than the fact that democratic centralism is the basic principle of an organization which officially proclaimed itself Marxist-Leninist at its third congress in 1977? The existing versions of democratic centralism are so varied that some commentary is necessary. On the one hand, in the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, it is a principle applicable only to the party, by virtue of its vanguard function and its elitist nature. On the other hand, it is a principle for action and not internal organization. The strictest discipline in public activity is accompanied by the broadest freedom of internal discussion. Thus the principle is applicable neither to movements outside the party nor to the functioning of internal debate. "Internal democratic centralism" does not exist. The bylaws and the program of the FRELIMO are very clear about this, because they specify that democratic centralism is the principle governing organization and work within the party (and)...on all its levels," which means that "the decisions of the higher organs are binding upon the lower organs...(and that) the minority must submit to the majority and defend the decisions adopted by the majority as its own."¹²

This definition, entirely consistent with the drift of the post-Leninist era, indicates without any possible confusion that the principle of submission by the minority to the majority is valid not only for the external actions of the party, but also for its internal functioning. Thus the members of this minority within a given body must defend the majority positions, not only in public but also within the party, to those on any lower level. Clearly, the members of the Central Committee are not privy to the discussions within the Political Bureau, nor do the members of the provincial committees know anything about the discussions of the Central Committee, and the cells rally in support of always unanimous leaders, even when the leadership itself has decided on points concerning which there may be disagreement--which in fact occurred during the preparations for the 4th Congress.

These norms lead to substantial internal contradictions, cutting the higher levels off from the cells and in reality blocking the actions of the party at the base. The leaders have very often become concerned about this. For example, in May of 1980, Jorge Rebelo, the official in charge of ideological work, presided during "the presidential campaign" over a meeting of 300 Maputo cell officials, for the "purpose of finding the reasons for their seeming passivity and defining ways of instilling new vitality in them."¹³ In fact, after they were established, the cells limited their efforts "to mobilization, through the repetition of slogans and exhortations unrelated to the resolution of the concrete problems of the masses." It is a fact that the problem was a difficult one! With the duty of imposing the "supremacy of the party" in all sectors, and in particular "in the main task, which is production," the cells tended to encroach upon the functions of the dynamizing groups, the production councils or the enterprise management. "When they perceived this error, or when they were criticized for it, they sometimes lapsed into inaction"¹⁴ or into general propagandizing. Therefore the Central Committee had to denounce the "false concept of party discipline (which a)...large number of party members and cadres" confused with "military discipline."¹⁵ But if the effects of this ill-slavish conformity, ultraconservatism and abstract propagandizing--were identified then by the leadership, no solution was proposed, except for greater voluntarism on the part of the cadres, who were urged to go back to the cells.

This did not prevent the party from building. After the chaotic upsurge of the dynamizing groups, the FRELIMO launched a national campaign in February of 1978 to organize party cells, and in 1980, it had established itself in all the districts of the country. In 1982, the 100,000 level for members and candidate members (members accepted in the preceding 18 months) had been reached. At the 4th Congress in 1983, there were 427 committees and 4,244 cells represented, with a total of 110,323 members, 53.5 percent of whom were peasants and 18.9 percent workers. Women accounted for 26 percent. In the selection of new members, the party had recourse to an original scheme--having the FRELIMO elected by the people. Although the vanguard role was reasserted, the "Marxist-Leninist training" criterion was emphasized less than "social conduct," "relations with the community" and "moral conduct." Illiterates and polygamists could thus be accepted. Brigades of veterans of the armed struggle, assigned to almost all parts of the country, accepted voluntary membership applications and examined motivations. All of the candidates were then presented in public and subjected to criticism during meetings. These meetings appeared to have been different in character, sometimes marked by "profound and enriching discussions," and in other instances by purely formal debate, or indeed a weighty silence.¹⁶ Only the candidate members who were not rejected by the assembly were kept on, with the leadership subsequently deciding on their final acceptance.

This "election" of the party by the people calls for several comments. It was characteristic of the strict and traditional morality of the FRELIMO leaders, and in fact made it possible to exclude the "climbers." The FRELIMO has the reputation of being one of the least corrupt African parties, which does not change the basic problem at all. The "people" can pass on the individual virtues or failings of this or that member, but still lack any structure for

participation in the local or national discussions on orientation. As to the cells, their "honesty" certainly emerges strengthened, but their political paralysis remains. They are familiar neither with the discussions in other sections of the party nor those on the higher levels, and thus they are ill-equipped to play a planning role. They can only absorb the line, with a minority being automatically isolated. Having "an elected party" is a procedure which thus has more to do with populism than popular power. In fact, conformism and conservatism have become the permanent characteristics, at the base above all, and are one of the causes of the increasing separation between the party and the people. It is no accident that it was decided in March of 1982 to postpone the 4th Congress for 14 months, in order to "allow massive mobilization on a national scale." The party urgently needed to win back a political space and to revitalize its structure. "It was not in fact possible to make suitable preparations for the congress if, as was the case, a large number of the party cells were in a situation of total inactivity. Thus the revitalization of the cells...was oriented toward a review of the role of the party in the leadership of the state and society.... Within this framework, the individuals who lacked, or who had ceased to have, the virtues of support of the party were eliminated... This process...affected 3,357 of the 4,244 cells."¹⁷

The FRELIMO leadership undeniably succeeded, in 1983, in again expanding the political space which had shrunk in 1982, within a context characterized by drought, war and black marketeering, through self-criticism of the errors committed--particularly in the agricultural sector--and criticism of the state for its failure to "take up the party orientation in global fashion."¹⁸ The mobilization of more than 100,000 workers on 1 May 1983 (as compared to between 20 and 25,000 in the preceding years) was indicative. In most triumphal fashion, the 4th Congress could conclude that "the Mozambican workers have demonstrated their full confidence in our party (and their) firm conviction that the FRELIMO party will be able...to continue to guide the vast laboring masses.... The strengthening of the FRELIMO Party and the augmentation of its leading role are indispensable conditions for success in this struggle."¹⁹ A year later, obviously, the situation was entirely different again.

But who, then, really holds power? The leading role of the party above all its own leadership. The Central Committee is defined as the highest organ between any two congresses. It elects a president and the Political Bureau, but since it is required to meet only every 6 months, it cannot provide functional leadership. It is in the Political Bureau that the locus of power is found, and it appoints the provincial officials. This limited and stable group is overall a new version of the old political-military committee of the guerrilla warfare days. It has 11 members. Whatever the changes in governmental and party assignments may have been, Samora Moises Machel, Alberto Joaquim Chipande, a native of the North, and Sebastiao Marcost Mabote, a native of the South, have controlled the army, Jacinto Soares Veloso the air force, and Joaquim Chissano security. Armando Emilio Gebuza, who was not a member of this initial team, has now joined the group. Jose Oscar Monteira, Sergio Vieira, Mariano de Araujo Matsinhe, Marcelino dos Santos and Jorge Rebelo provide the ideology needed for the cohesion of the group, to which nothing to date has ever given the lie. The exclusions have thus far only

affected the second circle of power (ministers who were not members of the Political Bureau, provincial governors) and the lower levels, although some cracks did however develop subsequent to the "production" operation. Within the party, there seem to be neither racial nor tribal problems.

The Elected Bodies

Between 1977 and 1980, Mozambique was provided with a pyramidal structure, the "people's assemblies." All the problems mentioned above have been reflected in these assemblies, beginning with the explicit imposition in the constitution and the electoral law of "democratic centralism." These assemblies are obviously not designed to define policy, but to pass on and implement the FRELIMO line.²⁰ Their legislative function is secondary. They are first of all liaison bodies between the party-state and the masses. The two principles of centralism and executory function specifically deprive a deputy of the right to inform his electors of the discussions in the assembly to which he belongs, and impose upon him the duty of defending the "majority" opinion, that is to say the party line, to them. This type of relationship between the assemblies and the masses has obviously not made life easier for these bodies, viewed by the "voters" as an additional party structure.

The method of electing these assemblies²¹ has been identical to that described earlier for party members. However, this populist element should not conceal the importance of the electoral campaigns. Most important, the "presentation" of the candidates during mass meetings has made it possible to deal quite an effective arresting blow against "infiltration." Between 25 September and 4 December 1977, 2,425 of the 27,040 deputies elected in the 1,026 local, district, municipal and provincial assemblies and the People's Assembly were rejected. In Zambezia, 655 candidate members were excluded because they had served as recruiting agents for "contract workers" (contrados), the colonial euphemism for the workers subjected to forced labor. Among the 2,282 candidate members rejected on the local level, 700 were former "traditional authorities" (regedores and cabos) appointed by the Portuguese, in other words former agents of or collaborators with the secret police. This makes one wonder, since the list of candidates was drafted by the FRELIMO and the dynamizing groups, and it emphasizes the great weaknesses of the party structures in the rural zones. The assemblies on each level elected delegates to "electoral conferences," each of which had in turn to designate the members of the assembly on the next higher level. However, it was the Central Committee of the FRELIMO which undertook the nomination of the 226 members of the People's Assembly, subsequently ratified by the provincial assemblies.

The socioprofessional breakdown of those elected locally is not known. For the other levels, the proportion of "workers" ranges between 26 and 39 percent, and that of the peasants between 11 and 38 percent. The members of the state apparatus and the "mass organizations" account for 32 to 43 percent of the total. The members of the Council of Ministers and the provincial governors are members, by right, of the People's Assembly. The proportion of women declines steadily as the level rises, from 28 percent in the local assemblies to 12 percent on the central level.

Another series of assembly elections was held in 1980, bringing the total number of provincial assemblies (including the city of Maputo) to 11, with an equal number of city assemblies (excluding Maputo), 102 district assemblies and 1,333 local assemblies, making a total of 43,390 deputies, not including those in the People's Assembly. On the organizational level, the achievement is impressive, representing the veritable construction and "diffusion" of the state apparatus through the whole of the country. In this connection, the definition of the base level assemblies as "veritable cells of the state" is significant.²²

Although the closed sessions of the People's Assembly seem to allow real discussions "in which almost all the deputies participate,"²³ its general functioning appears mediocre. It meets only twice a year for a few days to vote on a series of laws. It is in fact a permanent commission, elected on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO, which carries out the preparatory work. Certain people's assemblies meet only often enough to meet the legal requirements. "They function formally, and the practical scope of their leadership action is not felt. Some deputies only function as such during the assembly sessions."²⁴

Marcelino dos Santos emphasized a disconcerting list of reasons for this gloomy picture: enemy actions, the intervals prescribed by law, transfers of deputies, the lack of a permanent body, the lack of control by the higher level, irresponsibility on the part of some deputies, the holding of multiple posts, material hindrances. The assembly in the city of Tete, four district assemblies and 99 local assemblies have functioned not at all. But the only specific step taken with regard to this situation seems to have involved altering the spacing of the meetings. The People's Assembly deputies, elected for 5 years, saw their term of office extended to 8 years, while the term for the members of the local assemblies extended from 2 to 5 years. The next elections will thus be held during the second half of 1985.

The members of the assemblies, over which the pertinent state officials preside (president, governor, administrator), can only be dismissed by the higher level. A deputy can be relieved of his functions by his peers if he has "lost the confidence of the masses or the party,"²⁵ but no dismissal procedure is provided for the base level. In the cities, Maputo in particular, the deputies of the "cement city," better educated and trained, seem to dominate the urban assembly, further strengthening the bureaucratic neglect of which the "thatched hut" neighborhoods are the victims.²⁶

The Mass Organizations

The "mass democratic organizations" play a great role in the political strategy of the FRELIMO. They make "general staffing of the workers" possible and contribute to "the more efficient development of the party into a leading force for all of society, the vanguard detachment of a vast national front." This is the response to the obsessive concern of the FRELIMO with giving "priority to the proper political staffing of all social groups, such that all the citizens of Mozambique can identify with the basic principles of (its) political life."²⁷

Apart from the inevitable "democratic centralism," the functioning of these organizations is based on the appointment of officials by the party. However, a distinction must be made between the dynamizing groups, which are not linked by a national organization, and such other groups as the Organization of Mozambique Women (OMM) and the Mozambique Youth Organization (OJM). The case of the trade unions, the production councils and the Mozambique Workers Organization (OTM) will be dealt with later.

The FRELIMO structures in the zones under Portuguese administration were very weak, particularly in Maputo and Beira. After 25 April 1974, a certain number of self-organization demonstrations developed spontaneously, in an atmosphere of expectation (of the arrival of the Kokuana--Samora Machel), material demands and serious economic crisis because of the departure of the colonials.

The dynamizing groups emerged during the transition government (September 1974 to June 1975) as an arm of struggle against the provocations, sabotage or closing of factories, rumors, demands and strikes. It was also these groups which attempted to resolve the acute problems of life in the neighborhoods and villages, under the slogan "unity, vigilance, labor." Every week, they held "mass assemblies" in the residential and working quarters, which Marcelino dos Santos was to say "created a new feeling of confidence among the oppressed masses, and helped them to become convinced that they were capable of transforming Mozambique.... This is the very essence of popular power."²⁸

In the understandable confusion of the first months, the dynamizing groups served simultaneously as an emerging administration and a party in the process of being established. They had to act as agents and vectors of mass mobilization, but also as enterprise managers. In the rural sector, they broke up the power of the "regedores" and took the initiative in establishing community or collective farms (machambas). These groups soon became the focus of intensive and chaotic internal struggles, because there were those who believed that they would take over enterprise management, creating a covetous attitude in many. Noting this "veritable race toward the dynamizing groups," Samora Machel denounced "those enterprise situations where three of four dynamizing groups have been formed and engage in veritable electoral campaigns." Increasing numbers dropped out when it became clear that the groups were not management structures.²⁹ Purges were effected gradually. Within the framework of the efforts of the government to increase production, beginning in 1976, the dynamizing groups played an important role in the campaign to intensify labor discipline. It is this role as a disciplinary tool which has tended to become their main characteristic in the eyes of many workers.

What were the dynamizing groups exactly? The "presoviets," or "precells" of the FRELIMO? Or were they instead state bodies? After the first months had elapsed, the continuation of this confusion revived the problems mentioned earlier. There were some who described these groups somewhat hastily as "democratically elected" structures.³⁰ Indeed, as the report of one witness indicates, the members of the dynamizing group were chosen by all of the people meeting together in a general assembly. Party members came to hold a meeting and encouraged the people to select the members of the dynamizing group and to organize it. They explained what was necessary, what role the

group would play, and what its basic characteristics should be.... Some members of the dynamizing group were chosen because of their attitude and general conduct. They knew how to speak to the people and resolve their problems. They distinguished themselves by advancing the political line of the FRELIMO."³¹

It was basically a question of political structures, cells of FRELIMO sympathizers, made up of between eight and 10 individuals, rather than self-management bodies. There was initial confusion, and then the theoretical concepts of the FRELIMO, which assigned responsibility for administrative tasks to the groups. But they were not truly elected, since they were chosen in the same way as the party members. In fact, the situation was clarified with the creation of the production councils in the enterprises, the dissolution of the old municipalities in April of 1978, and the establishment of the town executive councils. The number of dynamizing groups was as a result greatly reduced. They have survived in the neighborhoods and local areas as residents' associations. "The dynamizing group, under the leadership of the FRELIMO Party, took on its functions as a popular administrative structure (and thus) also served as the authority in the implementation of certain state tasks...."³²

These "state tasks" meant, for example, participation in direct repression during the major "production operation," with a subtle distinction being established then between the "political leadership" of the neighborhood, which fell to the FRELIMO, and "the organization and mobilization of the people," entrusted to the dynamizing group.³³ The secretary of the group must be a party member, and it is the party which decides what responsibilities the members should assume. Only "the remaining members of the dynamizing group are to be elected from among the best representatives of the people."³⁴ Thus the merger of the party and the state is brought down to the lowest level, certainly making the staffing of the people possible, although this is much less true for the popular authority.³⁵

Apart from the trade unions, the two "mass democratic organizations" which are most important are the Mozambique Youth Organization, which is headed by Zacarias Kupela, and the Organization of Mozambique Women, of which Salome Moiane is secretary. Both are clearly defined as party organizations. However, the OJM cannot be compared to the relationship between a communist youth organization and a communist party, for example, in that the OJM is supposed to incorporate all the young people. The OMM also seeks to enroll all women. Thus there is no political basis for membership, but it is the party which defines the orientation, which makes any democratic internal life very problematical.

In accordance with a decision made by the Central Committee of the FRELIMO in December 1972, the first conference of the Organization of Mozambique Women was inaugurated by Samora Machel on 4 March 1973. However, it was not until after the second conference, in 1976, that its structures were established throughout the country, despite the considerable difficulties, due in particular to the high rate of illiteracy among women (over 90 percent). A feminine rather than feminist organization, the OMM does not challenge the "father and head of the family-wife, mother and housekeeper" dichotomy,³⁶ but

rather works toward the incorporation of women in the paid productive sector. To the extent that they have traditionally been involved in agriculture, "mobilizing them for participation in other activities was a way of liberating their creative initiative so that, through practice, they could prove their competence."³⁷ This is why literacy education (involving 12,000 women between 1977 and 1980) and "social education" (nutrition, health, sewing and "political-ideological" training) have been the basic activities of the OMM. The establishment of women's cooperatives, the integration of women in the state stores and factories...complete this activity. Recently, the OMM held a special conference and seems to be emphasizing more specific demands with a view to promoting mobilization.³⁸ The OMM is established in a large number of localities, but sometimes only formally, through the activities of female officials in the community village, cooperative or dynamizing group.

The Mozambique Youth Organization seems to function with much greater difficulty. Its establishment was ordered by the Central Committee of the FRELIMO before the holding of the 3rd Congress, and a national secretariat was created in April of 1977. The first conference was held the following 29 November, and Samora Machel justified its convocation at that time in terms of the "inertia and lack of creative initiative found in some sectors of the youth," but also and above all the fact that it was "in the urban zones that the models of bourgeois life have most seriously contaminated sectors of our youth," making this a "fertile field for enemy recruiting."³⁹ The tasks assigned to the OJM were the development of voluntary work, organizing leisure activities and cadre training. With such a program, it found itself in a pitiable state 3 years later.

In inaugurating the very "self-critical" Sixth Session of the National Council of the OJM in January of 1981, Jorge Rebelo had harsh things to say about the total disinterest on the part of many young people in "national life," thus recognizing their absolute indifference toward the undertakings of the OJM. Only a minority continued to support it "despite everything," while another minority, on the contrary, showed open hostility. Jorge Rebelo also criticized the formal, arrogant, indeed threatening behavior toward the young people the leadership of the organization,⁴⁰ proposing that it be remedied by means of participation in the implementation of the central state plan for 1981. And in fact, the "program of action" adopted for 1981 was exclusively organizational, containing no reference at all to unemployment, education or family relations. Beginning in June 1982, the OJM launched a campaign of "socialist emulation in support of the 4th Congress of the FRELIMO Party,"⁴¹ but in 1983, the party addressed the same reproaches to the OJM as had been voiced earlier, although in more moderate terms. The influence of the OJM remains particularly weak in the school institutions, where the organization has visibly been unable to fill the void created by the dissolution of the "academic associations," the spearhead for the mobilization of the democratic students between 1970 and 1975. The 4th FRELIMO Congress recommended that a second national congress of the OJM be held, but at the end of 1984, the Central Committee of the party postponed it until January 1986, in order to allow the drafting of an "assessment" and the undertaking of a "process of mobilizing and enrolling" members.

The National Organization of Journalists (ONJ) and the Organization of

Mozambican Teachers (OPM) are the two main vocational organizations which are not trade unions. The ONJ, established in April 1978, administers the School of Journalism, and has committees in all of the media establishments. It is criticized for being "unable to build on the great enthusiasm which characterized its establishment."⁴² The OPM was founded in October of 1981. In the preliminary discussions, it was made very clear that it was not a question of establishing a teachers' union, but of "uniting and staffing teachers" with a view to the "development of revolutionary education."⁴³ Unlike the organizations for the young people and women, the ONJ and the OPM are professional bodies to which all of the journalists should and all of the teachers are assumed to belong. They are in fact political-corporative "orders." Finally, the consumer cooperatives represent a much more important aspect of associational life than the production cooperatives. They developed, mainly in Maputo, beginning in 1976, and the number of members increased from 70,000 in 1977 to about 500,000 in 1982, incorporating more than a half of the population of the city. The cooperatives are the keystone of the rationing system, but they suffer from their inability to wage an effective battle against the black market. In fact, they do not challenge the basically private nature of the distribution circuits (113 of the 120 wholesale establishments, and 1512 out of the 1600 retail outlets). This has led to unease and discontent, openly expressed by the members of the cooperatives, which also come under the authority of the dynamizing groups.

The Trade Union Issue

Here we come to one of the most characteristic aspects of the FRELIMO "praxis." During the period of the provisional Portuguese government in Mozambique (May-September 1974), an unprecedented wave of strikes broke over the country, very particularly in the urban sectors. The old "national trade unions"⁴⁴ were "taken over," and a combative type of trade unionism developed, with the stevedores' union as its special center. In that same era, the workers' commissions multiplied.

The reaction of the FRELIMO was unilateral. The strikes were a weapon in the hands of the capitalists, the demands were divisive demagogic maneuvers, and the workers' commissions were designed to create anarchy and to "destroy authority in the enterprises." Taking this approach, the FRELIMO firmly opposed the demands set forth from the very beginning of the term of the transition government (20 September 1974). While this might have been understandable in view of the economic situation of the country, no structure was set up to provide the workers' with any real opportunity to debate and adopt decisions. The FRELIMO displayed its usual concern with exerting control over everything. The workers commissions were dissolved and the dynamizing groups undertook to establish labor discipline.

Even so, the staffing structures in enterprises remained weak, and the imposition of discipline by the dynamizing groups, perceived as FRELIMO structures, was a problem. The alarm bell was sounded by the strikes in the ports of Maputo, and above all Matola, in 1976. Through the agency of Matsinhe, the FRELIMO imposed harsh repression on the movement, and tens of workers were arrested.

The FRELIMO sought to "staff" the workers class, but it was aware of the danger that it could not control a central trade union if such were established. Three successive steps were taken. On the one hand, the old national trade unions were limited to administrative activity (labor cards), while on the other, a great "generalized political and organizational campaign on the production front" was solemnly inaugurated by Samora Machel on 13 October 1976. Finally, to transform this decision into a reality, new "structures" were announced. "The workers class is the leading class in our country...and (it) therefore has great responsibilities.... Without being organized, the worker cannot...participate effectively in national reconstruction.... It is necessary speedily to create structures to organize the workers, through which they will be able to participate...in the solution of problems, particularly where production and productivity are concerned."

However, the undertaking was launched cautiously. "Production councils" were introduced on an experimental basis in 46 public and private enterprises in Maputo in November of 1976. In August of 1977, there were about 100 of them. By 1979, the number of these councils, established throughout the entire country, came to 400, and they incorporated some 120,000 workers when the old colonial trade unions were finally dissolved. The production councils were interlinked by an organizational commission headed by August Macamo, a member of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO.

The production councils were described as pre-trade union structures. This was correct on the chronological level, because they predated the official establishment of the trade unions in November of 1983. However, the term has little meaning if one considers their functions or their nature.

The production councils were very clearly defined by their leaders as "tools for the social control of production."⁴⁵ Politically they came under the jurisdiction of the organizational department of the party. Their functions, close on the one hand to those of the enterprise, health and safety committees in Europe, also involved penalizing tardiness, absences, thefts, strikes and "bad discussion." The production councils had from three to 20 members, depending on the size of the enterprise, and they were grouped within the production council of a production unit in the larger enterprises. These were not bodies involving membership, but enterprise structures, yet dues were nonetheless collected. The members often received higher wages than the other workers. They were not elected, but the regulation in this connection juggled words. "...It is important that the election of the production council members be carried out in correct fashion, such as to safeguard the interests of the revolution. Therefore the choice of production council members will be made by the militants in the FRELIMO... The individuals thus chosen will be nominated by the political structure for approval by the workers in this section."⁴⁶ That candidates would be rejected is not entirely impossible--it has happened--but the selection process was predetermined.

As the "social" leadership of the enterprise, the production councils were the center of bitter struggles concerning the sharing of authority with the political leadership (the cells) and the administrative leadership, and indeed with the Ministry of Labor. Without establishing real "worker control," they nonetheless formed an obstacle to classic capitalist

management, by seeking to establish production plans and norms. The second "campaign" (1980-1981) clearly limited their influence on enterprise management.

Because of their corporative aspects, the production councils did not take "differences of a vocational nature" into account. It was precisely for this reason that they were soon dominated by the more educated individuals in the factories, the majority of whom worked in the service sector.

That having been said, the production councils seem to have been efficient. Since August of 1977, they have been pleased to note that, despite a situation still "far from normalization," their actions, "characterized by punitive measures against recalcitrant workers in the enterprises, denounced at popular meetings," have made themselves felt. Disciplinary regulations were approved in a large number of enterprises and tardiness, absences, thefts and alcoholism declined substantially. The workers were not excessive in their praise. "Almost all the workers with whom we talked see the production council in the production unit as an organization 'which doesn't care,' and a large number see it as an appendix of capitalist management (underlined in the text).... One rather widespread opinion among the workers was that 'we have never seen these bodies concern themselves with anything. Since their members earn well, and we do not, they don't care....'"⁴⁷

The picture is not always so dark, particularly when the production councils have had no need to oppose demands. But the nature of the relations between the production councils and the workers is unmistakable. The Greek owner of the PROTAL was not, for his part, unhappy. "The production councils have been very useful in mobilizing the labor force in society and in the establishment of a sense of discipline and responsibility, which makes all the time we spend together very profitable."⁴⁸

In 1982, the People's Assembly approved two laws simultaneously. One (Law No 5), called the law in "defense of the economy," did away with the right to strike and the right of autonomous worker association. The other (Law No 4) authorized "private economic entities" to organize in "economic associations." This simultaneous promulgation could not have been an accident. But are the new owners' associations under party jurisdiction as well?

It was within this context that the 4th Congress of the FRELIMO decided to establish "socialist Mozambican trade unions" within the Mozambique Workers Organization. This campaign was launched by the fifth plenum of the production councils (29 June-19 July 1983), which distributed, in advance, brochures explaining the role which the trade unions would play. Brigades traveled throughout the country to "revitalize the production councils," which had 13,500 members in 3,030 enterprises, employing 366,632 workers. Officials were "reelected," and this event gave the workers an opportunity to denounce instances of corruption. Mobilization in support of the establishment of the trade unions involved tens of days of voluntary labor, collection campaigns, the savings of 354,424 liters of fuel, 498 "inventions," as well as 332 collective bargaining agreements affecting 80,003 wage earners. Despite this very "vertical" and organizational aspect of these meetings, it seems that the workers insistently raised the problem of wages in this connection. District

and provincial conferences were held until mid-October, and then a constituent conference was inaugurated by Samora Machel. "By virtue of the class nature of our party and our state, the socialist trade unions are not a tool of confrontation.... (Their) task is not to set forth demands. The living conditions for our workers will improve as production increases.... In the present historic period, the interests of the Mozambican workers class are identical with those of the entire people."⁴⁹

This political delimitation was made clearer by the fact that the process of revitalizing the production councils coincided with the launching of the production operation, that is to say the mass expulsion of the "unproductive elements" in the cities. The role of the Mozambique Workers Organization thus appears to be the same as that of the production councils. It is only the form of staffing the workers which was tightened, since the trade unions are bodies which have members, and no longer merely "semivoters."

However, not all of the production councils have ceased to exist. They were then simply renamed "trade union committees," because the trade unions which were to be established by branch could not be established in each of them, in particular in the port and railroad sector. In fact, another strike erupted in the port of Maputo immediately after the 4th Congress. Since the press kept silent about this event,⁵⁰ the reasons for it are not clear.⁵¹ It is reported that fights broke out with the police and the army and 10 or so arrests were made. A meeting held from 28 June to 3 July 1984 decided that "the conditions necessary for the establishment of a national trade union in this sector were not yet established." The trade union committees were supposed to devote themselves to the task of increasing productivity, "the prerequisite for the establishment of a national ports and railroads trade union."

The fact that it is within the traditional and combative bastion of the Mozambican workers class that the FRELIMO is having the greatest difficulty establishing its "socialist trade unions" cannot fail to be highly indicative.

Populism, "Campaigns" and Democracy

A cooperative worker who has lived in Mozambique for a long time stated recently that "the failure of the party is obvious when one sees that the population is passive and is never mobilized except during a visit by the president or a minister."⁵² The Mozambican church, for its part, noted the "widespread disinterest on the part of the people in the production projects" in a document which, moreover, urged direct negotiation with the Mozambican National Resistance (RNM).⁵³

The leadership of the FRELIMO is perfectly well aware of the economic and social, but also political crisis, in which the country finds itself. To speak only of this last aspect, it will be noted that the party has undertaken a number of efforts to break out of the isolation which had become increasingly profound at the beginning of 1985. There was a "generalized campaign on the production front" in 1976, and then, above all, the "presidential campaign" of 1980. There were increasing numbers of surprise visits to enterprises to denounce bureaucracy, waste, filth, corruption--all

with a maximum of publicity. One can only comment here that the "highest leaders" already knew about this, rather than "discovering" anything! The structures were not altered. Certain of those to blame were punished, but some were also certainly made scapegoats. The upper levels of the hierarchy were brought in to take action against the intermediary levels, so as to prove to the people that the FRELIMO remained their party. The popular initiative, for its part, remained limited. The following year, the campaign had to do with the state apparatus, particularly the "people's courts" and the SNASP [People's National Security Service] (political police). This was "the year of legality." In fact, after receiving thousands of letters from all parts of the country denouncing the flagrant injustices and violations of citizens' rights, the president ordered an investigation of the prisons and detention centers. To be sure, the report was not published, but the press spoke of "extremely serious situations." Samora Machel went in person to effect the well-publicized liberation of certain prisoners, and an official at a reeducation camp was arrested.

During the South African attack on the African National Congress (ANC) premises in Matola, of which the army of Mozambique learned after the commando unit had departed, some officers were accused of treason and taken to court, put on public display and in a few cases, shot. But the ministers and high officials involved were left in peace.

Then, in 1982, the intensive preparations for the 4th Party Congress began. The "theses" were discussed, one by one, in thousands of meetings. Our analysis should not give the impression that meetings are not held in Mozambique! Quite the contrary, there is an abundance of them. They are organized on all levels, but in almost all cases, given the concepts of the party in power, there is no discussion on the guidelines. "Criticism" is addressed to those (individuals, administrations) who have not implemented the line properly, while "self-criticism" pertains to those who misunderstood it. Where the 4th Congress was concerned, it had been announced that there would be a "real" discussion, and that "peasant delegates" could "denounce anything" there. This was indeed true for certain facts and actions, but one can have doubts where the expression of differences and the suggestion of unprogrammed guidelines were concerned. For example, the criticisms voiced on the agricultural policy of the state had been seen much earlier in the reports of this same state. The measures, unanimously demanded, for real support of family and cooperative agriculture (and no longer solely for the state farms, to the extent of 98 percent) were never implemented afterward, as they had not been before.

Finally, during the summer of 1983, the "production operation" was launched within the context of drought and famine and the "rotten" war in which the Mozambique Armed Forces did not in all cases behave differently from the RNM or the many autonomous gangs of armed bandits--massacres committed by the Mozambique Armed Forces were denounced by the FRELIMO itself. Based on an ultratechnocratic concept, thousands of individuals in the "formal sector" in Maputo, Beira, Tete, etc. were sent into the bush, hundreds of kilometers from their homes, resulting in a series of abuses and settlements of account. In 2 months, the FRELIMO had again lost the political space it had won during the year of preparations for the 4th Congress. Now, this catastrophic operation

has never been publicly criticized by the party, either in terms of its concept or its effects. Some abuses were corrected (in particular with regard to the "wives of unidentified husbands"), and Armando Gebuza is now only a "minister without portfolio," but remains a member of the Political Bureau. How, given this political context (to limit ourselves again to this aspect alone), can a popular war be waged against the RNM? It is impossible! Who could fail to see here too one of the reasons for Nkomati?

Excessively concerned about controlling everything, the FRELIMO does not however control the state apparatus on the level of the powerful and technocratic "national offices" (which pursue the known policies in the agricultural sector), nor on the district level. Today, the district administrators are most often profoundly conservative. This is not because of their personal opinions, but due to their functions. If they undertake to lead peasant demands, they come up against the state and the party (of whose circles they are the secretaries) and are forced to yield, thus losing prestige within their communities. If they go ahead with the demands, promising aid from the state, they lose face when they find that the state lacks the resources or the desire to help. Thus they seek to keep the peace. They live in the same houses and have the same cars and perhaps the same "houseboys" as the former colonial administrators, and they often appear in the eyes of the people to be basically no different. Ill-understood, this bureaucratic stratum has doubtless played a capital role in the failure of the community villages.

The only authorized challenger remains Samora Machel himself. He has undeniable populist charisma and does not hesitate to denounce his own ministers in public and to speak about his police force in a way which would have earned anyone before him who used such terms some years of rehabilitation. This practice maintains the popularity of certain leaders, but dooms the party still further to paralysis and administrative limitations.

This is the more serious for the FRELIMO since it was weakened by Nkomati. It is significant that the Central Committee did not meet to approve the agreement. The Political Bureau alone made the decision, and the members of the Central Committee were individually asked for their endorsements.⁵⁴ The membership is discouraged and, very simply, profoundly weary.

This study of the Mozambican state in no way claims to be exhaustive. It is simply designed to show that the question of democratic rights, even in a situation of serious underdevelopment and dependence, is a decisive one in terms of a popular mobilization to exploit all the potential energy, all the available sources for creating value. As a result of the lack of concrete, reliable and permanent mechanisms for challenge, denunciation and correction, apathy soon won out. Popular means of political action have not been established, or in any case have not been developed by the official "popular authority." Indeed, the question of "popular mobilization" leaves the type of economic and social policy involved unresolved. However, the tragic example

of Mozambique clearly shows that the concrete absence of democratic rights is also an aggravating factor in the economic crisis. If only this harsh fact could lead to discussion.

8 February 1985

FOOTNOTES

1. TEMPO, 10 June 1984.
2. One cannot help but be concerned about the superficiality characteristic of the analyses of certain commentators, now that the 25 April 1974 and 25 June 1975 dates have passed. With no bibliographical claims, we might mention the following: A. Isaacman and B. Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982," Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1983; B. Munslow, "Mozambique: The Revolution and Its Origins," London, Longman, 1983; C. Searle, "We Are Building the New School! Diary of a Teacher in Mozambique," London, Zed Press, 1981; P. Sketchley and F. Lappe, "Casting New Molds. First Steps Toward Work Control in a Mozambique Steel Factory," San Francisco, California, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982.
3. J. E. Thorp, "Industrial Planning and Development in Mozambique. Some Preliminary Considerations," Uppsala, SAIS [Scandinavian Institute of African Studies], 1977, p 7.
4. "Mozambican Revolution," March 1974, quoted by K. Middlemas, "Independent Mozambique and Its Regional Policy," in the J. Seiler publication "Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup," Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1983, p 252.
5. On 7 September 1974, a disorganized effort by "pieds noirs" [whites of European origin born in Africa] involved raids by young European extremists on the poor quarters, resulting in the death of hundreds of Africans. The following 21 October, a provocation by Portuguese "commando units" led to a violent popular reaction, and some 400 Europeans were massacred. This led to panic and the speedy departure of colonials, despite the cautious policy of Joaquim Chissano, the prime minister of the transition government.
6. University Association for Cooperation and Studies of African Rights, "Political Constitution of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe," Lisbon, 1983. The first constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique was slightly amended by the Central Committee of the FRELIMO on 28 and 29 August 1977, and by the People's Assembly on 13 August 1972. Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Maputo, 1978.
7. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment to Socialism," Paris, L'Harmattan, 1983, p 98.

8. F. Dagnino, "Training of Cadres," JUSTICA POPULAR, January-June 1984, pp 15-19.
9. Problems arose because of courses which were too theoretical, but also due to the presence of a large proportion of "careerists" among the students. It was necessary to train 700 persons to obtain 110 administrators. Ibid., pp 17-19.
10. Article 5 of the FRELIMO Bylaws in "Bylaws and Program of the FRELIMO Party, 4th Congress Collection," Maputo, INLD, 1983, pp 6-7.
11. Concerning these organizations, see Information Coordination and Centralization Services, "Political Parties," Lourenco-Marques, May 1974, multigraphed; G. Filoche, "Portuguese Springtime," Paris, Acteon, 1984, pp 172-173, and above all B. Oliveira, "Here (Portugal) Mozambique," V. N. de Famalicao, published by the author, 1978.
12. Article 13 of the Bylaws in "FRELIMO, 3rd Congress. Program and Bylaws," Paris, L'Harmattan, 1977, pp 5 and 28.
13. TEMPO, 11 May 1980, pp 4-5.
14. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., pp 100-101.
15. NOTICIAS, 7 June 1981, quoted by Isaacman, op. cit., p 126.
16. Very interesting evidence reported in Isaacman, op. cit., p 123.
17. H. Matusse, "Fourth Congress, Main Event of the Year," TEMPO, 8 January 1984, pp 12-19.
18. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., pp 28-32.
19. Ibid., pp 5-7.
20. Popular Assembly, "Electoral Law. Seven Principles and Nine Tasks of the Local Assemblies," Maputo, INM, 1980.
21. Presented as a great lesson in popular democracy by such authors as A. Isaacman, "The Struggle Continues--Creating a New Society in Mozambique," New York, Fernand Braudel Centre, 1978, and above all A. Bady, "The Community Villages--Bases of the Mozambican Popular Power," LE MOIR EN AFRIQUE, 215-216, December-January 1984, pp 18-31.
22. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., p 119.
23. Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism...," op. cit., p 132.
24. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., p 119.
25. Articles 10, 13 and 14 of the Electoral Law.

26. The "cement city" is compared to the "canico" neighborhoods, popular districts on the outskirts where the traditional material for the construction of houses is reeds. See B. Pinsky, J. Svendsen, E. Gregersen, "Territorial Dilemmas: Urban Planning and Housing in Independent Mozambique," Copenhagen, World University Service, 1983, p 31.
27. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., pp 106-107.
28. Interview on 22 September 1977 reported by Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism...," op. cit., p 119.
29. S. Machel, "Producing Is a Militant Act," Maputo, INM, 1979, pp 25-26.
30. See, among others, D. Wield, "Mozambique--Late Colonialism and Early Problems of Transition," in G. White publication, "Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World," Brighton, Wheatloaf Books, 1983, p 88; and Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism...," op. cit., p 116.
31. Interview by M. A. Machay on the establishment of dynamizing groups in the province of Gaza, reported in Isaacman, ibid., p 117.
32. People's Republic of Mozambique, "Summary of the Resolution on the Organization of the GDS [Dynamizing Groups] and Communal Neighborhoods," Maputo, INM, 1979, p 6 (No 10-A).
33. Ibid., p 9.
34. Ibid., p 14.
35. When this is understood, how can one write that "above all, the dynamizing groups served as a school for democratic processes and class unity"? See Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism...," p 117.
36. OMM, "General Resolution Adopted During the Special Conference of the OMM" in SUPPLEMENT TO THE INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY NO 101, November 1984, p 6.
37. Salome Moiane, in ANTIAPARTHEID RESISTANCE, No 11-12, December 1983, pp 38-39.
38. Against certain initiation rights, against forced or inherited premature marriage, and against the "lobolo" (dowry paid to the father of the bride), but without demanding legal prohibition thereof.
39. S. Machel, "The OJM Should Be a School for the Liberation of Creative Initiative," Maputo, INLD, undated, pp 19-20.
40. OJM, "Let Us Make the OJM the Organization of All the Mozambican Youth," Documents of the Sixth Session of the CCN [National Coordinating Council] of the OJM, Maputo, 1981, pp 5-14.

41. OJM, "The Youth and the 4th Party Congress. Eighth Session of the CCN," Documents, Maputo, INLD, 1982.
42. FRELIMO, "Mozambique--From Underdevelopment...," op. cit., p 165.
43. Ibid., p 164.
44. On the crisis in the national trade unions, see M. Cahen, "Corporatism and Colonialism--An Examination of the Mozambican Case (1933-1979)," CAHIERS D'ETUDES AFRICAINES, 23-4(92), 1983, pp 383-417, and 24-1(93), 1983, pp 5-24.
45. Commission for the Implementation of the Production Councils, "The Organization of Production Councils," Maputo, 1977, p 17.
46. Ibid., p 14.
47. Confidential sources.
48. TEMPO, No 359, 1977, pp 35-36, in Isaacman, "Mozambique: From Colonialism...," p 166.
49. S. Machel, in NOTICIAS, 2 November 1983; extracts in SUPPLEMENT TO THE BULLETIN OF THE AIM [MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY], November 1984, p 9.
50. Four months later, during a seminar in Beira, Marcelino dos Santos made a very indirect reference to these events, stating that "the demands made, in particular by the dock workers in our country, although they were not presented in proper fashion, contributed to the development" of the trade unions. NOTICIAS, 17 September 1983.
51. Probably the new wage norms, increasing the role of "piecework pay" and in practice reducing income, between 15 and 22 May 1983.
52. A.-M. Gentili, "Mozambique--Why Nkomati?," Paris, 5 February 1985. (Report submitted to the meeting of the International Studies and Research Center of the National Political Science Foundation on "Southern Africa After Nkomati")."
53. Episcopal Conference of Mozambique, "Pastoral Exhortation by the Bishops of Mozambique--The Urgency of Peace," Maputo, 7 May 1984, multigraphed.
54. These letters of support were published one by one in the press during the month following the agreement, clearly confirming that an "individual appeal" was made to the members of the Central Committee. Report by P. Lamy to the Franco-Mozambican Friendship Association, Paris, 17 November 1984.

5157

CSO: 3419/69

MOZAMBIQUE

CABO DELGADO VISITOR DESCRIBES HORROR OF MNR CAPTIVITY

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29, 31 Oct, 1, 2 Nov 85

[Article by Albano Naroromele]

[29 Oct 85 p 8]

[Text] The Macua term "anannyatha" has reappeared in Cabo Delgado, with its grim connotation of terror and its macabre flavor, after having gone unused and totally forgotten for many decades. Before the 1950s, "anannyatha" was the designation given to individuals who, according to oral tradition, embellished with mythical touches, had been bought by whites of unknown nationality, although the latter were friends of the Portuguese colonialists.

This group of individuals had the task of capturing and killing the defenseless natives on their farms and on their travels through the dense jungle which formed an excellent shelter for wild animals, such as lions, leopards, snakes and other creatures. Until the 1950s, the conversations by the fireside at the doors of the peasants' huts were filled with stories of the horrible exploits of the "anannyatha."

Thus, children and even less informed grownups knew that the "anannyatha" (the literal meaning of which is killer without conscience) were men without character or dignity. They killed children, old people and women and then drained the blood from deep holes in the heads of their victims, who were hanged by their feet from trees.

The old people, who were the principal tellers of tales of the "anannyatha," explained that the blood of the victims was delivered to the colonial administrator, who in turn sold it to customers of unknown nationality.

If a listener asked the elder for more details about the characteristics of these vampires, the story teller, as if seized with a chill, would cough and spit violently on the ground, and then would say: "They are worse than the wild animals. They sleep there in the jungle, like pigs," the old people would continue.

"They don't bathe and when they aren't able to steal food, they are capable of eating the flesh and drinking the blood of their victims. They let their

hair and their beards grow like grass and they are covered with mites. Many of them go naked and their eyes are bloodshot from carousing. They never cut their fingernails. Some of the older ones have nails so long and tough that they can make holes in the victims' heads to extract the blood. When they capture a woman or even a little girl, they will rape her first, with a savagery which is unknown even to wild animals, and then kill her."

I remember that, in all the stories of the "anannyatha"--the terror which they inspired in us children kept us awake all night or we would dream of the murderers hanging us by our feet from trees--in all these stories the common denominator was the origin of the bloodsuckers. The "anannyatha" were the men of the feared Muikho Mwene, regulo [Portuguese-appointed chief] of the Meloco region, in Montepuez District, who was a highly regarded friend of the Portuguese authorities.

Most of the infamous prestige of the regulo Muikho was the result of the crimes of his band of murderers who lived with him in Meloco and were natives of the region which, at that time, was known as Mwene. When the killing ordered by Regulo Muikho finally came to an end, the term "anannyatha" disappeared from the popular vocabulary.

In July 1984, the term appeared again in the bitter discussions of the residents of Cabo Delgado. It was then, after all their efforts to establish themselves in Namuno District had been frustrated, that the armed bandits penetrated Montepuez and reached Meloco. So the armed bandits came to be known as the "anannyatha" in Cabo Delgado Province.

Strangely enough, it was the former regulo Muikho (the successor to the Muikho of colonial times) who, with other traditional chieftans and religious leaders under their command, gave refuge to the modern "anannyatha" in the province. This is common knowledge everywhere in Cabo Delgado. If you ask about the armed bandits there, the residents answer without hesitation: "They are living in Meloco with Regulo Muikho."

This firm response leaves no room for doubt, since it is consistent with reports by any inhabitant of Cabo Delgado regarding the criminal activities and movements of the bandits. In a later article, I will try to speak of the murder and pillage, the theft, the destruction of whole villages and other barbarities of the "anannyatha" of Meloco.

For now, I would add that there is no appreciable difference between the crimes committed by the "anannyatha" of old and the "anannyatha" of today, except that yesterday's murderers were natives of Meloco and the current ones are from the outside.

In Cabo Delgado, even though the armed bandits have threatened the people with death or even killed them or have tried to win over other former regulos in other parts of the province, they have always met with strong repudiation and hatred on all sides. Under the circumstances, the only recourse left to the "anannyatha" is to raid a little bit everywhere and then return to Meloco, where they have their hideout and are identified with the former collaborators of the colonialists.

In Cabo Delgado, the establishment of a general headquarters for the bandits in Meloco was the exclusive work of the former regulos in the region, notably Muikho. I went recently to that area of Montepuez district and visited the zone where these former regulos are living with the "anannyatha." I spoke to several people who had recently been liberated by the Armed Forces (FPLM).

From the statements of the bandits' victims regarding their forced recruitment for the old settlements after the villages where they were living had been burned, it is not hard to conclude that the recruitment was accomplished through the traditional influence of the old regulos. It is said that Muikho himself personally persuaded the population to live with the "anannyatha." Thus the force of arms, swords and cutlasses with which the bandits threatened the peasants during the recruitment was simply complementary to the persuasion of the former regulos.

In several villages of Meloco, "the old regulos have never lost their influence, because [the government] was not present in any strength, if at all," I was told by the first secretary and administrator of the locale. By way of example, he reported that there had been periods in which the local seat of government "did not receive any supplies for a year."

So the "anannyatha" in Meloco could take refuge in a space that was purely and simply empty--a void. This is no secret in Cabo Delgado, as Gen Alberto Chipande, governor of the province, admitted. There are secondary considerations surrounding this issue, such as the bandits' hope of making some kind of impact with their penetration into Cabo Delgado Province. However, Cabo Delgado will continue to be the secure rearguard in the combat against the armed bandits, not only because there are peasants living in the province who can no longer be deceived, but also because the "anannyatha" are being fiercely hunted down by the FPLM.

Another consideration is the strategic geography of Meloco (in the south of the province, taking in an area much too large for only 14 villages). It is characterized by dense jungle, which permits easy movement and provides shelter for the bandits, not to mention the abundance of food and water in the region.

[31 Oct 85 p 8]

[Text]. Even traveling in a convoy under military escort--synonym for protection against possible "anannyatha" attack--the traveler does not draw an easy breath throughout the journey from Pemba to Montepuez. There are actually people traveling alone in single vehicles, not that anyone could call them foolhardy, but no one out there would deny that they are courageous.

I traveled that road recently, as one of a party accompanying Gen Alberto Chipande, governor of the province, who was on a service mission to the locality of Meloco. I ascertained that the number of attacks carried out by the armed bandits on that road could be counted on the fingers of one hand, based on information from my traveling companions, who only very occasionally interrupted their conversation to point out another spot which had been the scene of some attack by the "anannyatha."

Since no traces remained of those attacks in the few spots where they had occurred, I was often led to think that the marks of the bandits' crimes are left only on the faces of the local residents.

There is good reason for this line of thought; the first crimes of the "anannyatha", even the ambush on the road, are borne by the peasants. They report the killers to the FPLM or else the bandits are chased and hunted down by the militia who are residents of the communal villages.

In addition, the nakedness of the villagers speaks for itself. Who would not be marked from the moment when he becomes aware that the "anannyatha" (whose existence has undermined the nation's economy and thus all the channels for distribution of essential products to the people) are responsible for the depersonalizing nakedness inflicted on his person?

This problem is particularly serious for the women. For them, the solution does not lie in the clothing and the skirts from the "disaster" relief, which in fact is not enough to go around, but in the sarongs to which they are accustomed and which do not exist. Nakedness, it is said, can make you think that the tar on the road would be more dignified than the sacks of tattered burlap and transparent plastic fibres, turned into a one-piece garment.

However, the passage from Pemba to Montepuez, during which I was making these observations, was not, as I said, the whole trip. Our destination was Meloco, where a military operation is underway to drive out the armed bandits and liberate the people who have been forced to live under the "anannyatha." From the seat of Montepuez District to the seat of the locality of Meloco, the landscape changes. To the traveler who had already passed over these roads some years ago, the savannah appears more overgrown now, capable of swallowing up a heavy truck loaded with cotton.

The monotonous impression, along with the poor condition of the road, the absence of any traffic for almost the entire length of the journey and the appearance of groups of FPLM and militia on routine patrol missions, disheartens the traveler who is not forewarned.

It is possible that even informed individuals forget that Meloco is a relatively extensive and sparsely settled area (with only 14 villages), creating the impression that the lack of people moving about is solely because of the presence of the "anannyatha" in the area.

These misgivings are no longer just illusory, once the cutoff is reached which links the seat of Meloco locality to Chiure District. The road is not only precarious, but not a single truck has passed over it for a year, because this really is the zone which is the primary refuge of the armed bandits in Cabo Delgado.

I was traveling a few days after the local populace, in cooperation with the FPLM, had reopened the road. The people who were living in the seat of the locality and in a nearby village had escaped from the forced resettlement in

the old villages when the bandits entered Meloco and began their criminal activities, with the support of regulos like Muikho and other colonialist collaborators.

Where the trail was reopened, slightly more than 10 kilometers from the seat of Meloco, the road was blocked by barriers of tree trunks. Beyond the barriers there were bones scattered around and skeletons of people who had been murdered with their arms tied behind their backs. At little farther on, on a small bridge, lay six bodies, including those of a woman and child, in an advanced stage of decomposition.

All of them had been defenseless civilians. All of them were victims of the "anannyatha." The rotting corpses had deep holes in the head and other parts of their bodies, made by blows which, according to those in the know, could only have been inflicted by axes, swords or spears. This is how the "anannyatha" murder in Cabo Delgado.

The bridge on which the bodies were resting had been cut off by two deep trenches at both ends, completely preventing the passage of trucks. The bandits forced the people in their power to dig trenches as deep as the height of a normal-sized man, along a distance of about 8 kilometers. In all, there were 24 trenches (they were covered over when the trail was reopened) up to the entrance to what had been the communal village of Matiquiti.

In that community, ironworkers, tailors and carpenters had once organized into cooperatives. There had been agricultural cooperatives and small livestock cooperatives. Project F0-7 was conducting activity in the village. The local residents were producing and eating onions, collards, cabbage and lettuce salad seasoned with lemon. When there was a meeting, each peasant brought a chair from home to sit on. Despite the lack of support from the district and local governments, Matiquiti was a community with a promising future.

It was burned to the ground the day after the armed bandits arrived, in the night, and contacted the old regulos. Only the local mosque survived the criminal fires set by the bandits. Some peasants who had recently been liberated by the FPLM told me that the "anannyatha" did not burn the mosque "because they were sympathetic with the religious leader from here."

A few kilometers after Matiquiti is the village of Khatapwa, which was also burned to the ground. Khatapwa was the community where the old regulo Muikho had lived (I mentioned him in Part 1 of this series); during the colonial period, the settlement was also called Muikho.

The fate of the inhabitants of these destroyed villages--several other villages were burned in Meloco--was equally grim, especially for those peasants who did not manage to flee from the armed bandits, either when they were setting fire to their huts, or later, in captivity in the old settlements where they were or are still living under the continuing threat of the "anannyatha."

In each village they passed, before they burned the homes, the armed bandits seized all the property of the residents. The peasants were taken off to captivity naked and without even a straw mat to lie on. "Since we had no

clothing," said an old man who had recently been liberated, "we had to strip the bark from trees to cover our nakedness."

Tree bark, after it is prepared, is traditionally known as "nakotto"; it certainly will not cover one's nakedness. I had seen nakedness, which I called "depersonalizing," on the road from Pemba to Montepuez, when I met with the people who had recently been rescued from the clutches of the "anannyatha." I cannot find the words to describe their state of misery.

Their fragile bodies ridden with fleas and covered with something that looked like scales, their unsmiling faces and the uncertainty in their bulging eyes, the ribs which could be counted under the skin, stained by the bark cloth, the indifference of the dead-eyed children: all this defies description and reflects the true face of the "anannyatha."

The spectre of the skeletons of the destruction was only dispelled at the village of Jonga, in Chiure District, where the people welcomed Alberto Chipande with smiles and spontaneous gaiety--despite their needs, anxieties, doubts and other problems. The contrast with the drama of Meloco was like day and night.

[1 Nov 85 p 8]

[Text] Under the leafy mango trees, shaded from the heat, were several dozen men, women and children who had been liberated from the clutches of the armed bandits ("anannyatha," as they are known in Cabo Delgado Province) by the FAM/FPLM the day before we arrived. They were peasants who were awaiting, with mixed impatience and trepidation, the conversation which they would have with Gen Alberto Chipande.

Above all, they were awaiting the outcome of the discussion, judging by the anxiety of the elderly Muhakhu Nlaltu (whose story I will tell in the next installment), who never tired of confiding to me: "The people have lost the habit of arguing, of asking questions, there in the jungle. They ordered us to do things and we did them. They ordered us to kill and we killed, since there was no escape. So I don't know what to expect from the discussion here."

We were in what, a year ago, was the communal village of Matiquiti, one of the first to be burned by the "anannyatha" in Meloco, in Montepuez District.

"Where is your husband?" This question was asked many times by the governor of Cabo Delgado Province, addressed to many of the recently liberated women at the meeting. The replies ranged from "he stayed in the jungle" to "they killed him" to simply "I don't know." However, the response was always a firm "No!" said almost in panic and with great loathing, when Alberto Chipande would ask: "Do you want to go back and live with the armed bandits?"

That "No" marks the beginning of a new life for these men, women and children after a year of seeing terror and death in captivity. In fact, the goal of the military operation in progress in Meloco (principal hideout of the "anannaytha" in Cabo Delgado) is not just to wipe out the bandits in the zone,

but to liberate the captive population and rebuild the villages which were sacked and destroyed by the bandits.

This will be a harsh blow to what appears to have been the armed bandits' major objective in Cabo Delgado: the breaking up of communal villages through destruction and terror and the forced return of the people to the old settlements. A step backward because, although it must be recognized that the communal villages were stagnating in terms of socioeconomic development, it is equally true that in this province, where all the rural population lives in villages, the peasants have been made aware of [the value of] organized living. Proof of this is that when the people refer to the old settlements, they speak of living "in the jungle," whereas they refer to the villages as living "at home."

According to the governor of the province, the rebuilding of the burned villages will have to be a joint undertaking of the returnees and those villagers who, at the time of the destruction and abduction or, later, in the jungle, succeeded in escaping from the bandits and went to live in other communities beyond the reach of the "anannaytha."

When I asked the general if bringing together these individuals with potentially different mentalities might not result in clashes between the two groups, he replied: "No, because what we propose to do is to enable families to be reunited, under our supervision.

"Many of those who were or are still living in captivity in the jungle," the governor continued, "have husbands, wives, fathers, uncles, brothers and other relatives who had time to escape from the bandits. Some of them also share ownership of cashew trees and other property in the destroyed villages that we want to rebuild. So there is no problem whatever in having them all return home where they can help each other to rebuild the village and begin a new life."

In villages like Matiquiti, Khatapwa and Meculane, among others, this reunion of families is already a fact. The people who are being liberated by the FPLM are arriving at the destroyed villages and are meeting relatives who are returning from other villages where they took refuge after they escaped from the bandits. This latter group is bringing food, rush mats and other needed articles to share with those who have been liberated.

In Matiquiti and Meculane, for example, the inhabitants who were not captives of the "anannaytha" returned home with their drums for dancing. When Alberto Chipande visited these two communities, the singers and dancers brilliantly performed some of the pieces in their repertoire. While the drums filled the air with their steady beat, bringing everyone into the dance, there were frequently moving reunions of couples, brothers and uncles who had been separated for a year by the terrorism of the armed bandits.

It should be noted that the villagers who had been liberated had not sung or danced since their capture by the "anannaytha" last year, according to their own declarations.

Meanwhile, province authorities are aware that the reconstruction of the villages along these lines will have its problems. For example, as I have already mentioned in previous installments, despite all the effort which is being put into Cabo Delgado at local and national levels, the phenomenon of nakedness, particularly for the women, is generalized and depersonalizing. In this matter, the liberated captives had sunk, purely and simply, to the state of animals.

Despite their use of bark cloth, the liberated peasants returned with serious physical ailments--horrible open sores, an alarming state of malnutrition and other diseases. "The liberated peasants alone," said the province governor, "are going to triple our problems."

The provincial authorities' awareness of the problems was made very clear in Alberto Chipande's conversations with the people he met in this working visit. The general stressed the need to improve the access roads in Meloco, to permit passage of the trucks which will supply essential products to the peasants, who are starting from scratch to rebuild their villages.

The solidarity movement which has stirred the entire province is also a sign of this awareness, reflected in the donations of articles of vital necessity by the unaffected population to the victims of the "anannyatha," not to mention the direct involvement of the members of the political structures and the ODMs in the work of rebuilding the burned villages.

Another problem has to do with the concerns which the liberated peasants are expressing. For example, many mothers have left minor children in the jungle. On the other hand, there are liberated children whose parents are still captives of the bandits. There is the problem of bringing up these innocent children.

We should mention the spirit of cooperation which a year of captivity has not managed to destroy in the liberated population. In Alberto Chipande's meeting with the recently liberated individuals, a woman asked for the floor and said: "These two children came back alone; their parents are still in the jungle. I will attend to them."

Another woman followed the first one, saying that if she were accompanied by the FAM/FPLM, she would go back and seek out her sons and her husband in the locale where they are living with the armed bandits. She concluded: "FRELIMO has not reached there yet."

An old man whom the province governor asked to accompany the soldiers into the jungle and point out the hideouts of the "anannyatha" replied promptly: "No problem!" However, noting that he could no longer see very well, he said he would take a young man with him, "in case I lose my way on the road."

The outcome of the conversation with Alberto Chipande, which the peasants had awaited with mixed impatience and uncertainty, was, in the last analysis, a reaffirmation of the trust of the former captives in their liberators, the FPLM, confidence which had survived the terror and death which they had witnessed in captivity.

An elder summed up the matter this way: "If a member of a family were devoured by a lion, the rest of the family members would not take on the nature of the beast." In other words, just because they had been forced to live with the "anannyatha," the former captives, like himself, had not turned into armed bandits.

[2 Nov 85 p 8]

[Text] A week later, I went back to visit Matiquiti. Thus, it had been a week since slightly over a hundred men, women and children had been liberated from the "anannyatha" (the name given to the armed bandits in Cabo Delgado). In those 7 days these peasants, together with others who had not been forced to live with the bandits in the jungle, had begun to rebuild their village, which had been destroyed in the middle of last year by the "anannyatha."

The first fact that caught my attention was that half-burned huts were nowhere to be seen, nothing to indicate the ruins of the houses destroyed in the fires set by the armed bandits. I saw huts under construction, almost all of them temporary. In other words, instead of solid walls (plastered with mud), the peasants were putting up rush sides.

The roofs were receiving more careful treatment, because the builders knew that "the rainy season is coming and people don't want to get wet," one of them told me, adding that, as for the temporary nature of the huts, this is also because of the short time before the rains come.

"Stucco houses take a long time to build," he explained, "and we need that time to get ready so that the rains do not catch us before we have started our planting. There is no time to lose."

This is a legitimate concern of the peasants of Matiquiti, who have the task of starting from scratch to reach the standard of living which the armed bandits destroyed over a year ago. It does not take much thought to perceive that, in Matiquiti, a village in the Meloco area of Montepuez District, the force and the pace of reconstruction has been spurred by the hatred of the armed bandits.

In my second trip to Matiquiti, I was a member of a party accompanying Alberto Chipande, governor of the province. In the center of the village, we were welcomed by a lively and smiling population. All the residents were well dressed, even the peasants who had been liberated the previous afternoon, so that it was almost impossible to distinguish between the former captives and the people who had not been forced to live with the "anannyatha."

The clothes which the former captives were wearing were the result of the solidarity movement which has been observed at the provincial, national and international levels in support of the armed bandits' victims.

The bodies of the recently liberated peasants, suffering from serious ailments, were still weak and the clothes, although they were decent and new, did not hide the ribs which could be counted under the skin. A week of freedom is not enough to erase all the marks of captivity filled with terror and death,

but those 7 days of freedom had restored hope to the eyes, even though they still bulged from their sockets, and the smiles killed by the "anannyatha" had been restored to the faces of the former captives.

So smiles have returned to Matiquiti, this community which is only one example of many in the province which had been victimized by the armed bandits and which are now being rebuilt from scratch by their inhabitants. "The 'anannyatha' can burn the houses, but they will never be able to destroy the villages," a peasant told me in an animated but serious conversation, as indicated by his expansive statement.

I noted another, equally important fact on my second visit to Matiquiti. One of the drums for the dancing at the small party to welcome Gen Alberto Chipande was being played by a former captive. In earlier articles, I had occasion to say that, in the jungle where they had been captive, the peasants neither danced nor sang.

Played by that former captive, the drum seemed to sing with happiness, like a prisoner who, after a long time in a dark prison, manages to break the bars by sheer force of will and escape to enjoy the right to the warmth of the sun of freedom. The children, on the other hand, who had had an indifferent and listless stare when I had first seen them, now competed with the older dancers with an enthusiasm that aroused envy in anyone who does not have the hang of dancing.

On the first visit, almost none of the newly liberated women would let their bodies give themselves completely to the rhythm of the drum and the dances. In addition to the fear, their lack of clothing was such that, at the slightest movement (some of them confessed to me), the tree bark cloth would leave their bodies completely uncovered. This time, the women showed that neither terror nor death had destroyed the beauty of feminine grace, exhibited through the art of dancing.

It was impossible to erase the image of Matiquiti under reconstruction when I left the community to go on to Meculane, in Chiurre District, where the peasants, as in the previous village, were rebuilding on the ruins.

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MOZAMBIQUE

PREPARATIONS FOR 1985-1986 CASHEW CAMPAIGN OUTLINED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Equipment valued at 23,480 contos was made available in Inhambane to kick off the 1985-86 cashew marketing campaign on 15 October. Manuel Nunes Company in Inhambane already has over 11,500 contos in equipment on hand for distribution to participants. The province plans to market 5,000 metric tons of cashews in this harvest.

The province's 1985-86 cashew marketing goal was unveiled at a recent meeting in Maxixe under the direction of Inhambane Governor Jose Pascoal Zandamela, where preparations designed to assure a smooth operation were discussed.

Among the tasks announced, the following stand out: publication of cashew marketing norms, reinstatement of district commissions, and the allocation and setting up of a pool of harvesting equipment. To make the operation more dynamic, district warehouse managers were authorized to pick up harvest equipment directly from the national distribution centers in Maputo. To guard against losses, the Inhambane PETROMOC delegation was instructed to allocate and distribute fuel and lubricants to participants prior to the beginning of the harvest.

The meeting, which was attended by district warehouse managers and other parties involved in the operation, heard a report on the last harvest, when about 2,500 metric tons of cashew nuts were purchased in the province. It was pointed out at the meeting that this figure was reached because of active participation and the positive efforts made by the district and provincial cashew commissions.

Warehouse managers from Homoine, Jangamo, Panda, Morrumbene, Massinga and Inharrime were given certificates of honor and other incentives for having distinguished themselves in harvesting cashew nuts in the last campaign.

In closing the meeting, the governor of Inhambane said that the Provincial Cashew Service should promote all activities related to planting cashew seedlings and the care of producing trees. He stressed that in order to assure greater efficiency on the part of district and provincial cashew commissions, it would be necessary to assign goals to everyone.

Governor Zandamela also said the best cashew growing areas should be identified so that the province's harvesting energies can be better allocated.

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CSO: 3442/25

MOZAMBIQUE

CHIBUTO HARVEST HAMPERED BY FUEL SHORTAGE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Oct 85 p 3

Text Chibuto District authorities, in cooperation with UDAAS in Xai-Xai, Gaza Province, will make every effort to minimize the risks that are threatening a good 1985-86 private-sector harvest because of a fuel shortage.

Private farmers hold a total of about 1500 hectares. For over four months now, they have not been getting any fuel to begin plowing for the 1985-86 harvest. This seriously threatens fulfillment of the goals planned.

According to our Xai-Xai correspondent, the district support and control director is now conferring with UDAAS on the possibility of sharing some of the latter's fuel allocation to meet the minimum needs of Chibuto farmers.

There was word that UDAAS authorities had already agreed to provide the district with 16 liters of gas-oil every month for the private sector. But the fuel has not yet been delivered and the reasons remain unclear.

"The situation is very critical and we are therefore in contact with other offices, since we never got a drop of fuel after the meeting with UDAAS," said the district support and control director.

According to statements made by some farmers contacted by our Xai-Xai correspondent, considerable portions of the crop were left unharvested in the last harvest, some of which spoiled in the fields due to shortages of fuel and means of transportation.

"Because of the fuel shortage, large quantities of my crops were not harvested and since the people can't use it all, the crops of the collective farm spoiled," said Arlindo Moiana, a private farmer with ten hectares of land.

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CSO: 3442/25

MOZAMBIQUE

INHARRIME DISTRICT SEED DIVERSIFICATION PROJECTS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Oct 85 p 8

Article by Abdul Carimo, NOTICIAS correspondent: "Economic Program Making Good Progress"]

Text The Inhacoongo Seed Production Center in the Inharrime District of Inhambane will have 50 hectares to produce peanuts, cotton and maize. This year the center hopes to begin producing caster oil beans and "galamaluco" [translation unknown] for seed, which are important to increase exports. Other economic programs are in a developmental phase in Inharrime, such as the Mangoro and Inhassune-Ramalhusca cattle-raising project and mining of semiprecious stones. An administrative office will soon be opened in Mocumbi to provide services to the public.

Inharrime District Director Jose Machava, speaking generally on the subject of economic development projects, told NOTICIAS that the seed production project is of fundamental importance, since it will enable the district to lessen gradually its dependence on imported seeds.

In the last cotton harvest, it was not possible to achieve the yields planned, which was also due to the shortage of seed. This is why Inharrime District believes that cotton seed production is very important to obtain better yields in the future.

At the same time, the first production of caster oil beans and "galamaluco" for seed is expected this year in Inharrime, both of which are important to Inhambane Province to increase exports.

Various economic projects designed to further regional development programs are being implemented in this part of the country. At the Mangoro cattle-raising project 15 km from the district capital, a breeding program is under way to raise animals that are getting rare, such as cows and goats. The Mangoro project should be getting cows shortly.

Administrator Jose Machava said that great efforts are now being made to repair fences to hold a minimum of 200 breeder cows.

A mining unit in Mangoro, an important economic region in Inharrime District, is being renovated to explore for agates and other semiprecious stones.

Another important program in Inharrime is under way at a slaughter cattle-raising unit at the Inhassune-Ramalhusca Project, where the Inhambane Provincial Cotton Enterprise is also active. This is a program designed to breed cattle.

The private and coop sectors in agriculture are also showing positive results in Inharrime. Several private farmers have begun working areas over 20 hectares in size.

In the coop sector, according to Administrator Jose Machava, vegetable and cereal production is in the development phase and at least two farming coops have been set up, one in Matsatsa and one in Mafassene.

Still, it is the family farming sector that is producing large and important success stories, which are typified by the effort the farmers are making to bring some degree of self-sufficiency to the region and diversify diets at a time when famine programs are being implemented. The coops even have production plans.

The Inharrime administrator said, "In this sector we will be selling maize and beans, among other crops."

He believed that the programs being carried out to promote economic development projects characterize the people's constant effort to carry out directives issued by the Fourth Frelimo Party Congress.

As a matter of fact, Inharrime is one of Inhambane's more promising economic regions. The area has around 67,000 inhabitants and 2,500 square kilometers.

The district administrator also said that an administration office will soon be opened in the Mocumbi region of Inharrime to provide services to the public and serve the people of Mahalamba, Napadiane and Chacane. The office will be about 30 km from the district capital.

8844/12851
CSO: 3442/25

MOZAMBIQUE

RIVER TRANSPORT RENOVATION PROJECT BEGINS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Oct 85 p 8

Text A huge program to renovate the river transport sector in the nation's capital was recently drafted by a commission appointed after a June meeting on reorganizing the city of Maputo. The program includes repairing some boats that have been out of service for some time, among other projects, which will increase passenger and cargo transport capacities. Our reporters learned that the work planned in this sector is integrated into the overall plan for reorganizing the city's transportation system to meet the ever-growing needs of the country's capital city.

One of the services contained in the program recently drafted for this sector is about to get under way: renovation of the ferry boat bridges in Maputo and Catembe.

According to information provided to our newspaper, these services are intended to restore traffic safety to passengers and vehicles using these bridges to and from Catembe.

As we mentioned in earlier editions, bridge renovation work, which has yet to get underway, will include the Maputo Bridge. A new steel framework and wood deck have been made for it.

Pedestrian walkways will also be renovated, as well as the lighting on both bridges, which is also considered an important step in restoring safety for pedestrian and vehicular traffic between Maputo and Catembe.

The work will be done by a construction brigade from the National Maritime and River Transportation Authority.

Renovation of the river transportation system in Maputo is not limited to repairing the Catembe and Maputo bridges. The program planned for this sector includes other areas which inherently play an important part in the overall functioning of the entire system.

In this respect, the program drafted by the Transportation Commission appointed after the meeting on reorganizing the city held in June by President Samora

Machel envisions the repair of a total of four boats in the near future which have been out of service for some time.

In addition, information obtained by our newspaper indicates that these repairs will be done by the carpentry brigade from the Naval Maintenance Company. To this end, a service contract will be signed between the river transportation authority and Naval Maintenance.

The 240-passenger Neptune is to be repaired in the medium term. As mentioned above, this work will be contracted to a brigade from Naval Maintenance. Time frames of three to 18 months have been set for completing these repairs. Our newspaper learned that this will enable the company to apply quality controls as the work is done. It will also enable the city government to provide the required supervision of work in this sector.

Maputo River Company activities are not limited to service between Maputo and Catembe. It has also been assigned to provide service between the capital and Inhaca and Matola-Rio.

Due to present conditions, service to these points is not provided: on one hand, the majority of the boats are not serviceable, and on the other hand, docking facilities are not safe. The program for renovating this sector is thus giving first priority to establishing the material conditions assuring service between the capital, Inhaca, Matola-Rio and Bela-Vista in Matutuine.

The work that must be done to do this involves renovating the existing infrastructure or building new facilities.

The company has a fleet of 13 boats, but only three are in service. The hulls of the others are damaged. These units slated for repairs will be used not only to provide service between Maputo and the points mentioned above, but also to ensure the shipment of goods to meet the people's needs.

8844/12851
CSO: 3443/25

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

MUSLIM COMMITTEE DONATES MEDICINE--A donation of various medicines, including liquid, pills and other medications valued at about \$5,000, was delivered to the Ministry of Health in Maputo by the Muslim Committee for Africa. The shipment is part of a \$40,000 aid program which this organization has earmarked for Mozambique. The donation was delivered by Yahia Ibrahimo Adam, the committee's Mozambican representative, and it was received by Hilario Mapuso, a pharmacist from the Ministry of Health. According to word at the time of this delivery, the remainder of the donation should arrive in Mozambique this month. The photo was taken as Mr Mapuso was thanking Mr Adam, the committee's Mozambican representative, just after the donation was delivered. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Oct 85 p 87] 8844/12851

CSO: 3442/25

NAMIBIA

ARGUMENTS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL SAID TO WASTE TIME

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 1 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Jean Sutherland]

[Text] Time-wasting arguments over the proposed Constitutional Council and Proclamation AG 8 had got the Transitional Government nowhere and after five months AG 8 still remained untouched with all its shortcomings.

The government still had a chance to prove itself, but unless it made progress on instituting the proposed Constitutional Council they would be in the same position in 12 months' time, the Minister of Finance and Governmental Affairs, Mr Dirk Mudge, said in the National Assembly on Wednesday.

"Unless the Council begins its work soon, all the parties in this government will be in serious trouble."

At the moment "there are no winners in this House—the winners are the political parties outside this House", he added.

He was speaking in the debate on a motion for national unity which calls for the abolition of racial and ethnic classification and the scrapping of AG 8.

On Tuesday Mr Mudge adjourned the debate saying it was a joke to expect him to speak about national unity "under present circumstances".

However, a press conference to put his side of the story over the Van der

Byl controversy appears to have been a cathartic experience and it was a politically refreshed Mr Mudge who took the floor.

Treading a cautious path, he nonetheless made a frank appeal to all sides to address themselves to "a practical search for solution".

The tone was definitely moderate in a rather subdued National Assembly this week as parties try to find each other once again.

The deputy Minister of National Health and Swatu member, Dr Siegfried Tjijorokisa, also called for concessions from all sides.

To make the government work there had to be mutual trust as well as honesty and justice.

"The days have passed of saying we will drive the white man into the sea," he said addressing himself to his "black and brown colleagues" and drawing some "hoor, hoors" from the ranks of the National Party.

"And I must say quite categorically to our white

security has restricted present losses to the lowest level since the recession began two years ago.

However, OK's 'regular' thieves now waited at the door of the shop and helped customers wheel trolleys to their cars. On the way, items were stolen which would effectively block reforms in areas like health, agriculture and education.

Mr Mudge said AG 8 was not the only thing which needed to be dealt with "but it is one of the many things and I have made no secret that my party has serious problems with it".

One of the main deficiencies in AG 8 was an imbalance in the division of revenue and assets among the ethnic authorities, he said.

They would have had a better chance of succeeding if there had been a fair division.

"But as it stands now it cannot work because some representative authorities have so much money they don't know what to do

with it, while others don't even have enough to deal with the most basic needs of their people."

"In some places children learn to write with their fingers in the sand, while at some white primary schools parking places are being tarred," he said.

While this kind of injustice existed it was naive of anyone to think that the system could work.

/13104
CSO: 3400/563

NAMIBIA

SECURITY FORCES DISCOVER LARGE ARMS CACHES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 25 Oct 85 p 13

[Text]

WINDHOEK. — Security forces in northern South West Africa have uncovered large quantities of explosives and ammunition intended for use in standoff attacks and bombardments of Oshakati and Ruacana, it was reported in Windhoek yesterday.

The cache included 577 82mm and 60mm mortar bombs, more than 100 RPG7 rockets and B10 bombs, 201 22mm rockets, 19 landmines, 210kg of TNT, and 82kg of plastic explosives.

The SWA Territory Force said in a statement that the discovery had thwarted several attacks by insurgents.

The cache was found after information had been received from someone with access to Swapo military planning, the statement said.

The person and several other Swapo insurgents intended to surrender to the security forces, it added.

The ammunition and explosives were part of a supply stockpiled for Swapo's north-western front, according to the statement. — Sapa.

/12828
CSO: 3400/541

NAMIBIA

BECKER ADDRESSES HNP CONGRESS

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 18 Sep 85 p 3

[Unattributed article: "South Africans Misled About South West Africa:
Multiracial Administration a Farce"]

[Text] South Africans are misled into thinking that there is a government of national unity in power in South West Africa. In reality, however, it is an appointed government in which there is no unity.

So said Advocate Sarel Becker, secretary of the HNP [Herstigte Nasionale Party] in South West Africa, at the congress of the party in Pretoria. Advocate Becker introduced a debate over South West Africa at the congress.

Newspapers imply that South West Africa is now experiencing a wonderful new deal, a government of national unity that satisfies all the aspirations of its population and has created peace and security in the country. No one is throwing rocks, and everyone is building a new future together, it is said.

Those who say so are misleading the public, Advocate Becker declared. This is not an independent government, it is a government appointed by Mr Botha.

One might say that they have been permitted to carry out a bloodless coup d'etat, Advocate Becker said. Neither is it a government of national unity, because the HNP does not participate in it.

Earlier Mr Dirk Mudge and his party were attacked from the right, but today they are attacked from the left in the National Assembly, and Mr Mudge increasingly has to listen to the voices of the far left, Advocate Becker said.

"Who are they? There sits Mr Moses Katjiuongua of SWANU [South West African National Union], an organization that follows the Red Chinese. Then there is naturally also SWAPO-D. The D stands for Democratic, but that party is simply SWAPO, and its leader, Mr Adreas Shipanga, is Moscow-oriented. They are anti-Christian, and some of them worship the spirits of their ancestors. South West Africa has gone much further down the path of the Anti-Christ than the RSA [Republic of South Africa]," Advocate Becker said.

That the Blacks in South West Africa don't throw rocks is not owing to Mr Mudge and his friends.

Since 1966 there has been no peace in South West Africa.

Advocate Becker said further that where there was in fact order and security in South West Africa, it was thanks to Major-General Charles Lloyd, who had killed so many SWAPO men that SWAPO was obliged to use children against the Army.

"General Lloyd is a real Boer general. He said that he had to fight with one arm behind his back because of the budget, but with the other arm he drove SWAPO deep into Angola."

Just when General Lloyd was about to achieve final success and end the war, he was recalled to Pretoria and another general took his place. SWAPO could breathe again, and the position in Angola was gradually evacuated. General Lloyd was a hindrance to the government in its policy of detente with the communists.

Today a strong communist air force is being built up on the border of South West Africa, and the Army fears air attacks on Ondangwa and Oshakati.

The strategic value of South West Africa is very clear from its location, Advocate Becker said. South West Africa and the RSA practically surround Botswana. Botswana could become a first-rate menace because of its proximity to the Rand and Pretoria. Only the position of South West Africa prevents it from showing its true colors.

South West Africa is also a fundamental part of the RSA. Afrikaans is the predominant language, in contrast to Natal. The western side of the subcontinent is more genuinely Afrikaans than its eastern side, and we can therefore not abandon South West Africa, Advocate Becker said.

12906/12795
CSO: 3401/6

NAMIBIA

CABINET SEEKS TO SETTLE DISPUTE OVER JUDGE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 25 Oct 85 p 11

[Text] WINDHOEK. — The SWA transitional Cabinet and legal representatives began deliberations in Windhoek yesterday in an attempt to settle out of court an application to annul the appointment of the Constitutional Council chairman, Mr Justice Piet van der Byl, as judge.

The issue was due to be heard in the Windhoek Supreme Court yesterday, but all the parties agreed to postpone the application indefinitely.

The SWA transitional government was inaugurated on June 17 this year, but severe strain and conflict among members over the appointment to the SWA Supreme Court of Mr Justice van der Byl have plunged the Cabinet into its worst crisis since the formation of the government.

Proceedings of the Constitutional Council — assigned to draft a constitution for an independent SWA — have been stalled for weeks by the dispute.

The Health Minister, Mr Moses Katjiuongua, and the Mining Minister, Mr Andreas Shipanga,

opposed the appointment and gave notice of an urgent court application to set aside Mr Justice van der Byl's appointment as a judge.

They cited as respondents Mr Justice van der Byl, the Administrator-General, Mr Louis Pienaar, and Cabinet colleagues, Mr Dirk Mudge (Finance Minister), Mr Fanuel Kozonguizi (Justice Minister) and Mr Hans Diergaardt (Cabinet chairwoman).

Mr Katjiuongua is leader of a SWA national union group and Mr Shipanga is leader of Swapo-Democrats while Mr Mudge is chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.

The controversy arose because, by law, the proposed Constitutional Council has to be chaired by a judge or retired judge, and Mr Justice van der Byl was appointed to the Bench of the SWA Supreme Court in order to qualify for the position.

He has been a senior South African Department of Justice official throughout his career.

His appointment as judge was criticised in

statements issued by the SWA Bar Council and the South African Society of Lawyers.

Both bodies said the appointment violated accepted norms and traditions for the appointment of judges and they pointed out that Mr Justice van der Byl had had no experience in private practice as a lawyer.

Reports in Windhoek said Mr Mudge, on a visit to Pretoria last week, briefed the State President, Mr P W Botha, on the situation.

The trip was followed this week by a secret visit to Pretoria by Mr Pienaar and Mr Justice van der Byl, according to the reports.

The possibility has been raised that everything possible was being done to keep the dispute out of court, because if the application went ahead, sensitive Cabinet records would form part of the documentary evidence to be submitted in a public hearing. — Sapa.

/12828
CSO: 3400/541

NAMIBIA

JUDGE HIEMSTRA TO BE CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL TALKS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

WINDHOEK. — The Administrator-General of SWA, Mr Louis Pie-naar, has decided to appoint a former Transvaal judge, Mr Justice Victor Hiemstra, as chairman of the proposed Constitutional Council in the territory.

The decision to appoint Mr Justice Hiemstra, which was seen as a mere formality, was taken after a recommendation by the SWA Transitional Cabinet made at a regular weekly meeting in Windhoek yesterday.

Mr Justice Hiemstra became a judge of the Transvaal division of

the Supreme Court in January 1957 and was seconded to Bophuthatswana as Chief Justice in 1977 where he served until his retirement in June last year.

By law the proposed SWA Constitutional Council has to be chaired by a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court.

The 16-member council is expected to begin its work in closed session early next year.

It is assigned with the drawing up of a constitution for SWA within two years after which the Council will disband. — Sapa.

/12828
CSO: 3400/541

NAMIBIA

VOICE OF NAMIBIA REPORTS 'MANY LEADERS EMERGING'

EA230035 Dar es Salaam Voice of Namibia in English 1830 GMT 20 Nov 85

[From the "Around and About Namibia" program; station commentary as read by George (Chagirira)]

[Text] Everyone is aware of the fact that in Namibia SWAPO is fighting seriously against the racist regime of South Africa and presented the plight of the people of that country to the outside world. Today when the road of untold hardships is almost to come to an end, many so-called leaders are emerging. Many of these personalities opted to be (?oblivious) when the political situation of Namibia was obscure. SWAPO has over a period of time exhausted its almost energy and resources and has sacrificed power and benefits to achieve these aims and objectives. And now we are being told to reap together the fruits of our labor with some opportunists and (?selfish) puppets currently masquerading under the umbrella of the so-called multiparty conference. As it has been from the beginning, SWAPO is armed to continue the fighting even on behalf of those who became bogged down in a senseless power struggle and blind anti-SWAPO propaganda.

No matter South Africa consolidates her military position further, as reports indicate of a racist army police being flown to the operational areas in what is termed as a high drive in the realms of imagination. SWAPO is assured of an ultimate seizure of political power. This should be made clear to the racist rulers in Pretoria, that the war being waged by SWAPO in Namibia is doubtless a revolutionary one. And at no given time during our hard struggle for genuine independence did we avert from reaching this noble objective.

It is time to be recalled that, however, when the Afrikaers took up arms to fight against British domination during the Anglo-Boer War, they were fighting obviously to seize power for the benefit of the South African Boers. And in this respect, SWAPO's aims have a lot in common. People like Dirk Mudge, who is deeply involved in a power struggle with his racist fellows, should first clean his own house before he tells SWAPO what to do.

Today, bearing in mind (?this) consciousness of its apartheid policy in South Africa itself, where it is engaged in merciless butchering of blacks, seeks to lull the world into believing that some things in corresponding with the wishes of the people are being done in Namibia. [sentence as heard] However, SWAPO

and the oppressed people of Namibia have the right to carry out the struggle to its ultimate, logical conclusion.

Today, the purpose of the terror campaign against the oppressed people of Namibia is that South African racists want to use the violence which herself has organized as a pretext to keep her Armed Forces in the territory and continue occupying our country by force of arms. The Pretoria regime wants to fan ethnic strife and hostility, which in turn will be used as an excuse for the continued colonization of our country. The racist regime of South Africa seeks to promote its puppets it has assembled in Windhoek as an alternative to SWAPO, which is fighting for genuine national and social liberation in Namibia, as a solid political entity. In the meantime, the multiparty conference is being given a free (?field) in preparation for a civil war in Namibia. Therefore no amount of deaths, imprisonment, and Boer savage brutality will ever make the Namibian people lay down their arms until all racist occupationist troops are pulled out from Namibia.

Everything for the struggle! And all for final victory!

/8918

CSO: 3400/513

NAMIBIA

SWAPO RADIO CONDEMS WINDHOEK TRIAL OF 'PATRIOTS'

EA141647 Addis Ababa Voice of Namibia in English 1900 GMT 13 Nov 85

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] Ever since the beginning of its repressive colonial rule of Namibia in 1915, the South African white minority regime has been sentencing patriotic Namibians to death and long-term imprisonment for their anticolonial (?activities).

Within the large concentration camp which is today's Namibia, another 75 Namibian patriots--all members of SWAPO--including a Windhoek advocate, Comrade (Anthony Boskey), are scheduled to appear in court in the Namibian capital on 18th November. Again, their only crime is their determination to fight for the liberation of their motherland. The framed-up charges against them must be withdrawn. The international community must, as a matter of the utmost urgency, pressurize Pretoria to stop her illegal trials in Namibia, to relinquish her illegal grip on the territory, and allow the long-suffering people to determine their own destiny in a peaceful process.

Comrades and compatriots: The intensification of the armed liberation struggle, coupled with mass political and economic action, are the only effective way to liberate ourselves. Let us initiate sustained mass activities against the racist regime and its (?puppets). Let us cripple the colonial economy through walk-outs, strikes, and consumer boycotts, and let us liberate our imprisoned comrades and ourselves by liberating our country.

Workers, peasants, patriotic (?prison staff), youth, and students of Namibia: It is our historic and moral duty to free ourselves now from the tyranny of the illegal occupationist regime and its treacherous puppets. No task is more noble than the general liberation of the motherland and the building of a truly just society. Freedom to all Namibian political prisoners! Independence now for Namibia! Everything and every effort for the struggle! All for final victory!

/8918
CSO: 3400/513

NAMIBIA

MEIRING SAYS WAR NOT UNWINNABLE

MB151236 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1229 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Text] Windhoek, Nov 15, SAPA--SWAPO's armed wing would eventually be reduced from a fighting force to a "nuisance factor" and when that happened the organisation would have to revert to an ordinary political party in the SWA/Namibian democratic process, the officer commanding the SWA Territory Force, Major-General George Meiring, said in Windhoek.

According to a report published today in the Namibian newspaper, Gen Meiring said he did not think the SWA/Namibian bush war, which has been carrying on for more than 19 years, was an unwinnable situation.

"Any war of this nature is [a] very protracted one, certainly, because you are fighting for the hearts and minds of the people," he said.

"They (SWAPO) are losing because they are losing manpower, losing the fighting soldiers.

"Now they are down to 8,000 (men under arms), maybe 7,500 next year and 7,000 the year after.

"They have to do so many things with these troops that the number of troops available to fight this country will be less and less.

"And thereafter they become more of a nuisance factor than a fighting force."

Gen Meiring said SWAPO had two mechanised brigades which concentrated mainly on fighting the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA, and guarding the southern railway line between Namibia and Monogwe in Angola.

Altogether more than 3,500 SWAPO insurgents were deployed against UNITA.

"Only about 1,500 (SWAPO insurgents) are available at any time to fight against SWA" and only half of them would come down during the rainy season when SWAPO embarked on its infiltration campaign in SWA/Namibia, he said.

SWAPO was presently mustering its forces in preparation for its annual offensive expected from December 1 onwards.

"The intensity has gone down over the years, but it always happens," Gen Meiring said.

"The past 3 years, there was infiltration into Ovambo and not to any other place. We foresee the same thing happening."

The general said that in talks earlier this year at Cape Verde, SWAPO's president, Mr Sam Nujoma, had indicated that SWAPO would not stop its military effort.

Nevertheless, Gen Meiring said, the SWA/Namibian security forces would carry on with the war to persuade SWAPO to abandon its military campaign "because the price (for SWAPO) will become too high."

The security forces were also hoping for victory by the UNITA leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, who is fighting Luanda's MPLA government.

"If he wins, we are in the pound seats," Gen Meiring said.

"He will not allow SWAPO to fight from his territory, because they are fighting him."

If Dr Savimbi applied pressure in Angola long enough, he would be able to enforce a negotiated settlement which would give him a political victory.

"If they start talking to him, he will have a landslide and they know it," Gen Meiring said.

Gen Meiring said SWAPO's military command was sending insurgents into battle against UNITA partly to let them gain combat experience.

"They are not seasoned fighters, so they give them a little more experience before they send them down here."

Gen Meiring said that apart from SWA/Namibian independence, the causes that had called SWAPO into armed warfare no longer existed.

"Everything else has been achieved in Namibia," he said.

"There is no discrimination. There is freedom of movement."

"The reasons for launching the armed warfare, apart from independence, are no longer there."

/8918

CSO: 3400/513

NAMIBIA

JUSTICE MINISTER SAYS UN DEBATE 'IRRELEVANT'

MB160502 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1607 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Text] Windhoek, Nov 15, SAPA--Although SWA/Namibia could not ignore the United Nations, the world body's actions on behalf of the territory at this stage were at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to economic development, the transitional government's minister of justice, Mr Fanuel Kozonguizi, said in Windhoek today.

The UN Security Council, presently debating SWA/Namibia, was expected again to consider calls for sanctions against South Africa and the territory, Mr Kozonguizi told a meeting of the Windhoek Chamber of Commerce.

"Yet, we know nothing will come of that meeting," he said.

"To keep in line with the fashionable but futile exercises," the SWA/Namibian Government had sent the deputy minister of information, Mr Katuutire Kaura, to New York.

The government did not expect Mr Kaura to be given the opportunity to address the UN Security Council, as had been given to SWAPO's secretary-general, Mr Andimba Toivo ja Toivo.

"By this morning, no member state of the council has had the courage to invite Mr Kaura to be afforded the privilege of addressing the council," he said.

"This is not strange and we expect it, because we know the UN is not serious at all about a settlement of the Namibian issue.

"None other than the UN Secretary-General (Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar)--who is the one to supervise elections under UN Resolution 435--is working hard to block any appearance by a representative from the internal parties."

Mr Kozonguizi said the UN had recognised SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia."

"But nowhere else in the world will you find a political organisation or party basing its existence and authenticity in a country on its being recognised by an external organisation, however respectable that organisation might be," he said.

"Namibia cannot be an exception."

The real issue was whether the people of SWA/Namibia could secure a political or constitutional dispensation, acceptable to all the people as represented by the various political tendencies.

No group in SWA/Namibia, including SWAPO, could rule the country alone without external support.

Governments in Africa could come to power through elections, but the vote alone was not enough to sustain their rule.

"Such governments stay in power, because they have physical or armed power to keep out opponents and to maintain law and order," Mr Kozonguizi said.

"Our government today exists because we have the backing of the South African security forces.

"The SWAPO government of tomorrow will also be able to exist only if it has the backing of the same security forces."

Mr Kozonguizi said the UN, which is expected to take a vote later today on economic sanctions, was harming SWA/Namibia.

"The day the sole and authentic representative takes over, it may find the coffers of this country empty," he said.

/8918

CSO: 3400/513

NAMIBIA

DELEGATION DEPARTS TO TRY TO ADDRESS UNSC

MB141151 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1143 GMT 14 Nov 85

[Text] Windhoek, Nov 14, SAPA--A delegation of political parties in the SWA/Namibian transitional government have left Windhoek for New York where they will attempt to obtain permission to address the current session of the United Nations Security Council.

The delegation is headed by the deputy minister of information, Mr Katuutire Kaura.

The minister of justice, Mr Fanuel Kozonguizi, told a news conference in Windhoek today that the purpose of the visit was to put forward the views of the government on the future of the territory, presently being debated by the UN body.

"We would very much like to contribute and do everything in our power to make the process work towards independence of this country," he said.

Parties represented in the SWA/Namibian transitional government have long accused the UN of bias in favour of SWAPO, which is recognised by the UN General Assembly as the "sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia."

Mr Kozonguizi said if permission was refused for the delegates of the transitional government to address the UN Security Council it would be final proof of the world body's prejudice.

SWAPO's general-secretary, Mr Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo, addressed the UN Security Council yesterday, but the UN has declared "Null and void" the installation of the SWA/Namibian Government.

/8918

CSO: 3400/513 88

NAMIBIA

EDUCATION MINISTER SEES CHILDREN AS HOSTAGES OF ETHNICITY

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 21 Oct 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Joe Putz]

[Text] If whites rejected proposals for responsible change contained in the draft education strategy the future would see more radical demands for education reform.

Defenders of minority rights hang onto ethnic education because it gives them a political hold over their voters. "But that makes political hostages of our children and enhances ethnic disunity instead of creating national unity."

These were some of the controversial statements made by Minister of National Education Andrew Matjila, one of the leading moderates in the Transitional Government, in Windhoek on Friday night.

Speaking quietly and with little rhetorical emphasis, Mr Matjila warned an Interessengemeinschaft audience that many teachers all over the country totally opposed the present system and viewed the proposed changes as "not radical enough".

At the same time, the organised dissent amongst civil servants in the education establishment had materialised "as expected".

It was therefore time for responsible elements in society to stand up and be counted. Those who wanted to throw out the present system lock stock and barrel often advocated change for change's sake

and ignored the fact that change did not necessarily represent an improvement.

But whites defending the present system were continuously expressing dire warnings of the danger of lowered standards in an integrated system.

"But I often doubt whether these are the real reasons," Mr Matjila said. Many were just hiding their resistance against racial integration behind the arguments of standards, culture and religion.

"Do they not realise we must aim at a unitary state if we are to win the conflict. How can we do this if we divide our children," Mr Matjila asked.

"No minority poposals can serve the interests of the country."

On June 17 a government of 'national unity' had been formed. How could such a government support a divisive education system, he asked.

Fears of a lowering of

standards were unjustified since the Transitional Government had decided in the beginning that it would not threaten the source of its leaders and entrepreneurs by handicapping their education.

"Instead we must uplift those receiving inferior education at the moment and broaden the base," he said.

But a comparison of white and Owambo education offered a glaring example of the still existing inequality of funds and facilities.

Whites had the best quality teaching staff, the highest per capita number of classrooms and 878 whites wrote matric in 1984 with an 88 percent pass rate while Owambos had 368 matric pupils with a 13,1 percent pass rate.

At the same time the Owambo-speaking group represented 50,7 percent of the school population while whites were only 5,1 percent of the total.

"Why can't the reactionary minority learn from South African mistakes, he asked. Once the population has been radicalised, gradual change becomes impossible.

"The clock is ticking and the keg will eventually explode while we are engaged in petty squabbles", he said.

"In the next three years a national election will happen inevitably", Mr Matjila warned.

/13104
CSO: 3400/565

NAMIBIA

MATJILA CALLS FOR BETTER EDUCATION FACILITIES FOR BLACKS

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 4 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] There were an estimated 35 000 black children on the streets in Namibia because of a lack of educational facilities, the Minister of Education, Mr Andrew Matjila, said in the National Assembly on Friday. And he regarded this as a conservative estimate.

Introducing a motion calling for the improvement of human relations, he said human relations went hand in hand with sharing. "Let those that have nothing be given their share, it is their birthright."

Mr Matjila referred to discrepancies between black and white educational facilities and asked if it was fair "of our white brothers to turn a white boarding school into a hotel, a boarding school that could have helping the children of this country?"

"Is it fair to have 15 children in a school that would normally accommodate 200, while others have a double system?"

Children who were unable to go to school were potential troublemakers, he said.

"We must be consistent. We cannot complain about the communist danger if we do not block the holes from which these stinking things come."

Education was no longer a privilege but the right of every individual in the country.

"Until those in power, those in control, realise this and make the same opportunities, the same facilities, available to everybody, human relations cannot be promoted."

No-one in Namibia should feel they were being ignored because discrimination was being fostered.

Referring to reports in some sections of the media and letters "which insult our people, letters intended to stir up feelings", Mr Matjila said it was high time "to get out of a group mentality".

Appealing to his "white colleagues" not to interpret him as trying to create trouble, he asked "why can't we share in order to promote love?"

There were 316 428 school-going blacks in Namibia, representing nearly one-third of the total population, and 14 603 white.

"I want them to share what they have," Mr Matjila said.

It was not a case of having to give away all that

was yours "but if you have 12 marbles and the other fellow only has two, at least give him one".

There were 10 914 teachers in the country of whom 1 054 worked for the Administration for Whites.

Working on the accepted norm of 25 to 30 pupils a class, the whites had a surplus of 513 teachers, while there was a shortage of 1 858 in black schools.

There were 1 238 classrooms, including science laboratories, needlework rooms etc, available for white pupils and 7 022 for black children.

If quotas were laid down according to accepted norms, white children needed 504 classrooms and black children 9 769.

"Thus under the present circumstances, white children have a surplus of 734 classrooms and the total immediate shortage for blacks is 2 747."

Mr Matjila said there was a shortage of 167 schools and 80 boarding schools. "This is an unacceptable situation."

To eliminate this R535 million was urgently needed.

It was at schools that human relations started he emphasized.

/13104
CSO: 3400/563

NAMIBIA

PARADOXES OF APARTHEID EVIDENT IN SCHOOL SYSTEM

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 9 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by Brendan Seery]

[Text]

WINDHOEK — At remote schools in the Caprivi Strip young Namibians learn to write with their fingers in the sand, while at white schools in the bigger centres, car parks are being tarred and top-class athletics tracks being built at a cost of tens-of-thousands of rands.

As an estimated 35 000 Namibian youngsters roam the streets because of a lack of educational facilities, a large hostel at a white boys' school in the dusty settlement of Karibib has been turned into a hotel, because the authorities could not find enough pupils to fill it.

Each year around R1 200 is spent on the education of each white child, while just over R300 is spent on each coloured pupil and less than R250 on each black child.

The paradoxes and inequalities spawned by apartheid's grand design are still painfully evident in a Namibia, which today is hobbling along the road to independence.

But, as the clamour for change grows louder, so too do the voices raised in opposition to anything which will change the status quo.

A report published last month on education, and which was compiled by a committee of experts, made mild suggestions that all education be centralised

under one authority and not controlled — as is the case at present — by the multitude of "ethnic authorities".

For many whites, the report's suggestions — which included recommendations that some under-used "white" facilities be put to better use by opening them to all races — appeared to be the thin end of the wedge of racial integration in schools.

Among those to voice its reservations was the National Party of South West Africa, itself a member of the Multi-Party Conference Government. They argued that education was being "politicised" and that the issue of schooling was one which affected the fundamental rights of an individual and was, therefore, a "constitutional" issue.

Rightwingers have already mobilised a surprising amount of support — not all of it well-informed — against the report, and a number of angry petitions are being circulated and gathering a steady stream of signatures from worried whites.

The familiar rationalisations of apartheid are heard around the territory much as they echoed around the Rhodesia of the late 1970s — "preservation of standards" and "respect for different cultures".

The debate has so far only surfaced in an oblique way in the National Assembly sessions in Windhoek.

National Education Minister Mr Andrew Matjila, himself a former teacher and schools' inspector, came straight to the

point with his white colleagues. The blacks and other non-white races in Namibia had a right to education which had so far been denied them because of their colour.

There were 316 428 school-going blacks in Namibia and 14 603 white pupils, he said. Of the 10 914 teachers in the country, 1 054 worked for the administration for whites. Working on the accepted norm of between 25 and 30 pupils per class, the whites had a "surplus" of 513 teachers, while there was a shortage of 1 858 in the black schools.

There were also vast discrepancies in classroom and boarding facilities between the white and black schools, said Mr Matjila.

He added ominously that the government "cannot complain about the communist danger if we do not block the holes from which these stinking things come".

Mr Matjila found support for his view from Mr Dirk Mudge,

the DTA strongman and Minister of Finance in the new administration. Mr Mudge, while making it clear he did not advocate the immediate opening of all schools to all races, suggested that the vast wealth enjoyed by the white administration could be shared out among other groups.

While injustice of this type persisted, it was naive of anyone to think that the system could work, Mr Mudge said. He has recently been addressing meetings of his Republican Party to explain the education report, and is understood to have met some opposition from the more conservative of the party's followers.

Mr Mudge and some of his MPC colleagues appear to have realised that the only way the new administration will gain

support from Namibia's people is by cutting the ground from under the feet of Swapo. The only way this can be achieved is through the substantial transformation of society and the elimination of those obstacles which stand in the way of a better life for the majority of the territory's inhabitants.

Almost five months after its inauguration by South African proclamation in June this year, the MPC Government has done little towards achieving those objectives. It is patently hamstrung by the need to effect a compromise which will not only satisfy burgeoning black expectations but also retain white confidence, and, therefore, skills.

The education question will be watched closely by many people, both inside and outside the country. The MPC Government's success or failure on the issue could well be an accurate pointer as to its own eventual success or failure as an alternative to Swapo.

/12828
CSO: 3400/541

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

SWAPO CONDEMNS MEMBERS' JAIL TERMS--The South-West Africa Peoples Organization, SWAPO, today condemned the 24-year imprisonment term imposed on two members of SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, 2 weeks ago. A SWAPO statement issued in Dar es Salaam said that those imprisoned were Mr (Vaikong Gitewa) and (Sam Muvindi) who are alleged to have abducted and killed an announcer of the so-called South-West Africa Broadcasting Company, Radio Ovambo, (Martina Sanyinange). (Sanyinange) was killed in June 1983 by the South African murdering squad of [name indistinct] when they were traveling in her car. The statement said that the two militants were sentenced to long-term imprisonment because of their strong resistance and rejection of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and their resolve to fight for freedom and independence against the oppressive Boer regime in Namibia. Other reports say that the regime in Namibia has freed 22 SWAPO prisoners under an amnesty. The reports from Windhoek say that 16 of the 22 men were transferred in September to the Namibian capital from South Africa's notorious Robben Island jail off Cape Town and were serving life sentences. The others were serving terms between 7-18 years and all of them were allegedly convicted on terrorism charges. [Text] [Dar es Salaam External Service in English 1900 GMT 14 Nov 85 EA] /8918

MURDER SENTENCE FOR SWAPO INSURGENTS--Windhoek, Oct 30, SAPA--Two SWAPO insurgents, Veiko Nghitewa, 24, and Sam Mundjinji, 29, were sentenced today to an effective 24 years each after being convicted by the Windhoek Supreme Court on charges of murder, abduction and theft. The trial, which lasted nearly a year, arose from the death in northern SWA/Namibia of an Ovambo-speaking SWABC radio announcer, Mr Martin Shaayenange, on June 12, 1983. According to evidence, the men had been members of a three-man group who had received orders from SWAPO's military command to kidnap Mr Shaayenange and take him to Angola. Then they neared the SWA/Namibian border with Angola, they detected much activity by the security forces in the area and decided they would not be able to cross into Angola with the Mr Shaayenange. The third unnamed member of the group explained that in terms of standing instructions by SWAPO's military wing they would have to kill him. They then buried the body and took Mr Shaayenange's vehicle. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 0847 GMT 30 Oct 85 MB] /8918

CSO: 3400/513

NIGER

BRIEFS

EEC TALKS ON GRANT PACKAGE--Negotiations between Niger and the European Economic Community, EEC, began this morning at the Ministry of Planning. They are scheduled to end on Wednesday. The negotiations are being held on the use of the 40.5 billion CFA francs package granted to Niger in the framework of the Lome III Convention. The general orientations of this program of financing concern the field of rural development and the development of food production. Cooperation between the European Development Fund [EDF] and Niger can be traced back to 1960. The EDF has already financed the irrigation project (?in Namasigoungou) which cost 1.462 billion CFA francs and the rehabilitation project of the (?Tillaberi) strip which cost 357 million CFA francs. The delegations of the EDF and Niger Republic were led by Dieter Frisch and Almoustapha Soumaila, the director general of EDF and the Niger minister of planning, respectively, during the negotiations. After the negotiations, the director general of the EDF made a statement in which he congratulated Niger for its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in food and gave the assurance that the EEC is willing to assist Niger in its program to stock its cereals. [Excerpts] [Niamey Domestic Service in French 1900 GMT 11 Nov 85 AB] /12712

CSO: 3400/432

NIGERIA

FOREIGN MINISTER LAUDED FOR STRENGTHENING DIPLOMACY

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 14 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Akpennongun Tarbunde: "Akinyemi: A Kissinger in Nigerian Foreign Policy?"]

Text

WHEN Professor Bolaji Akinyemi was to leave the exalted position of the director-general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, (NIIA), his valedictory speech was titled "A Farewell to Policy." Today, however, this view must have been modified with the turn of events. As minister of External Affairs, Akinyemi has not yet bidden farewell to policy.

Now, his appointment might just fulfil the expectations of some Nigerians who have looked forward to the emergence of a Kissinger in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign affairs. To begin with, Dr. Henry Kissinger's impeccable academic qualifications in the area of foreign policy and his emergence as the American Secretary of State are a coat of colours which perfectly fits Professor Akinyemi in the Nigerian context. Kissinger is an authority in foreign policy and served several American administrations. Akinyemi is an authority in foreign policy and has served several regimes in Nigeria. Both personalities have rendered their services in the area of foreign policy

decision-making and implementation. And just as Kissinger was fondly referred to as a master strategist, so has Akinyemi given renewed perspective to various global issues. His United Nations' speech is case in point.

But can Akinyemi really "Kissingerise" Nigerian foreign policy? As a person who not only brought administrative stability and coherence to the NIIA but also gave it an intellectual focus, Professor Akinyemi will be expected to set the ministry and NIIA on their proper paths in the intricate bureaucratic politics of foreign policy formulation and implementation.

Coherence

This is because going by practical experience and personal knowledge in foreign policy analysis, nobody is today better placed than the professor to know whether the NIIA should be an extension of the Ministry of External Affairs or an autonomous body making policy contributions which may not necessarily tally with the position taken by the ministry.

Under Akinyemi, we might not experience any

major shift in determining who our foreign friends are. As his UN speech indicates, we will be firmer and more decisive on major issue-areas which affect our domestic interest. Yet we are not likely to abandon our non-aligned posture nor attempt to estrange ourselves from our traditional Western allies. This is to be expected, especially with our large corps of career diplomats trained in Western values and ideals.

Besides, since they are the men on the spot and the actual executors of our foreign policies, there is very little shift to be effected by way of ideological redirection in our foreign policy. Akinyemi should or is likely to give the career diplomats much more freedom in their assignments. However, it should also be clear that since Akinyemi will be the fountain of policy formulation and will be held responsible for what happens in our foreign affairs, he will have to insist that certain things are done by the career diplomats in the way he can confidently account for both to the President and to Nigerians.

What is likely to emerge in the circumstance is a Nigeria-centric foreign policy where the interests of Nigeria will dictate the nature and scope of goals she pursues in the larger world.

An equally important point to note is the general climate of political economy prevalent in Nigeria. As for the climate, the idea of a military-industrial complex espoused by President Babangida (then Army Chief of Staff) is congruent with Prof. Akinyemi's view which has been that not enough attention has been paid to the development of our defence potentials.

Akinyemi thus, therefore, appears as a modern-day nationalist who is concerned about the welfare of the individual Nigerian and the political and economic stability of the state. Therefore, although his portfolio

is external affairs, he will take the perspective that Nigeria's external relations are an extension of our domestic political economy.

The point is that it should not surprise his colleagues in the Cabinet when in their meetings Akinyemi argues on domestic policies and points out their implications for foreign policy. Such veering off into local affairs has to be seen in the light that there is an inextricable link between Nigeria's domestic policies and foreign policies. The expulsion of illegal aliens or even the closure of our borders are a few examples.

The renewal interest in our neighbouring states — e.g. the Chief Ukpabi-Asika delegation — could be seen in the light of our national security needs. Conflicts in these states (e.g. Chad) will have international implications. Co-operation and good neighbourliness can ensure that Nigeria does not get drawn into any open conflict especially given the subdued hostility between Nigeria and her neighbours in the recent past.

Hostility

The totality of these environmental factors in addition to Professor Akinyemi's perception would determine whether or not he is the "Kissinger" some observers may be looking forward to in Nigeria's foreign policy. But as already pointed out, the domestic base will have to be strengthened and consolidated. The efforts of the Babangida administration to bring the economy out of the woods and ensure self-reliance in crucial areas of our national life is a step towards this strengthening of the domestic base. The success of this programme of economic revival will considerably strengthen the hands of Akinyemi and the President in infusing our foreign policy with vigour, direction and purpose.

NIGERIA

TIGHT SECURITY CURBS SMUGGLING ALONG CAMEROON BORDER

Kaduan NEW NIGERIAN in English 18 Nov 85 pp 1, 3

Article by Abu Tapidi: "Tight Security Curbs Smuggling Along Nigeria-Cameroun Border"

Text

From ABU TAPIDI, Yola

TIGHT security network and the voluntary formation of vigilante groups at our border towns with the Cameroun Republic have curtailed smuggling activities and currency trafficking.

A *New Nigerian* investigation in various border towns in Gongola State showed that, smuggling, currency trafficking and other nefarious activities are on the decline because people are now busy harvesting their crops and most of the local labour force used by the big-time smugglers as fronts are not forthcoming.

The *New Nigerian* also gathered that, most members of the joint border patrol teams were being changed very often thus, leaving no or little room to cultivate intimate relations with smugglers.

It was understood that, the peak of the smuggling activities was normally from December to April after harvesting and the porous borders could easily be turned into all types of roads during the dry season.

When the *New Nigerian* visited Belel and Sahuda border towns, there was no sign of a hitherto bustling business. There was no traffic as the borders remained closed and security tight with grim looking soldiers, security and the customs men keeping vigil in strategic positions along the routes.

The situation was the same in towns and villages visited in Michika, Mubi, Fufure and Ganye local government areas of the state.

However, the *New Nigerian* noticed that the members of the joint patrol teams in almost all the places are still staying several kilometres on our own side of the border contrary to the directives early issued by the Federal Government that they should stay five kilometres to the international boundary.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Alhaji Mohammed Yusufu told the *New Nigerian* in Yola that the security personnel have introduced new measures and have also spread their tentacles to control smuggling, currency trafficking and other nefarious activities.

Alhaji Mohammed confirmed that so far, the situation was under control because the command had recorded virtually nothing in respect of smuggling because of the new measures introduced and strengthening their manpower.

The *New Nigerian* could hardly lay hands on clothing materials, batteries, matches, detergents, hardwares and other items smuggled in from the Republic of Cameroun in most places visited during the state-wide investigation.

/12851

CSO: 3400/528

NIGERIA

EXPORT COUNCIL TEST MARKETING PRODUCTS ABROAD

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 18 Nov 85 pp 1, 2⁴

Article by Nduka Nwosu: "Nigeria Intensifies Export Potentials"

Text Nigerian exportable products will soon be sold in Brazil if the result of a Commonwealth Secretariat survey on the Brazilian market as a possible buyer of Nigerian products proves positive.

The sponsor -- the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) is also involved in a market survey and test marketing of Nigerian products in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Nigeria currently has about 55 exportable products listed by the NEPC. These include products of cocoa and palm kernel, crude glycerine, asbestos cement sheets, African print designs, dry kola nuts, aluminium household utensils, natural spring water, soap, detergents, wire, nuts and bolts, nails, cassava waste, piassava, wire products, PVC pipes and fittings, sheanuts, tin ore, columbite and the export of services.

NEPC special trade fair bulletin "Export Pavillion," revealed that the Commonwealth Secretariat survey was the result of an agreement with Nigeria on the funding of an export market development programme by the Commonwealth Fund For Technical Co-operation.

The results of two earlier successful projects by the body prompted NEPC to propose four new projects for 1985. The projects will among other things initiate a contact promotion programme (CPP) for Nigeria in Cameroon and Gabon regarding Nigerian made wines, motorised fishing, transport boats and knocks.

The survey is also commissioned to study the viability of marketing Nigerian cocoa products in Australia.

The CPP is required to identify Nigerian producers who have the capacity and capability to produce export products for Douala and Libreville. This will be followed by a mini-exhibition of the selected products in each city and the discussion of export orders.

Andrew W. Harley and Associates, a UK based management consultancy firm MC Alphine Thorpe and Warrier Limited, in collaboration with its Nigerian counterpart (not names) will study the possibility of exporting yam flour, kola nut wines, processed palm wines, Nigerian phonographic records and African prints of various designs.

The second phase of the assignment will study the Brazilian market size and structure, her price levels, competitors and suppliers and the element of market segmentation, distribution, purchasers products and market positioning.

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CSO: 3400/527

NIGERIA

DAVID-WEST WARNS COMPANIES NOT TO ANNOUNCE OIL FINDS

Lagos SUNDAY TIMES in English 17 Nov 85 p 1

Text 7 Any oil company that goes to the press to announce a new oil find will pay dearly for it.

Handing down the warning during the week, the Petroleum Resources Minister, Professor Tam David-West, in an exclusive interview said that such an act was a gross disrespect to the country.

"How can the President and even the minister read of oil find first on the pages of a newspaper?

"It is not done in any part of the world and oil companies have been told that they will not, I repeat, will not be allowed to go to the Press and announce oil find."

Recently, an oil producing company, Pan Ocean, told the Financial Times of London that it has discovered a new oil field in Nigeria.

This press statement seemed to have spurred the minister to order oil companies to desist forthwith from unilaterally publishing oil finds in the media.

"Oil production statistics are classified matters and oil companies cannot publish them.

"If there is a significant oil find that is worth making news, the President must know first. If they want to address a joint press conference by them alone, it doesn't bother me but my President must know first."

On the prospects of oil find at the Chad Basin, Professor David-West said that the chances were bright.

"Oil prospecting is structured because you do not go and just start to drill anywhere. You must gather geological and other data and have them analysed. If you find that from the analysis the prospects of hydro carbon are good then you can start to drill.

"It is also a gamble because you do not know at what particular point you will strike hydro carbon because the topography changes even in the Delta area for a particular spot may be dry and few kilometres from there in the same topography, you will get oil gushing."

There was hydro carbon in the Chad Basin at Tuma, the area where the oil prospecting is taking place.

"Oil prospecting at the Chad Basin is not a useless exercise. If it was, we would have left there long ago.

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CSO: 3400/527

NIGERIA

PETROLEUM DRILLING STATISTICS DETAILED

Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English 18 Nov 85 p 1

Text 7 A total of 3,525 oil wells were drilled in the country between 1960 and June 1985 by the various oil companies associated with production activities.

These statistics were made available to the Business Times at Kaduna last week by a senior management official of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

The highest number of wells drilled was recorded in 1972 and 1974 with 250 each or seven percent of the total wells while the least was recorded in 1964 with 14 wells representing 0.40 percent.

However, a further analysis of the data shows that since 1981 among others, the number of wells drilled by producing oil companies had been showing a downward trend.

Out of a total of 494 oil wells drilled between 1981 and 1985 by nine oil companies, 151 were drilled in 1981 representing 31 percent of the total between 1981-1985.

During the period also (1981-85) 116 wells or 23 percent were drilled in 1982, 82 or 17 percent in 1983. In 1984 the number which also depicts the declining trend was 78 wells or 16 percent and 67 wells representing 14 percent in 1985 (up to June).

The NNPC official would not give reason on the declining trend.

Nevertheless, the minister of Petroleum Resources, Professor Tam David-West, commenting on the country's oil production activities said recently in Lagos. "After the positive response to the fiscal incentives of 1977, there has been a marked decline in exploration activities since 1981" noting that this was prompted by the consequent fall in demand for crude oil prices which dampened the enthusiasm of oil companies in exploration and development activities."

David West continued by saying that global inflation and high cost of money have raised drilling costs by more than 3 times since 1974 and the production sharing of service contracts which put the full financial risk for exploration development and production on the companies such that business is no longer as attractive as it used to be."

The statistics showed that: Nigeria has attained a production capacity of 2.5 to 2.6 in the past. The present slump in the oil market which had reduced the excellent prospects of investment recovery, had reduced over production capacity to about 1.8 mbd.

Warned the Minister: "If Nigeria is to sustain her current production level and attain her policy objectives, conscious efforts must be made to boost exploration activities", adding: "To this end, Government is currently looking into modalities of incentives to promote enhanced exploration efforts.

Besides, out of the total of 3,525 oil wells drilled between 1960 and June 1985, 1581 or 45 percent were on land (one on-shore) 1,196 representing 34 percent were off-shore and 748 wells or 21 percent were drilled in swamps.

The statistics showed that Mobile producing Nigeria Ltd and Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum operated primarily off-shore, while Shell Petroleum Developing company of Nigeria had about 12 percent off-shore, 30 percent swamp areas and 58 percent on land.

Also, between 1981 and June 1985, of the 494 wells drilled, Shell had the highest number with 200 or 40 percent of the total. Elf drilled 91 wells or 18 percent of the total, Gulf had 62 wells representing 13 percent, Agip 39 wells or 8 percent. Mobile 32 wells or 6 percent, Texaco 26 wells representing 5 percent, Ashland 25 wells or 5 percent, NNPC 16 wells or 3 percent and Pan Ocean only 3 wells representing one percent.

OIL WELLS DRILLED BY COMPANIES 1981 - 85

| COMPANY | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MOBIL | 21 | 8 | — | 2 | 1 |
| NNPC | — | 5 | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| PANOCEAN | — | — | — | — | 3 |
| TEXACO | 2 | 3 | 10 | 11 | — |
| SHELL | 71 | 56 | 26 | 20 | 27 |
| AGIP | 13 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 2 |
| GULF | 26 | 12 | 15 | 4 | 5 |
| ELF | 14 | 22 | 15 | 17 | 23 |
| ASHLAND | 4 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 151 | 116 | 82 | 78 | 67 |

/12851
CSO: 3400/528

NIGERIA

VEHICLE PLANTS GIVEN DEADLINE TO 'NIGERIANIZE' POSTS

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 9 Nov 85 p 24

Article by Chris Obinagwam: "Vehicle Plants Given 3 Months to Nigerianise Posts"]

Text Vehicle assembly plants have been given 3 months to Nigerianise 6 key posts in the automotive industries.

The positions which must be headed by Nigerians are: Commercial sales/marketing division, Finance/Accounts division, Supply division; Spare part division; Bilingual secretary/confidential secretary and medical doctors.

Industries Minister Alhaji Bunu Sheriff Musa gave the order yesterday in Lagos when he met chairman and managing directors of automobile companies.

Alhaji Musa said that Nigerianisation of the posts was to ensure closer monitoring of the assembly facilities in Nigeria.

He disclosed that the Federal Government had already directed that Nigerian deputy managing directors should be appointed to all companies, including vehicle assemblies, in which it has equity interest.

According to him, such deputies should not be glorified holders, but should be actively in the operation of the company and should be able to stand in for the managing directors during their temporary or permanent absence.

The minister deplored the frequent threat by assembly to retrench workers as a means of cutting their losses and described the action as a wrong solution to the problem.

Alhaji Musa, said that there were other items which required a thorough review than the deprivation, in some cases, of lower level workers in the automobile industry of their livelihood.

Some of the cost items which must be looked into by assemblers are highly inflated cost elements like salaries and wages, advertising/sales promotion and insurance tax.

Housing, transportation, legal social contributions, social aid, training/travel and fees/sundry which are then built on to the total cost of the produced vehicle and which in the end, produce heavy losses in the balance sheet, could be drastically cut down without unnecessarily cutting down the work force, he said.

According to Alhaji Musa, "The technical partners have a stake and should have a stake in the survival of the automobile sub-sector which ensures a steady market for the CKD components and the technology which they provide."

The minister advised the chief executives to look into the general financial management of the assembly plants, the various facilities enjoyed by Nigerian and expatriate staff which are incompatible with the realities of the nation's economy today.

/12851

CSO: 3400/527

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

OIL RESERVE FIGURES-- The Western Divisional Manager of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd., Dr Emmanuel Daukoru on Tuesday in Warri, said that Nigeria has about 16.7 billion barrels of crude oil reserves which could last for 37 more years. Dr Daukoru who was speaking at an oil seminar for senior practising journalists sponsored by the Shell Petroleum Company, said that crude oil reserve figures were flexible because the search for crude oil was a continuous process and that it was possible for more oil wells to be discovered that could see Nigeria far into the next century as an oil producer. Dr Daukoru said that Nigeria has abundant gas resources as a source of energy adding that there is about 6.3 million cubic feet of gas reserves in the western division of the company's operation. He disclosed that a N40 million gas plant project was underway at Otorogu in Bendel to primarily supply the NEPA power plant in Lagos. [Text] [Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 15 Nov 85 p 17 /12851]

GOC ON ARMY PROMOTIONS--Brigadier Peter Ademokhai, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 1 Mechanised Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army, Kaduna has assured soldiers that the recent cut in their salaries would not stop normal promotions in the army. Addressing troops in Minna, Brigadier Ademokhai explained that promotions would still be extended to deserving soldiers. The GOC said that army headquarters would provide new uniforms for soldiers in the next four months to replace their present ones. He said that the Brigade's Medical Corp had been provided with vehicles to enable it go round and enlighten soldiers on the need for family planning and urged them to set up committees in their units which would work toward the improvement of the welfare of soldiers. The GOC, who is on a two-day visit to units under his command, had earlier paid courtesy visits to the state Governor, Lt-Col David Mark, the Commander, Training and Doctrines Command, Brigadier Duro Ajayi, and the Emir of Minna, Alhaji Ahmadu Bahago. [Text] [Kano THE TRIUMPH in English 16 Nov 85 p 17 /12851]

CSO: 3400/529

MOURIDE BROTHERHOOD BUCKS GOVERNMENT

Paris POLITIQUE AFRICAINE in French Sep 85 pp 85-86

[Article by Mar Fall: Senegal: The Peanut Connection]

[Text] "Where have the peanuts gone?" asks the sole Senegalese national daily paper LE SOLEIL in the edition of 11 March 1985. This question might rather be translated: the government is vigorously searching for 3,500 20-ton semi-trailers loaded with peanuts.

The peanut harvest of 1984/85, estimated at between 500 thousand and 600 thousand tons, arouses lively controversy. More than 200 thousand tons of the national wealth have in fact simply vanished. It's enough to make one wonder. Certainly, people have set themselves to making their own oil. It stands to reason! Yes indeed, there is good reason to get out the old press, since everyone knows that the price of a liter of oil today is 450 CFA francs. With manual grinding, 5 kg of peanuts are enough to give you your liter of homemade oil. But there, that comes to a quantity that cannot be compared with the sales made by the rural people themselves who consider themselves wronged by the government.

Persistent rumors are circulating throughout the whole country about the destination of this large supply (Mauritania, Gambia, London etc.) and concerning the chief organizer of this grey market, which would be...the Moslem hierarchy of the very turbulent Mouride Brotherhood. This is a hypothesis which, if confirmed, would considerably change the present political situation. Since the government obtains from this trade an indispensable portion of its operating budget, it is easy to see the importance of this news, especially as the Diouf-State is in pretty bad shape despite the help of the United States, which is going to give it 25 billion CFA francs in assistance beginning on October 1, 1985.

Abdou Diouf is not happy with the rural sector, as indicated by the tone of his speech of 4 April the anniversary of Senegalese independence in 1960.

The Mouride Brotherhood seems to be in healthy condition. Its political weight is beyond challenge; the Mouride and Tidjane religious heads remain up to the present privileged and favored partners of the modern state, which could hardly do without them. The vote in favor of keeping Senegal in the

French Community at the time of the referendum of 1958 was obtained in part thanks to the "ayes of the marabouts". Observers credit the Mouride Brotherhood alone with about 500 thousand votes on that occasion. More recently, in February 1983, Abdou Diouf benefited from the assistance of the marabouts for his election as chief of state.

These marabout hierarchies have a sphere of influence that extends far beyond the rural environment. The associations swarm everywhere, particularly in urban centers distinguished up to the present by "modernism". "Venerable Islam" has given way to a militant and sometimes aggressive Islam. Would the establishment of a grey market sponsored by Tuba, the capital of mouridism, be the beginning of a direct confrontation between state and marabout authorites?

In this quite possible prospect (the marabouts are not going to play the role of counterforce forever), it may be asked what the real chances of the Mouride Brotherhood are. It is known that they have resources in the economic area, in commerce and in business. Mouride machines are being set up in certain locations in the urban economy (Kebe, Djilly Mbaye, Momar Sourang, Lobatt Fall etc.). The Sandaga and Tilene markets of Dakar are under the control of the MBackhe-MBackhe. On the politico-ideological level the mouride hierarchy still takes the leadership of the rural population upon itself. The weakness of the statist secular (opponent-state) ideologies leaves a void; mouridism fills it up and presents itself as an alternative. It has an unchallenged base.

The "brotherhood of the seekers" counts, however, on a weakness of mouridism-- its lack of technical experience sufficient to make the government machinery work. If there is scarcity at that level, an alliance with certain nationalist leaders (their dream) and even with some elements of the Diouf-State might alleviate that weakness.

It seems that it may no longer be a question of symbiosis between the state and the marabout leaders. It is rather a case of every man for himself and God help everyone.

13028/12955
CSO: 3419/65

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

IRRIGATION PROJECT LOAN--The irrigation project in Massam Department is to be partially financed by a 5.55 billion CFA franc loan. Mamadou Toure, minister of economy and finance, and Ronald Dulcard, director general of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE], signed the loan agreement this morning. This sum of money, which is to go towards the partial financing of an irrigation project in Massam Department, is to be repaid over a period of 20 years at an interest rate of 3.75 percent. [Excerpt] [Dakar Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 6 Nov 85 AB] /12712

RADIO-TV MAGAZINE--The Senegal Radio and Television Broadcasting Office [Office de Radiodiffusion-Television du Senegal, ORTS] now has a monthly review, entitled ORTS MAGAZINE. The first issue of the magazine has just appeared on the newsstands. You can find the radio and television programs for November in it. You can also read articles on current affairs. [Text] [Dakar Domestic Service in French 2000 GMT 9 Nov 85 AB] /12712

CSO: 3400/432

SOMALIA

CHINESE DEVELOPMENT AID PRAISED

Mogadiscio HEEGAN in English 1 Nov 85 p 2

Article: China: Friend of the Somalis"

Text Chinese development projects in Africa rate high in the field of infrastructures and economic life-line which tend to quench the dire needs of the poor developing nations. Chinese companies have undertaken and successfully implemented numerous vital Agro-industrial ventures in Africa which needs the technical know-how of the Chinese People's Republic. The Chinese people has been traditionally friendly and generous to the Somali people since time immemorial. This ancient friendship has been cemented and strengthened during the last two decades in which the two friendly nations forged close economic and diplomatic relations.

China offered Somalia economic assistance in the form of badly needed agro-industrial equipments, construction of highways, and other economic life-lines which help enhance the national economy and the standard of living of the Somali People. The number of Chinese development projects implemented in Somalia during the last twenty years and their utility to the nation remains unique among other foreign investors and friendly nations who offered aid to Somalia. In a terse remark at the inauguration ceremony of a recently Chinese implemented river-water diversion project in Middle Shabelle, region president

Siad commended the concrete and substantial aid extended to Somalia by the Chinese government and people. With 10 Kilometer Canal, a dam and a bridge, the 90 million Somali Shillings worth Dudunleh project is intended to divert the excess water of the Shabelle River to avoid flooding and at the same time help make more use of the water during heavy raining. The Chinese built monumental faculty of political Science here is still fresh in the minds of Somalo-chinese cooperation sympathizers.

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CSO: 3400/466

SOMALIA

NATION'S DIFFICULT ECONOMIC PLIGHT EXAMINED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 9 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] **spotlight:** FINANCIAL STRANGULATION

Somalia's economic and financial situation can never have appeared in such a desperate plight as it did during the World Bank consultative group meeting on the country which took place in Paris on November 5 and 6. At the time of the previous group meeting, which was held at the end of October 1983, at least appearances were kept up: Somalia put forward an economic recovery plan for 1984-86 which envisaged external aid of 1.5 billion dollars, destined mainly to finance development projects.

Since then, the situation has grown considerably worse. Most of the projects originally approved have been suspended or shelved, in the hope that the financial stranglehold on all economic activity in the country is loosened, if only slightly. For the first time at a World Bank consultative group meeting the representatives of eight donor countries and 16 international aid funds and organisations present kept the discussions firmly on debts and the balance of payments rather than development projects. Out of 430 million dollars worth of aid which it is considered that Somalia will need in 1986, more than a quarter is for debt servicing and a third for balancing the budget and paying for imports of oil, grain, etc.

The donors made no comment on the 120 million dollars for debt servicing, a domain which normally falls to the Club of Paris. But neither did they make any firm commitment on the 310 millions remaining, which they said would depend on "certain additional structural reforms." The Bardhere dam project, for which the Somalis have been fighting for several years, and which they have made the cornerstone of the country's economic development, is right back in the melting pot. Yet as recently as last June, after a meeting of investors in Mogadishu, the minister for the Juba valley development, Ahmed HABIB Ahmed, said that 70 per cent of the required finance had been found. After the consultative group meeting the same minister told THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER that the whole question of finance will have to be reviewed, and a new scheme could be ready by the end of 1986, if all goes well.

Somalia's foreign debt amounts to 1.5 billion dollars, while exports bring in only 100 million a year on average. The Somalis today are having to pay for the investments undertaken in the 1970s, many of them providing no return, while in 1984 their export revenue plunged dramatically to 47 million dollars, scarcely two per cent of gross national product compared with an average of 9.5 per cent in the 1970-84 period, as a direct result of Saudi Arabia ending its purchases of Somali cattle. Imports in 1984 amounted to 429 million dollars.

The inflation rate reached a record 92 per cent in 1984, and although it fell again in 1985 it was still 35 per cent for the first seven months of this year. A large part of the external debt was rescheduled by the Club of Paris last January and the International Monetary Fund provided 54.7 million Special Drawing Rights in March, saving Somalia as it was on the edge of bankruptcy (at the end of 1984 its reserves of foreign currency stood at less than 168 million dollars). Paradoxically, because of these very difficulties, donors have cut back on their aid to development projects, from 271 million dollars in 1981 to 145 million in 1982, 124 million in 1983, 70 million in 1984 and 33 million in the first half of 1985.

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CSO: 3400/466

SOMALIA

COLONEL MOGES STRATEGY DESCRIBED

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER 9 Nov 85 p 4

Text 7

Mohamed ABSHIR is the new provisional leader of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, following the arrest last October 12 in Addis Ababa of the front's president, Abdullahi YUSSUF, his political adviser Abdullahi Mohamed HASSAN and another senior official, Major HORRI. Mr. ABSHIR, a 40-year-old civilian, previously responsible for the international relations of the SSDF, is a pro-Western businessman who has lived in Djibouti, London and Nairobi, yet paradoxically he is well thought of by the Ethiopians. His assumption of the leadership of the front is all the more surprising in that he was not a member of its central committee. However, he was one of Abdullahi YUSSUF's fiercest critics, attacking him for his authoritarianism.

The SSDF's former defence secretary, Abdi Abdulle SAID, whose nom-de-guerre is JINI BOGOR, also told THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in Nairobi on November 2 that the appointment of Mohamed ABSHIR as acting president was made without any consultation of the front's membership. Attacking this "fait accompli", JINI BOGOR said the Ethiopians had yet to give any explanation for the arrest of Abdullahi YUSSUF. Although he no longer occupies any position of responsibility within the SSDF, JINI BOGNOR said he still thought Ethiopia and Libya the front's main "friends".

I.O.N.- While the Ethiopian authorities have given no explanation for the arrest pf Abdullahi YUSSUF, according to the information obtained by THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER that the whole operation was mounted by the head of Addis Ababa's internal and external security services, Colonel MOGES. This very secretive figure, 45-years-old, who is responsible for all Ethiopia's clandestine operations in the region, has apparently decided to switch his backing to Mohamed ABSHIR, after supporting Abdullahi YUSSUF for years.

The charge of policy is said to be in line with a new strategy which involves weakeriza the SSDF and strerngthening the rival Somali National Movement, while pordering to the secessionist feelings of a number of Issaqs from northern Somalia. Colorel MOGES would like to see the SSDF allied to the SNM, something which had been impossible

before, notably because of Abdullah YUSSUF. It is noteworthy that Mohamed ABSHIR's appointment was welcomed very quickly by the SNM (see I.O.N. N° 203). The seductive approach to the Issaqs, meanwhile, is being carried out at various levels: 14 leading Issaqs from Somalia, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia were recently invited to Addis Ababa, while promises have been made that if northern Somalia seceded the new state could be given part of the Ogaden, as well as the former British "Reserve Areas" round Jijiga.

This plan of secession conceived by Colonel MOGES evidently means relying on the Issaqs, while the Mejertein of the SSDF are seeking to recover the power which they once held in Mogadishu rather than set up another autonomous state. There have been so many tactical upheavals in this region in recent years, however, that it is quite impossible to say if this project will be pursued to its final objective.

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CSO: 3400/466

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY PRAISES REAGAN ON USSR EXPANSIONISM

MB210551 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Station commentary]

[Text] While nuclear disarmament, for the Soviet Union at least, is the prime point for discussion at the Geneva summit conference between the American and Soviet leaders, the clash between the two superpowers in past decades have not been in the nuclear field.

The awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons has in fact relegated confrontation between East and West to other spheres. In recent times this manifested itself to an increasing extent in regional conflicts, as in Afghanistan, Central America, and Southern Africa.

This is why, despite strong opposition from the Soviets, President Reagan has insisted on including superpower involvement in regional conflicts on the agenda for the summit meeting.

In pursuance of its ultimate goal of world domination, the Soviet Union exploits political instability in strategic regions to its own advantage, utilising the classic methods of terrorism and sabotage, incitement to revolution, and the supply of arms to terrorist organisations, in order to overthrow existing governments and replace them with Marxist regimes.

The West's unwillingness to counteract this strategy has encouraged the Soviet Union to involve itself even further -- either directly, as in the case of Afghanistan, or through surrogate forces, as in Angola.

Communist expansionism cannot be checked by means of diplomacy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 elicited worldwide condemnation. But not a single government -- including the spineless Carter Administration in the United States -- was prepared to lift a finger. Today, 6 years later Afghanistan is virtually a colony of the Soviet Union. This occupation -- flagrant aggression against a sovereign state -- is now all but forgotten.

When President Reagan entered the White House in 1980 there were welcome signs that he would take active steps to protect not only America's

strategic interests, but also the rights and freedoms of smaller nations.

His most dramatic action was military intervention in Grenada in October 1983 to thwart a takeover of the island by Cuban forces and to restore democratic government.

This firmer approach was also reflected in the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement towards South Africa to provide, as it was stated, a protective umbrella for peaceful internal change.

This speaks of understanding of Soviet strategy whereby any political instability brought about by internal change is exploited.

The United States clearly has the same concern about the presence of Cuban surrogate forces in Angola -- and is insisting on their withdrawal -- as neighboring South-West Africa would not enjoy sovereign independence while the Cuban threat from across its border persists.

American action is now being taken a step further with efforts in Congress to provide material support for Dr Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, against what is openly being labeled as "Soviet aggression."

Last month Mr Reagan told the United Nations that he would be inviting the Soviet Union to cooperate in resolving regional conflicts in five strategic regions of the world -- Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

Only time will tell whether Mr Gorbachev has accepted the offer. But the Soviet leader can be sure of one thing. The Reagan Administration is not likely to let any further communist expansionism go unchallenged.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

KANGWANE'S MABUZA URGES MANDELA RELEASE

MB251708 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1608 GMT 25 Nov 85

[Text] Johannesburg, Nov 25, SAPA -- The release of Nelson Mandela was sine qua now in the search for a lasting solution to South Africa's political problems, Mr Enos Mabuza, chief minister of Kangwane, told British prime minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, in London today.

In a memorandum Mr Mabuza presented to Mrs Thatcher, a copy of which was released in Johannesburg, he said that as an immediate measure aimed at preventing increasing unrest, the South African Government should address the legitimate grievances of blacks, as well as speak to acceptable leaders instead of arresting and detaining them.

It should take urgent steps to dismantle apartheid laws, afford blacks equal economic opportunities and thus create a conducive climate for a negotiated constitutional formula of genuine democratic principles.

Mr Mabuza said although he held no brief with the African National Congress, it was the institutionalised violence of apartheid that set the ANC on its path and despite its strategy of violence, it should be regarded as part of the solution to the country's problems.

Mr Mabuza said it was statutory discrimination against, and the denial of political rights to blacks that would continue to fuel anger and give rise to unrest.

He told Mrs Thatcher that although he was chief minister of a national state, he and his constituents were not willing participants of the system and rejected the homelands policy.

The danger existed that in initiating negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation the South African Government might co-opt homeland and local black leaders for talks that would, in his opinion, not be acceptable to the majority of blacks, Mr Mabuza said.

The British Government could play a greater role in normalising the South African situation by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on the National Party; and its assistance in educational and social advancement for blacks could be an indirect, but valuable contribution to the acceleration of reform, Mr Mabuza said.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

RADIO FREEDOM CALLS FOR INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN TO FREE MANDELA

EA261417 Addis Ababa Radio Freedom in English to South Africa 1930 GMT
25 Nov 85

[Inakho Tshomi commentary]

[Text] Compatriots, the decision last weekend by the apartheid rulers to finally return our heroic leader, Comrade Nelson Mandela, to their fascist dungeon at Pollsmoor Prison in spite of his ill health and after deliberately frustrating false hopes that he might be released, once more stresses the dire need for us, the oppressed people and the international community, to intensify the campaign for his release. We are now called upon to intensify more than ever before the struggle for the release of Mandela and all other political prisoners at all levels of struggle. The Botha regime has once again told us in no uncertain terms that it will never release Mandela, his colleagues and all other political prisoners of its own free will. It will have to be pressurized, it will have to be fought by nothing else but struggle by high-(pitched) battles and international [word indistinct].

We will have to see more and more combinations of our offensives in the streets as well as on the factory floor. It will never [words indistinct]. And as much as the government refuses to release Mandela neither will it ever dismantle its criminal and oppressive apartheid system of its own free will. The release of Mandela and all political prisoners and the total dismantling of the repressive system of apartheid can only be the fruit of public reaction, of our sacrifices in the battlefields. There is no way out.

We are up against a clique of dedicated intransigents and stubborn men who will not listen to any pleas nor any other language than that [word indistinct]. Once again, they have left us with no other choice but to intensify the struggle for the release of our leaders and the destruction of the hated system of apartheid. We are once again reminded of the wise words of our president, Comrade Oliver Tambo, that without struggle Botha and his fascist henchmen will not only not reform their criminal apartheid system but will also not see any reason at all.

Unless there is intensified struggle against their barbarous regime, there will be no need for them to reform anything. Today, they are talking the

language of so-called reforms not because they have suddenly changed hearts and become benevolent but they are reacting to our struggle, to our sacrifice. Today they are talking of the release of Mandela and other political prisoners although still putting unacceptable conditions but they are doing so not because they have suddenly become soft-hearted and very considerate but it is because of our struggle -- our campaign for the release of those patriots from jail. But now they have again decided to ignore all of those calls for the release of Mandela. Instead to [words indistinct] sending him back to his cell only means that we must continue fighting.

It means now we must mount even more of these campaigns demanding the release of these leaders and all others without any conditions. The idea that Mandela will be released only to be banished [words indistinct] in exile in Zambia or anywhere else outside his country of birth is as unacceptable and must be rejected and the same conditions that he renounces. That would be a conditional release and Mandela and our leaders in Polsmoor have rejected any and all such ridiculous conditions for their release.

We, the oppressed, are called upon to stand firmly beside them demanding and fighting for their unconditional release. It has to dawn very clearly in the minds of the Pretoria fascists and their imperialist, Western allies that there will never be peace in our country until those leaders are released unconditionally apartheid is defeated. There can be no compromise on that. Mandela and all our leaders must be released to come out to participate in the process leading to the establishment of a democratic non-racial South Africa as free men not to find themselves chained and even restricted by some ridiculous measures. After all Mandela and all our leaders have themselves categorically rejected any such offer of release.

They clearly declared in February this year they would never sell their birthright to be free. They would never accept release from prison only to be imprisoned in their own yards in the bantustans and now banishment in exile. As those leaders clearly stated, countrymen, their freedom and ours -- their oppressed people -- is inseparable. They cannot and will never regard themselves as free men while we, the oppressed people, are still subjugated under the criminal system of apartheid, while large parts of our country are ruled under martial law [words indistinct].

Mandela's freedom is synonymous with the destruction of apartheid. By their decision to return him to prison in spite of his ill health, the apartheid rulers have once more undermined respect. Apartheid must go for Mandela to be released. The struggle continues. The free the Mandela campaign must be intensified.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC RADIO CALLS FOR OVERTHROW OF APARTHEID GOVERNMENT

EA251534 Dar es Salaam Radio Freedom in English 1815 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "Workers' Unity, Which is People's Unity"]

[Text] Compatriots and fellow workers: The call for the strengthening of the weapon in the fight for equality and justice. It is in the interests of all antiracist fighters to see to the unity of the most oppressed and exploited class of our country. The workers, who constitute the largest section of our population are the ones who, for many generations, have been in direct contact with the crude policies of apartheid. They have stood firm to their demands and as a workforce they should respond to the call of unity in a more vigorous way. They should see to the dismantling of the apartheid regime.

Recently, the Botha regime has once more threatened to withdraw all workers coming from the bordering countries. The regime is again responding to the call for its international isolation. And the call by the African National Congress is being responded to at a time when the regime is all out to suppress the revolutionary wave that is hitting both the economy and the political life of white South Africa. The illegal occupation of Namibia and the enforcement of barbaric laws of the apartheid system, which has been declared by the UN as inhuman, are the two evils of the Pretoria regime which must be eradicated in the benefit of the two countries of Namibia and South Africa.

The cause of racism is being challenged by the people of our country as a whole. The townships and the factories have turned out to be the platforms of violent change of the policies of the regime. And the unity that has been forged by the coming together of the democratic trade unions in South Africa is a step ahead in the direction of the revolutionary overthrow of the system. The formation of the United Democratic Front, which has stood firmly in the fight against racism and the complete overthrow of the apartheid regime, was and remains the unity that will lead South Africa to change, and not to reform. Today the trade union movements have joined hands and have vowed to stand as one in the face of all evils of the capitalist.

(To) the management and the employee, the very process of making profit by subjugating our people to inhuman laws that keep our people in perpetual slavery, shall be challenged by the unity of all workers. The threat by the capitalists, as led by P. W. Botha, will not win any war by expelling migrant workers from neighboring South Africa [as heard].

For the workers of our country and the trade union movement, the duty lies squarely on us. These workers are not our enemies but our fellow workers. They have been exposed to the horrors of capitalism and exploitation of man by man. This situation has to be proved to Botha and his gang, that the solutions of the country's problems does not lie in the presence of migrant workers from neighboring countries. This move alone is a mere retaliation to the call for sanctions against South Africa. It is a reason that South Africa tries to put forward in its attempt to create economic dependence of the neighboring countries to its economy. This is a myth that the countries bordering with South Africa are trying to (defuse).

The formation of the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference] and its success is enough proof to the economies of southern Africa have less to do with the regime. [As heard] What is happening is the economic sabotage conducted by the regime with its bandit movements in Lesotho and Mozambique. South Africa has opted to destabilize their economies in response to its isolation.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions should stand firm against the expulsion of foreign migrant workers from the mines and other industries. This move by the enemy should be rejected and defied.

The rate of unemployment inside the country is caused by the laws that govern the making of capital and which are in the interests of the capitalists and none in the interests of the workers. The intensification of trade union activities, aimed at bringing to a halt long years of exploitation of the African workers and the creation of more comforts and privileges to the white community will force the government to change.

To the workers and all trade unions in the Congress of South African Trade Unions: The most important task is to expand the ground of political activity and begin to demand the complete dismantling of the apartheid system as a whole. The demand for better wages and better conditions of work have not brought any significant change in the fight for the transfer of power to the people.

The workers must learn to take up issues of running industrial affairs on their own. There must be a replacement of racist employees with peoples organs of labor. In an effort to advance the struggle the workers must learn all possible means of racist labor machines to stop by sabotaging them, by removing important parts from the machines. These machines can only serve to raise the falling white economy and not the needs and demands of our people. Their continued existence shall not help advance the struggle for equality and justice.

Fellow countrymen and dear compatriots, the economic might of the regime falls and rises because of our contribution. Let us use our might as workers and stop all brutalities that are taking place in the townships and fight for the removal of all members of the defense force and all whose duty is to kill the young and old in the streets of our townships. Let the trade union movement join hands with the democratic movement and see to the complete overthrow of the regime.

It is important to note that the international community and the progressive mankind is behind our struggle and is doing all that is possible to isolate the regime. Ours is to join hands and advance the war of liberation. Ours is to prepare conditions and be ready for the complete transfer of power to the people. Let us begin to fight and bring down all organs of the state.

Dear countrymen, let us consolidate our victories and look to greater achievements. Generations and generations have lived under this system of rule. They are perished under the same system. It is today more important that the destruction of the regime should be speeded up. The long years of oppression and exploitation, accompanied by repression, must finally come to an end.

Fellow workers, our unity is our strength and, therefore, it should come in its most vigorous way. This unity must aim at challenging white supremacy and paving the way for the establishment of democracy in our country. An injury to one is an injury to all.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY SEES FEDERAL STRUCTURE EMERGING WITH REFORM

MB240615 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 23 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "Multilateral Cooperation"]

[Text] This week's conference between South Africa and the four independent black states within its borders, known as the TBVC countries of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, symbolized the growing cooperation between all South Africans towards a new reform to create a South Africa with equal rights and opportunities for all irrespective of race, color, or creed.

In just 3 years, this multilateral cooperation between the five states has blossomed into a formal secretariat of which the Multilateral Development Council of Ministers is the highest policy-making body overseeing general development strategy. This cooperation in areas such as agriculture, commerce and industry, health and welfare, manpower and training, tourism, and posts and telecommunications, has led to mutual benefit, including a joint regional development program and the establishment of the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

This system of equal freedom for all South Africa's 10 different black nations could form the basis of a federal system of government which could also include the communities from these 10 nations who live and work in the major centers in South Africa. Collectively, these people are known as the urban blacks. This federal system appears to be the direction in which the reform process in South Africa is gradually developing. Up to now, visible negotiation has been between the South African government -- which includes the white, colored, and Indian communities -- and the governments of the 10 black states, independent or self-governing. Because of the unrest situation in some of the urban black areas, negotiations with the leaders of these communities have had to be conducted in secret.

All this has led to the present move toward the inclusion of black leaders in the influential presidents council. It is this council which brought the reform process off the ground and which led to the establishment of the new 3-chamber parliament for the white, colored, and Indian communities. The inclusion of black leaders in the President's Council could end the present negotiating impasse, and it might well become a vehicle for power-sharing and joint decision-making between all the people of greater South Africa.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

RADIO FREEDOM ACCUSES GOVERNMENT OF TRYING TO DIVIDE RACIAL GROUPS

EA230022 Addis Ababa Radio Freedom in English to South Africa 1930 GMT
20 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "Unity is Our Main Weapon of Struggle"]

[Text] Compatriots, the grave and unfortunate development of events during the past few days in Queenstown and the surrounding colored and African townships in that Eastern Cape area of our country once more stresses the need for us, all the oppressed black people, African, coloured and Indian, to carefully preserve our unity and to make this task one of our main priorities; to guard our bonds of unity jealously, that has been strengthened and cemented by the blood of our martyrs which has flown for decades and to remain vigilant against enemy attempts to disunite or to destroy them.

It is becoming clear once again, countrymen, that the enemy's dirty tricks department is actively working within our midst, trying to drive a wedge between our different racially oppressed groups. (It will) never and will never become necessary for us, the oppressed, to solve our differences of whatever nature through violent means, through attacking each other or petrol-bombing or stoning each other's residences. Our enemy is one. It is the barbaric apartheid regime and it is against him that we should direct all our anger and united might against.

Our attacks against colored residences or African residences, even if it is only for one night, only gives the enemy the respite he needs. Turning against each other amongst the oppressed black people only helps the enemy to perpetuate his oppressive rule over us all. It gives the Boer regime all the time and chance it needs so desperately. It helps to save for Botha's soldiers and police the bullets, tear-gas and batons they needed to crush our united might against them.

Whatever differences that might exist amongst us the oppressed, countrymen, must always by all means be resolved amicably without the use of violence against each other. Whatever problems might exist must be resolved in a calm spirit of political dialogue, as they do not in anyway constitute antagonistic contradictions.

We should not let ourselves to be diverted from our right and legitimate political line of (march) and give comfort and encouragement to an increasingly

uncomfortable and frightened regime. Instead, all genuine patriots of our motherland should work hard to prevent our people becoming unwitting tools of the Botha-Malan-Le Grange clique. The differences that seem to exist between our African and colored people in and around Queenstown can easily be resolved through dialogue. Our various civic and community leaders are called upon to sit down and discuss these problems and resolve them in a mature, political atmosphere. It is their task to ensure that common points are (raised), points of strengthening our unity are correctly identified and that divisive factors and elements are isolated.

By so doing, we may even realize that the unfortunate violence that erupted over these past few days was actually instigated by enemy agents and provocateurs, as we have finally discovered to have been the case in August this year when there was violent conflict between our African and Indian compatriots in the (Kumiks), Inanda KwaMashu and Umlazi as well as other affected areas of Durban. A crisis committee was formed there, consisting of leading and respected members from all the oppressed black communities of Durban, whose main purpose was to take urgent steps to stop the violence and build peace and friendship amongst our people. The committee of our respected leaders clearly identified the problem that existed (there) and was able to discover that one of the main contributing factors to that violence were hooligans from both the African and Indian communities who were responsible for the burning, looting and robbing of our people. And it was clear to them that these hooligans were being instigated from somewhere. Others did not even belong to the Durban [as heard] as they did not speak Zulu.

The final conclusion was that some force was indeed trying to divide us, the oppressed black people, and break our unity. The hooligans were being used by the apartheid regime as its tool to divide the Indian and African people.

Today in Queenstown, countrymen, this might be the same case again. This is why our community and respected leaders in that area from both communities will also act urgently to take concrete steps of resolving the problem that now exists there.

Our main goal at all times, countrymen, must be to strengthen our unity into a mighty force against the apartheid regime. This unity, which we have no doubt achieved over the years at such a high price, must be defended by all patriots and democrats of our country. We should know the main enemy at this crucial phase in our struggle is the criminal apartheid regime which continues to deny us all, the people, our democratic rights. The enemy is frightened of the ever growing unity of the oppressed. That is why it is using its (powerful agents), puppets, its army and police to counter this unity. What it hates to see is the united might of us, the oppressed, being felt even in the white areas of the country, where in the Cape and Johannesburg and other cities, colored and African youths and patriots have stood side by side, militantly confronting the fascist police and troops. The enemy is struggling desperately to turn that militancy against ourselves.

Compatriots, the perspectives of our revolutionary struggle must never be blurred. They must never be blurred by minor differences. We are determined to destroy the criminal apartheid monster, root-and-branch and on its ruins build a true, nonracial democracy in our country. To reach this goal we must strive by all means to attract into the arena of struggle all democratic forces drawn from all racial and class sections of our population. This is a task that faces us all African, colored, Indian and democratic whites. On this principle there can be no compromise. Unity is our main weapon in our struggle. [Inakho Ishomi].

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY SAYS WEST HARMING OWN INTERESTS IN COUNTRY

MB220827 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 22 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "South Africa and the West"]

[Text] The statement by South Africa's Deputy Minister of Information Mr Louis Nel that the West had failed to come to grips with the realities of southern Africa, to its own detriment as well as that of the region, calls for serious consideration.

Mr Nel was speaking in Munich at a symposium on policy and strategy organized by the Hans Seidel Stiftung. He said that if the Western world could rid itself of its prejudices and look objectively at the realities of the region it will adopt a different approach. Pointing out that southern Africa had become one of the focal points in the struggle between East and West, Mr Nel said the West was in danger of losing its leading position in the region in favor of the Soviet Union.

The tragedy of this situation is that it is the West itself which is contributing toward it. Western governments are giving way to radical pressure groups, many of which are fronts for communist parties or at least are anti-Western and anticapitalist. What Western nations have to recognize if they are not to lose ground in southern Africa to the Soviet Union, is that meaningful change is taking place in South Africa and that sanctions and disinvestment and the threat of these are counter-productive and against Western interests.

Another extremely important point to be grasped by Western governments is that the ANC and SWAPO terrorist organizations doing Moscow's bidding.

At the Munich Symposium, Mr Nel outlined a number of guidelines the West should follow in dealing with southern Africa. First among them is that the ANC should not be embraced by Western government but ostracized. This shift will come about only when it is recognized that the ANC is acting against Western interests. It is committed through revolution to turn South Africa into a Marxist-Socialist state. Secondly, the world's business community should be encouraged to invest in South Africa in order to hasten the reform process and improve the quality of life of the black people. Thirdly, rather than being concerned with those leaders in South Africa

who favor revolutionary change, the West should give greater recognition to the country's moderate black leaders.

With this approach the West will not only be making a positive contribution to the reform process in South Africa but also in the vital area of safeguarding its own interests in the entire subcontinent.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI SAYS BLACKS NEED 'UNITED VOICE' IN DURBAN

MB211731 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1708 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Durban, Nov 21, SAPA -- Blacks in the Durban area needed to be able to speak with a united voice, the KwaZulu chief minister, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said today. He was addressing Natalia Development Board officials, headed by Mr Carl Eggers, at a meeting in Ulundi on the question of whether Durban's Lamontville township and Hambanati, near Tongaat, should be included in KwaZulu. The outcome of the meeting is not yet known, but it is understood that more such discussions are to be held.

Chief Buthelezi told the development board officials: "We need a united black voice in the greater Durban area.

"The incorporation of Hambanati and Lamontville into KwaZulu will add to the strength of any representations which will need to be made to a central government."

This was important, he said, because the state president, Mr P. W. Botha, had talked about changes in political structures in urban areas, and of evolving structures to link urban areas to central government.

"As in many other matters, the state president has not spelt out what he envisages. We do not know where he intends going."

He appealed for the Natalia Development Board to handle the issue with prudence. Adequate discussion was needed before any steps were taken. There existed "simmering violence" in the area which could result in an explosion of violent activity if the incorporation issue became a catalyst.

"While we reject the government's consolidation plans, we appreciate the motivation behind the feelings of the residents of Hambanati and Lamontville to stand together with us so that we can stand or fall together." Chief Buthelezi denied that he had a greedy desire to incorporate more townships into KwaZulu.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S ROLE IN REGION

MB251228 Johannesburg International Service in English 1100 GMT 25 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "Southern Africa"]

[Text] The summit meeting between the Soviet and American leaders has apparently been reasonably cordial, but it has become clear that one of the main issues confronting them -- that of regional conflict -- remains far from resolved.

Insofar as South Africa is concerned, the view of the Soviet Union -- and it is shared by some Western Governments -- is that South Africa's policies are the main and underlying reason for the ills that beset the southern Africa region.

This is an incorrect assessment of the situation. It is not South Africa's fault that wars are raging in Angola and Mozambique, or that Lesotho is having to cope with guerrilla activity. These conflicts are the result of internal differences in the countries involved.

It is not South Africa's fault that the economists of many southern African states are (shaky). The reasons for that are Marxist-socialist policies and economic ineptitude.

Any objective observer of the southern African scene sees in the subcontinent one state that stands above all others when it comes to economic development, infrastructure, literacy, and standards of living. Throughout, South Africa's policies have been designed to promote community security, and to change in an evolutionary way towards meeting increasing black aspirations.

More than that, the development of South Africa has served as a catalyst for developments elsewhere in the region. Southern African states freely admit that their economies would collapse without South Africa.

It is that country upon which they lean, upon which they depend, for a vast number of essential services and (products). The power and wealth of South Africa in the African context -- its ability to provide a lifeline to its neighbors and to provide the Western world with essential minerals -- must be ascribed in the final analysis to this country's policies, and to nothing else.

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CSO: 3400/512

SOUTH AFRICA

WRITERS VIEWS TACTICS OF INTERNATIONAL MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS

Johannesburg ARMED FORCES in English Nov 85 pp 20-21

[Article by Alyn H. Denham]

[Text] In the years immediately preceding World War II, and as a direct result of agreements signed with the United States and the British Empire, Communist territorial control spread from a single nation, Russia, to engulf and enslave 100 million human beings in Europe, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Another 450 million were added at the end of 1949 as the Communists took over the Chinese mainland. In the 1950's, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, North Vietnam, Tibet and Cuba were to follow. The subjugation by Communist forces of South-East Asia was completed in the 1970's. More recently, a cooperative U.S. Congress included the pro-Western governments of Rhodesia and Nicaragua to the above list.

The expansionism that has been responsible for the subjugation of these hundreds of millions in less than half a century continues relentlessly. Southern Africa has become a focal point of this Communist expansionism following Moscow's successes in Angola. Mozambique and Rhodesia (now Marxist Zimbabwe). The strategic location of Southern Africa, control of which would present the Soviet Union with a monopoly of strategic minerals without which the economies of the United States and the Free World would collapse, has made it a prized objective.

The attack on South Africa

In seeking to attain this objective, the Kremlin has made South Africa a priority target using real and/or imagined grievances of the black majority as a scapegoat. Through successful exploitation of the guilt complex of post-Hitler and post-colonialism in Western nations, and through the successful marshalling of the numerical strength of the recently liberated Third World countries, international Communism has succeeded in misrepresenting South Africa as the only country in the world where racism is so institutionalized that it must be viewed as a special case of international condemnation.

The consequence of this successful Communist onslaught against South Africa is, that whereas the anti-South African campaign was initially a purely Communist campaign, it has now reached the stage where it is conducted on a world-wide basis. The chief vehicles in the campaign today are the following:

International communism, which helps finance Communist and terrorist organizations which believe that revolution is the only way to power, and which also finances front organizations in the United States and the Free World that provide propaganda on South Africa.

The United Nations, which, in total disregard of its founding objective of promoting world peace, has established a gargantuan structure directed at destroying South Africa's pro-Western status.

Radical church groups, which have become addicted to a social gospel, and have come under the influence of clergy from the churches in atheistic Communist countries, churches under Kremlin control.

Marxist, liberal and left-wing organizations in the Free World whose activities are noteworthy for the overlapping of personnel and the commitment to the full spectrum of Marxist/Leninist causes.

The Western Media which makes its facilities available to propaganda against South Africa emanating from the abovementioned groups and organizations.

The campaign itself has a five-prong purpose:

To force the handover of power from the current pro-Western government of South West Africa/Namibia to the Soviet-backed South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as a prelude to the overthrow of the status quo within South Africa itself.

To provide financial and other support to organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), and various related Marxist splinter groups. All of these organisations are committed to mounting terrorist actions from external bases in order to effect revolutionary, as distinct from evolutionary, change in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia.

To support internal subversion, sabotage and revolution in South Africa directed at overthrowing the present government by force and installing in its place a black regime which (in the design of International Communism) will be a precursor to a Communist dictatorship.

To pressurize foreign governments and organizations to sever all ties with South Africa in all fields of endeavour, but more particularly in the diplomatic, political, sports and economic fields (though, in the latter instance, sanctions and especially oil and armaments sanctions, disinvestment by foreign corporation, and boycotting of South African goods) in belief that total isolation will bring South Africa to her knees.

As a means to the above ends, to saturate the world with anti-South African propaganda, no matter how far removed from the truth that propaganda might be.

The American Left in Action

Religious organizations in the United States work closely with a wide range of secular groups. For example, the Reverend Timothy Smith of the Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) is also on the Executive Board of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) which, with its lobbying arm, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), spearheads the secular movements in the United States for the overthrow of South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia.

WOA's record shows that it played a key role in the passing, by the United States Congress, of the disgraceful Clark amendment which restrained the U.S. government from assisting the freedom fighters of Angola, led by UNITA leader Dr. Jonas Savimbi, in their efforts to overthrow the current murderous Marxist leadership. This amendment also secured the repeal of the Byrd amendment which allowed the importation by the United States of strategic chrome, or imperative to industry, from pro-Western Rhodesia. The WOA has also remained in the forefront of the campaign to deny bank loans to South Africa.

WOA's parent organization, ACOA, originated in meetings in London in 1951 between members of the African National Congress (ANC) and an American activist radical, Bill Sutherland, now an employee of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) which is based in Marxist Tanzania. AFSC justifies the use of violence by terrorist on the grounds that democratic societies are "violent". The ACOA has taken a leadership role in the campaign to stop United States bank loans to South Africa, to promote disinvestment in South Africa by U.S. corporations, and to stop the sale of Krugerrands in America.

Together, ACOA and WOA serve as primary financial sources for other radical groups such as the Southern Africa Committee (SAC) and the Patrice Lumumba Coalition. They have particularly close ties with Randall Robinson's TransAfrica, a militantly leftist organisation, and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), generally recognised as America's farthest left organization amongst those many Marxist groups which refrain from openly professing a Marxist alignment. The IPS has given birth to another Marxist group, the Transnational Institute (TI) which is based in Amsterdam.

TransAfrica's Board of Directors includes Carlton B. Goodlett, a veteran member of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) who is active Vice-President of the Kremlin-controlled World Peace Council, the Helsinki-based group identified in 1978 by the Central Intelligence Agency as Russia's single most important front organization. Also on TransAfrica's Board is Courtland Cox, who is closely associated with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). Of course, TransAfrica is a strong and vocal supporter of the Communist terrorist SWAPO and the ANC and has played host on more than one occasion to leaders of these murderous groups on visits to the United States.

The Institute for Policy Studies, which is also involved in the anti-South African campaign, has consistently advocated policies that support Soviet foreign policy. IPS and its Transnational Institute (TI) have documented ties to the Russian and Cuban intelligence services. These two organizations have made much use in their activities in Western Europe of the late Ruth First (killed in Angola in 1982 by a parcel bomb), a high level functionary of the South African Communist Party and wife of Joe Slovo, thought to be a Colonel in the Russian secret police, the KGB, who currently has the task of supervising ANC terrorist actions against South Africa. It is interesting to note that Ruth First, despite subscribing to the atheistic doctrines of Communism, was also a propagandist for the World Council of Churches. (Ruth first was considered to be a specialist working for SWAPO).

The inter-linking personnel and resources on the Far Left in the United States is not confined to the ACOA, WOA, ICCR, IPS, TransAfrica, AFSC, and the National Council of Churches (NCC). There are a plethora of splinter radical organizations in the United States which collaborate in the campaign against Southern Africa, most under the leadership of either the NCC, the ACOA, TransAfrica, or the IPS.

The hundreds of Communist-oriented organizations in the United States which are part of the campaign to destabilize Southern Africa, either as their sole objective or as part of anti-anti-Communist projects, span every conceivable area of activity from the legal profession to scholars, from academics to trade unions, from the U.S. Congress to the pulpits of churches that are members of the National Council of Churches. They include Marxists, Trotskyites, the Communist Party of the United States, and an innocent and naive public that are being influenced by these organizations.

If the United States Justice Department revealed the true colour (Red) of these Soviet-fronts, they would wither and die on the vine because Communism and truth cannot exist side by side. It is critical for the readers of this article to realize that if South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia fall into the abyss of the Soviet sphere, the United States will not be far behind.

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CSO: 3400/574

SOUTH AFRICA

THOUGHTS ON URBAN INSURGENCY IN NATION'S CONTEXT

Johannesburg ARMED FORCES in English Nov 85 pp 6-8

[Article by R.F. Reid Daly]

[Text] Introduction

Insuregnecy - General. The insurgent, his reason for being, his aims and the means he uses to achieve his aims must be thoroughly understood if he is to be defeated. The means he uses ar often devious, sometimes to the uninitiated to provide the stimulus to achieve his political aim. It should never be forgotten, however, that his civil and military actions are totally subordinate to his political aims. Mao Tse-tung emphasising the importance of a good public image to engender popular support stated: "if guerilla war is without a political objective, it must fail; equally if it maintains a political objective which is incompatible with the political objectives of the people it will not receive their support, and this war will also fail." Total involvement of the masses is the key to succession a guerilla war.

Government forces

It follows then, that if the insurgent is to be defeated, he must be confronted by Security Forces and a Government more determined and skilled than he in the application of civil and military counter measures. It is an unfortunate fact, however, that these two areas are often grossly misunderstood.

The realities and practicalities of an insurgency war often escape the conventional military mind because of a tendency to cloak these in academic semantics and definitions. It has been said that the areas of irregular and psychological warfare belong more properly to the field of the social sciences. The average soldier confronted by an irregular war situation has never studied the social sciences and it is probably just as well, for he would flounder even more deeply into a morass of academic theory which he does not always understand. It is extremely important then that the theory and the practical application of civil and military measures to be adopted in an

insurgency war are clearly and simply defined, and that all involved in the persecution of the war understand precisely what is their function.

A Frenchman writing under the nom de plume "Colonel Nemo" stated that: "Regular armies have almost never succeeded in gaining the ascendancy over guerrilla operations of any importance. Perhaps it is because of a sub-conscious desire to hide this importance that the great commanders have minimised the role of guerrilla operations."

Strategy and tactics

Insurgents

It did not require a military genius to predict the strategy and tactics insurgents would adopt in order to attempt to effect the overthrow of the Government of the RSA.

The insurgent as set out above is essentially a propagandist. All means to promote his propaganda are grist to the mill. He is, amongst other things, an agitator, and used violent confrontation as a means of involving the masses on a personal basis against Government. In this way he bonds the masses to his movement by a literal "pact of blood". He endeavours to inflame the emotions generated by acts of mob violence to a peak so that a crisis point is reached, and a state of revolution becomes general throughout the country. The geography and grouping of the population of a country will dictate the type of insurgency war to be waged i.e. urban or rural. The choice of the urban scenario currently being experienced in South Africa therefore, should not have surprised anyone, if indeed it did.

From a propaganda point of view the urban scenario has much more scope to offer than does the rural. A rural insurgency war is usually spread over great distances with poor communications making the coverage of incidents by the news media difficult. By contrast the urban scene is quickly and easily available to the media. Insurgents are able to manipulate mob actions at will and force the Security forces to react to them. They are also in a position where they are able to manufacture incidents which the outside news media can use to tremendous effect to propagate the cause of the insurgent. The lack of faith exhibited by the average American in his "cause" during the Vietnam War can be directly attributed to the war being brought into Mr Average Americans home every evening during that war. And it proved to be a mind numbing, morale sapping exercise to the American nation depriving it, and consequently its Army, the will to fight and win.

The adverse overseas publicity the RSA has received as a result of media exposure of recent riots in Black Townships should sound a sombre warning to all in authority. For, as we have seen, any reaction by our Security Forces to a situation brought about by insurgent action, however justifiable and sensible in the immediate circumstances, can have disastrous repercussions on the Country's image. Security Forces under the constant focus of the outside media, have a heavy responsibility. Their task, in normal circumstances, is onerous enough, for they have to fight insurgency on one hand yet, while so

doing, avoid any action which might discredit the Security forces and therefore the Country.

The initiative belongs to the insurgent; it is he who decides when the war will begin and what form it will take. The Security Forces have to play a waiting game. They have to disperse themselves so that they can cover areas of potential threat. Their task, particularly in an Urban role, is of a defensive nature; they must restore and maintain order; protect property and life. The political nature of the struggle imposes limitations on the actions of conventional Government Forces. The only avenue open to the Security Forces where they can compete with the insurgent, using his own fundamental tactics, is by skillful use of especially trained Special Forces. But whatever form the Security Force tactics take, there is one imperative to which all efforts of the Security Forces must be directed. And that is that the initial stage of an insurgent campaign must not be allowed to develop into its next logical stage.

Security Forces. It is probably true to say that the South African Security Forces main counter insurgency training and indeed, practical experience, has been directed toward rural operation. What the current climate now requires as a matter of urgency, is a well constructed urban strategy specifically designed to beat the insurgent at best, or contain him at worst. Failure to achieve this could have very serious consequences upon the Country. But before any such strategy is set into motion, one prime requisite must be resolved. And that is the STATUS of the insurgency campaign i.e., is it to be looked at as simply industrial unrest, or is it to be regarded as outright revolutionary warfare. This is extremely important and there can be no pussy footing here in the hope of gaining political mileage. The quicker the nation is apprised of its situation the better.

History has shown that a blinkered or sheltered approach often has extremely adverse effect on the morale of the population when the realisation of their true situation sets in. In this context the writer is reminded of the uproar which ensued when a Rhodesian Police Provincial Commissioner, who was being dined out, concluded his farewell speech by saying to his Commissioner:

"Sir - for years you have treated us like mushrooms - you have kept us in the dark and fed us on manure." (Manure was not the actual word used).

Whatever the Rhodesians faults he was never afraid to speak up, and this anecdote is merely mentioned to highlight an ever present danger in a national crisis.

It is important then that the issues are acknowledged and faced up to in the early stages of a revolutionary war. Failure to do this will result in the insurgent increasing his initiative and control over the situation with a consequent rapid escalation of the war. The Security Forces, by contrast, (as has happened at the commencement of so many other insurgency wars) lacking in positive direction, will feel helpless and become despondent because of an inability to get to grips with the problem.

Joint Operations Centres

Mention was made earlier of the urgent necessity of determining the status of a state of unrest as early as possible for the cogent reasons already canvassed. There is also another very important reason for this and that is the so often vexed question of command and control. In the early stages of all insurgency wars this prickly and contentious subject inevitably seems to raise its head. Regrettably, in spite of past lessons on this very issue, it appears that the wheel has to be re invented at the commencement of each war with all the attendant frustrations to the fighting troops, whilst interservice rivalry, and interference from agencies ranging from Politicians and heads of Civil Service Departments, take place. Whilst the Security Forces bicker and lose the opportunity to gain the initiative so vital in the early rounds, the insurgent, clear in his aim and free of such infighting makes heavy inroads into the local population capitalising on the breathing space afforded him by the Security Forces.

The British experienced these very problems in Malaya as early as 1948. After some severe military reverses they devised a system of command and control by means of a series of committees at various national levels. The British realised, almost too late, that the principal ingredient of success against insurgents is the ability to co-ordinate the actions of all civil, police and military forces of Government. And this principle has been adopted by most countries who have encountered problems of insurgency.

But every system has its own inherent weaknesses and Command by Committee certainly has its share. I.L. JANIS has this to say on Government by Committee and what he say is also pertinent to Command by Committee.

"Another hazard of modern war is Government by committee." Four of the worst military disasters in recent American history (Bay of Pigs, Pearl Harbour, Korean War, Vietnam) are directly attributable to the psychological processes which altered group decision making. These American disasters show very clearly that even the combined intellects and specialised knowledge of highly intelligent men are no proof against decisions so totally unrealistic as to subsequently tax the credulity of even those who made them. Far from diminishing the chances of ineptitude, the group actually accentuates the effects of those very traits which may lead to incompetence in individual commanders. The system of this process which Janis terms "group think" include:

- a. An illusion of invulnerability that becomes shared by most members of the group.
- b. Collective attempts to ignore or rationalise away items of information which might otherwise lead the group to reconsider shaky but cherished assumptions.
- c. An unquestioned belief in the groups inherent morality, thus enabling members to overlook the ethical consequences of their decision.

- d. Stereotyping the enemy as either too evil for negotiation or too stupid and feeble to be a threat.
- e. A shared illusion of unanimity in a majority viewpoint augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent.
- f. Self appointed "mind guards" to protect the group from adverse information that might shatter complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.

At the outset of the bush war in Rhodesia, the Rhodesians, were undoubtedly far better prepared for an insurgency war than any other country in Africa. This was not due to any prophetic brilliance on the part of the Rhodesians. It was simply because they had served over a number of years (going back as far as 1951) in the insurgency war then being waged in Malaya. Their military schools had already prepared training manuals on the tactics to be employed against insurgents should a war break out.

Counter insurgency training, in fact, formed a normal part of all military training.

A system of command and control following closely on the British system of committees had been instituted (in theory), at all levels as early as March 1964. On the surface all looked well, and with the standard of training which had been achieved in the Army, a well oiled machine should have swung into action the moment any insurgent action took place. The human factor and interservice rivalry however, had not been taken into account. The Rhodesian Police, in spite of the cogent lessons spelt out for them from the insurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, were still firmly of the opinion, that armed insurgents were a police matter, and that the Army should only be called in to assist, if the Police were hard pressed, and then only in support of the Police!

Following a skirmish with seven insurgents which the Police handled using Reservists in preference to the Army, the Army Commander put a case to Government and demanded that the Defence Force be given its proper role. Perhaps one of the most interesting facts which emerged as this war developed was that it very quickly became standard practice that the Army chaired the JOC meetings and in fact commanded operations. This came about because as the tempo and the pressures brought about by the war increased, the Police and other civilian agencies began to realise that Rhodesia was in the throes of a war, and a revolutionary war as a war in every sense of the word and war is a soldiers business, not a policemen's.

Township Tactics. A soldier orientated to rural insurgency, is often somewhat at a loss when confronted by urban insurgency for the first time. He should not be however, for he has a number of advantages over the urban insurgent which he did not enjoy when fighting the rural insurgent. In a rural scenario the aim of the insurgent is to subvert the countryside. By skillful use of small groups spread over as large an area as possible, he endeavours to force the Security Forces to spread themselves as thinly as possible over as wide an

area as possible. In this way he reduces the potency of the Security Forces and can even weaken them to the extent whereby they become the targets instead of the reverse.

The Security Forces to avoid this tactic often have to take a calculated risk and denude selected areas of troops. The danger here is that these areas will be immediately declared "liberated" areas by the insurgents. So unless the Security Forces have a 1st class intelligence service which will enable them to group and strike accurately, and at will, they have a problem and are in fact losing the war.

The urban insurgent however, does not have this facility. The fact that he operates in the townships means that he is concentrating his forces in a relatively small area. Security Forces, therefore, enjoy an advantage over the insurgent and can maximise on the principle of concentration of force. Security forces are able to achieve one thing that is almost impossible in the rural scene and that is to dominate the ground.

By dividing the township up into sectors down to section level and actually living in these townships Security Forces will dominate the ground. Consideration should be given to the following:

- a. Strongpoints the construction of these at strategic points will enable Special Forces to impose a strong network over the entire township.
- b. Patrols. Active patrolling by day and night will make it very difficult for insurgents to gather mobs together in order to foment riots. These patrols should be by foot and vehicle and carried out continuously by day and by night.
- c. Re-action Units. These should be vehicle borne positioned at strategic points ready to react to patrol reports. Each Company, for example, should have its own reaction unit.
- d. Surveillance. All high points should be occupied and used for the purpose of surveillance. Fixed wing aircraft at high altitude in radio contact with troops are also a useful adjunct for this task.
- e. Helicopters. A small "fire force" comprising selected men provides an invaluable means of pursuing ringleaders and effecting their capture. Ringleaders and agitators are thus deprived of their traditional cover i.e. that of taking cover within the mob.
Stone throwing gangs can be similarly dealt with. A good surveillance network can pinpoint houses in which such personnel have taken refuge. Deployment by helicopter makes their capture a simple matter.
- f. Special Forces. Urban insurgency is a tailor made situation for special force operations. Their ability to provide top class up to the minute intelligence makes their deployment a must.

- g. Intelligence. If Security Forces are to be able to maximise on the advantages urban insurgency affords them, i.e. the concentration of both forces, it is mandatory that all intelligence services liaise closely at the various JOC levels.
- h. Indigenous Troops. Maximum use of these troops should be made even if they are split up to provide a presence with each group of White troops. The use of Black troops does much to reduce the image of a Black/White confrontation and removes a string from the propaganda bow of the insurgents. Black soldiers understand the sensitivities of their people and above all have the ability to communicate and tell the people exactly why they are there, and what Government is trying to achieve.

Civil Action Programmes. It has been said that anti-insurgency campaign must be 80% civil action and 20% military. What is not added unfortunately is that all the civil actions in the world will be to no avail if the military actions are not successful. It is, therefore, the prime function of the military to prosecute a vigorous and unrelenting campaign against the insurgents. In this way a firm platform is provided so that political and civil reforms/actions can be implemented without interference. Civil actions are the business of the Civil Authorities not the Army although they are obviously dovetailed in the planning of operations at JOC level.

Conclusion

The thoughts expressed above deal mainly with the military aspect of an insurgency war. The military, however, acknowledge that most, if not all, of these wars must have a "cause" - a promise of better things which will initiate and sustain a struggle, often against tremendous odds. The tasks of the Security Forces, whilst Civic and political action takes place, is to neutralise the revolution by destroying its promise. And this is achieved by military action which shows the insurgent, in the clearest of terms, that he cannot and will not succeed.

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CSO: 3400/574

SOUTH AFRICA

EXCHEQUER ACCOUNT RECEIPTS, TRANSFERS REPORTED

Cape Town GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English/Afrikaans 15 Nov 85 pp 3-5

[Text] No 2568

15 November 1985

Statement of Receipts Into and Transfers From the Exchequer Account for the period 1 April 1985 to 31 October 1985.

Treasury, Pretoria.

[Statement on following page]

Receipts

| Head of Revenue | Month of October | | Total 1 April to 31 October | |
|--|----------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|----------------|
| | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| Exchequer Balance, 31 March 1985 | R -- | R -- | R 533,229,222 | R -- |
| Exchequer Balance, 30 September 1985 | R 988,899 | R -- | R -- | R -- |
| State Revenue Account | | | | |
| Inland Revenue | 2,010,713,850 | 1,715,518,351 | 15,353,040,951 | 11,668,328,386 |
| Customs and Excise | 41,669,260 | Dr 6,366,845 | 826,136,796 | 932,456,094 |
| | 2,052,383,110 | 1,709,151,506 | 16,179,177,747 | 12,600,784,480 |
| National Road Fund | -- | 13,864,630 | 3,101,131 | 100,432,795 |
| State Oil Fund | -- | 24,057,686 | 2,640,274 | 175,339,439 |
| South African Development Trust Fund | -- | 6,323,000 | 7,931,255 | 16,020,005 |
| Sorghum Beer Research Fund | -- | -- | 1,107 | -- |
| S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund | -- | -- | 150 | 2,040 |
| | R -- | 44,245,316 | 13,673,917 | 291,794,279 |
| Other Receipts | | | | |
| Treasury Bills: Internal | 1,781,671,000 | -- | 9,611,528,000 | -- |
| Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Raised | | | | |
| Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds | 13,068,000 | -- | 53,462,800 | -- |
| Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds | | | | |
| Internal Registered Stock-- | 1,563,350 | -- | 8,264,800 | -- |
| 15.5%, 1990 | 53,000,000 (1,528,000)* | -- | 1,490,000,000 (90,003,000)* | -- |
| 16%, 1986 | -- | -- | 500,000,000 (16,822,000)* | -- |
| 15%, 1988 | -- | -- | 350,000,000 | -- |
| 14.5%, 2006 | -- | -- | (27,800,000)* | -- |
| 15%, 1994 | -- | -- | (20,579,000)* | -- |
| 14%, 1992 | -- | -- | 725,500,000 (39,316,000)* | -- |
| | | | 168,000,000 500,000,000 | -- |
| | | | (27,966,000)* | |

[Continued on following page]

| | Receipts | | | Total 1 April to 31 October |
|---|------------------------------|------|----------------|------------------------------|
| | Month of October | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| Head of Revenue | 1985 | -- | -- | 50,000,000 |
| 14.5%, 1987 | -- | -- | -- | (829,000)* |
| 14%, 1987 | 120,000,000 (2,705,000)* | -- | -- | 300,000,000 (6,819,000)* |
| 14%, 1995 | 200,000,000 (27,275,000)* | -- | -- | 200,000,000 (27,275,000)* |
| Foreign Loans and Credits Raised-- | -- | -- | -- | 74,266,617 |
| 1978 | -- | -- | -- | 146,341,463 |
| 1985/91 | 298,141 | -- | -- | 7,718,357 |
| 1981/86 | 55,523,766 | -- | -- | 87,746,624 |
| Surrenders, Revenue Services 1984/85 | R 2,225,124,257 | -- | 14,272,828,661 | -- |
| *Less Discount RSA Stocks | R 31,508,000 | -- | 257,409,000 | -- |
| Inland Revenue | R 2,193,616,257 | -- | 14,015,419,661 | -- |
| Transfer from State Revenue Account | R 4,245,999,367 | -- | 30,208,271,325 | -- |
| Appropriation Account: House of Assembly | 3,928,985 | -- | 14,347,554 | -- |
| Inland Revenue | R 155,812,000 | -- | 1,376,552,000 | -- |
| Transfer from State Revenue Account | R 159,740,985 | -- | 1,390,899,554 | -- |
| Appropriation Account: House of Representatives | 1,045 | -- | 27,281 | -- |
| Inland Revenue | R 122,000,000 | -- | 757,000,000 | -- |
| Transfer from State Revenue Account | R 122,001,045 | -- | 757,027,281 | -- |
| Appropriation Account: House of Delegates | 241,968 | -- | 1,542,794 | -- |
| Inland Revenue | R 46,491,968 | -- | 313,930,000 | -- |
| Transfer from State Revenue Account | R 4,574,233,365 | -- | 32,671,670,954 | -- |
| Total (including Opening Balance) | R 4,575,222,264 | -- | 33,204,900,176 | -- |

| Service | Issues | Estimates 1985/86 | | Month of October 1985 | | 1984 | | Total 1 April to 31 October 1984 | |
|--|--------|----------------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|
| | | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R |
| State Revenue Account Votes | | 10,908,000 | 868,000 | 916,000 | 6,104,000 | 6,104,000 | 6,104,000 | 6,239,080 | 6,239,080 |
| Statutory Amount | | 266,000 | 22,170 | 16,583 | 155,190 | 155,190 | 155,190 | 98,581 | 98,581 |
| Parliament | | 19,736,000 | 1,394,000 | 1,790,000 | 11,171,000 | 11,171,000 | 11,171,000 | 7,827,000 | 7,827,000 |
| Statutory Amount | | 12,036,000 | 964,000 | 1,043,000 | 6,800,000 | 6,800,000 | 6,800,000 | 4,793,000 | 4,793,000 |
| Transport | | 503,340,000 | 47,362,000 | 35,000,000 | 296,334,000 | 296,334,000 | 296,334,000 | 206,866,000 | 206,866,000 |
| Constitutional Development and Planning | | 5,350,229,000 | 436,608,000 | 380,837,000 | 3,213,632,000 | 3,213,632,000 | 3,213,632,000 | 2,706,872,000 | 2,706,872,000 |
| Foreign Affairs | | 1,177,616,000 | 90,000,000 | 63,000,000 | 660,800,000 | 660,800,000 | 660,800,000 | 312,250,000 | 312,250,000 |
| Statutory Amount | | 700,000 | 57,000 | 10,040,000 | 399,000 | 399,000 | 399,000 | 70,280,000 | 70,280,000 |
| Home Affairs | | 46,174,000 | 3,344,000 | 105,911,768 | 26,742,100 | 26,742,100 | 26,742,100 | 748,683,155 | 748,683,155 |
| Commission for Administration | | 63,702,000 | 1,100,000 | 950,000 | 56,631,000 | 56,631,000 | 56,631,000 | 41,261,000 | 41,261,000 |
| Improvement of Conditions for Service | | 235,000,000 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| National Education | | 107,336,000 | 8,334,000 | 65,000,000 | 3,261,720 | 3,261,720 | 3,261,720 | — | — |
| Police | | 954,709,000 | 79,000,000 | 81,500,000 | 59,199,000 | 59,199,000 | 59,199,000 | 617,100,000 | 617,100,000 |
| Public Works and Land Affairs | | 1,119,001,000 | 80,000,000 | 105,000,000 | 580,000,000 | 580,000,000 | 580,000,000 | 511,800,000 | 511,800,000 |
| National Health and Population Development | | 1,336,416,000 | 105,000,000 | 145,000,000 | 788,730,000 | 788,730,000 | 788,730,000 | 1,022,000,000 | 1,022,000,000 |
| Statutory Amount | | 302,000 | 17,000 | 20,000 | 119,000 | 119,000 | 119,000 | 121,400 | 121,400 |
| Administration: House of Assembly | | 387,849,000 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Statutory Amount | | 1,925,932,000 | 155,812,000 | — | 1,376,552,000 | 1,376,552,000 | 1,376,552,000 | — | — |
| Development Aid | | 2,159,657,000 | 157,825,000 | 160,000,000 | 1,154,625,800 | 1,154,625,800 | 1,154,625,800 | 791,000,000 | 791,000,000 |
| Statutory Amount | | 276,851,000 | 23,070,000 | 18,000,000 | 161,490,000 | 161,490,000 | 161,490,000 | 187,000,000 | 187,000,000 |
| Education and Training | | 917,486,000 | 73,000,000 | 58,000,000 | 502,000,000 | 502,000,000 | 502,000,000 | 401,000,000 | 401,000,000 |
| Defence | | 4,274,108,000 | 332,132,000 | 314,600,000 | 2,544,936,000 | 2,544,936,000 | 2,544,936,000 | 2,300,700,000 | 2,300,700,000 |
| Manpower | | 127,973,000 | 22,000,000 | 7,200,000 | 68,400,000 | 68,400,000 | 68,400,000 | 49,307,000 | 49,307,000 |
| Trade and Industry | | 954,137,000 | 104,000,000 | 87,000,000 | 523,000,000 | 523,000,000 | 523,000,000 | 424,760,000 | 424,760,000 |
| Justice | | 177,075,000 | 16,000,000 | 8,500,000 | 100,300,000 | 100,300,000 | 100,300,000 | 73,000,000 | 73,000,000 |
| Statutory Amount | | 9,379,000 | 620,000 | 500,000 | 5,160,000 | 5,160,000 | 5,160,000 | 5,673,000 | 5,673,000 |
| Prisons | | 358,798,000 | 28,877,000 | 27,366,000 | 224,549,000 | 224,549,000 | 224,549,000 | 213,973,000 | 213,973,000 |
| Agriculture Economics and Marketing | | 578,959,000 | Dr11,000,000 | 69,000,000 | 400,600,000 | 400,600,000 | 400,600,000 | 514,700,000 | 514,700,000 |
| Water Affairs | | 248,030,000 | 21,300,000 | — | 142,700,000 | 142,700,000 | 142,700,000 | — | — |
| Mineral and Energy Affairs | | 627,553,000 | 70,700,000 | 75,200,000 | 427,733,000 | 427,733,000 | 427,733,000 | 347,074,000 | 347,074,000 |
| Finance | | 993,162,000 | 75,678,000 | 65,000,000 | 561,178,000 | 561,178,000 | 561,178,000 | 492,120,000 | 492,120,000 |

[Continued on following page]

| Service | Estimates 1985/86 | | | Issues 1985 | | | Month of October 1984 | | | Total 1 April to 31 October 1984 | | |
|--|----------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---|--------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R | R |
| Statutory Amount | 5,093,577,000 | 613,486,000 | 491,647,000 | 3,313,213,000 | 2,607,252,000 | | | | | | | |
| (615,000,000)* | (31,508,000)* | (55,111,000)* | (257,409,000)* | (375,389,000)* | | | | | | | | |
| Audit | 11,986,000 | 969,000 | 907,000 | 6,933,000 | 6,343,000 | | | | | | | |
| Environment Affairs | 122,928,000 | 9,700,000 | 31,271,700 | 71,100,000 | 227,771,700 | | | | | | | |
| Administration: House of Representatives | 261,770,000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | | | | | |
| Statutory Amount | 1,070,107,000 | 122,000,000 | -- | -- | 757,000,000 | | | | | | | |
| Administration: House of Delegates | 108,029,000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | | | | | |
| Statutory Amount | 452,164,000 | 46,250,000 | -- | 313,930,000 | -- | | | | | | | |
| R 32,074,981,000 | 2,716,489,170 | 2,410,216,051 | 18,960,477,810 | 15,592,864,916 | | | | | | | | |
| *Less Discount R.S.A. Stocks | 615,000,000 | 31,508,000 | 55,111,000 | 257,409,000 | 375,389,000 | | | | | | | |
| R 31,459,981,000 | 2,684,981,170 | 2,355,105,051 | 18,703,068,810 | 15,217,475,916 | | | | | | | | |
| Standing Appropriations | -- | -- | -- | | | | | | | | | |
| National Road Fund | -- | -- | 13,864,630 | 3,101,131 | 100,432,795 | | | | | | | |
| State Oil Fund | -- | -- | 24,057,686 | 2,640,274 | 175,339,439 | | | | | | | |
| South African Development Trust Fund | 20,500,000 | -- | 6,323,000 | 7,931,255 | 16,020,005 | | | | | | | |
| Sorghum Beer Research Fund | 1,800,000 | -- | -- | 1,107 | -- | | | | | | | |
| S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund | 1,000 | -- | -- | 150 | 2,040 | | | | | | | |
| R 22,301,000 | -- | 44,245,316 | 13,673,727 | 291,794,279 | | | | | | | | |
| Other Issues | R 31,482,282,000 | 2,684,981,170 | 2,399,350,367 | 18,716,742,727 | 15,509,270,195 | | | | | | | |
| Treasury Bills repaid: Internal | -- | 1,424,358,000 | -- | 10,712,945,000 | -- | | | | | | | |
| Tax Redemption Certificates repaid | -- | -- | -- | 147 | -- | | | | | | | |
| Loan Levy repaid | -- | 1,129,255 | -- | 7,895,406 | -- | | | | | | | |
| Currency subscription I.B.R.D. | -- | -- | -- | 14,876,784 | -- | | | | | | | |
| Currency subscription I.D.A. | -- | 171,000 | -- | 542,000 | -- | | | | | | | |
| I.M.F.: Valuation adjustment | -- | -- | -- | 1,294 | -- | | | | | | | |
| Internal Stock, Bonds and Loans Redeemed | -- | 9,200 | -- | 978,550 | -- | | | | | | | |
| 8% National Defence Bonds | -- | -- | -- | 1,039,000 | -- | | | | | | | |
| 6% Security Rand Bonds | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | | | | | |

[Continued on following page]

| Service | Estimates 1985/86 | Issues | | | Total 1 April to 31 October 1984 |
|---|----------------------|--------------------------|------|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | Month of October 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | |
| 7% Treasury Bonds | -- | R | R | R | -- |
| Second Series 8% Treasury Bonds | -- | 366,700 | -- | 7,339,300 | -- |
| Indefinite Period Treasury Bonds | -- | 186,900 | -- | 1,721,800 | -- |
| Indefinite Period National Defence Bonds | -- | 3,537,400 | -- | 26,234,100 | -- |
| Defence Bonus Bonds | -- | 872,550 | -- | 6,096,800 | -- |
| Internal Registered Stock: | | | | | |
| 9.75%, 2001 | -- | -- | -- | 440,100 | -- |
| 11.5%, 2001 | -- | -- | -- | 548,000 | -- |
| 10.35%, 2001 | -- | 19,000 | -- | 1,865,400 | -- |
| 9.8%, 2001 | -- | -- | -- | 2,694,550 | -- |
| 9.25%, 2002 | -- | 52,000 | -- | 3,059,700 | -- |
| 9.25%, 2004 | -- | 136,000 | -- | 6,156,399 | -- |
| 9%, 2004 | -- | 32,000 | -- | 1,579,667 | -- |
| 9.375%, 2004 | -- | 35,000 | -- | 2,085,000 | -- |
| 15%, 1985 | -- | -- | -- | 500,000,000 | -- |
| 5.5%, 1985 | -- | -- | -- | 45,707,408 | -- |
| 10.5%, 1992 | -- | -- | -- | 347,000 | -- |
| 10%, 1996 | -- | -- | -- | 231,000 | -- |
| 11%, 1997 | -- | 2,120 | -- | 2,516,010 | -- |
| 11%, 1998 | -- | 89,000 | -- | 2,911,500 | -- |
| 10.75%, 1999 | -- | 61,000 | -- | 1,399,700 | -- |
| 10.25%, 2000 | -- | -- | -- | 405,660 | -- |
| 10.625%, 2000 | -- | 54,000 | -- | 1,067,000 | -- |
| 10%, 2000 | -- | -- | -- | 1,631,910 | -- |
| 10.5%, 2000 | -- | -- | -- | 884,700 | -- |
| 6%, 1985 | -- | -- | -- | 108,903,106 | -- |
| 7%, 1985 | -- | 51,086,007 | -- | 51,086,007 | -- |
| 9.75%, 1985 | -- | 70,340,100 | -- | 70,340,100 | -- |
| Foreign Loans and Credits Redeemed | | | | | |
| 1978 | -- | -- | -- | 66,555,740 | -- |
| 1983/87 | -- | -- | -- | 23,540,889 | -- |
| 1981/86 | -- | -- | -- | 14,123,795 | -- |
| 1976 | -- | -- | -- | 33,252,825 | -- |
| 1984/87 | -- | -- | -- | 112,621,934 | -- |
| 1985 | -- | -- | -- | 99,866,411 | -- |

[Continued on following page]

| Service | Issues | | | Total 1 April to 31 October | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|------|
| | Estimates 1985/86 | Month of October 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 | 1984 |
| Issues, Revenue Services 1984/85 | -- | 139,575 | -- | 1,745,345 | -- | R |
| R | -- | 1,563,082,337 | -- | 12,037,578,692 | -- | |
| Total State Revenue Account | R | 4,248,063,507 | -- | 30,754,321,419 | -- | |
| Appropriation Account: | | | | | | |
| House of Representatives | R | 155,812,000 | -- | 1,376,552,000 | -- | |
| Appropriation Account: | R | 46,250,000 | -- | 313,930,000 | -- | |
| House of Delegates | R | 324,062,000 | -- | 2,447,482,000 | -- | |
| Totals | | 4,572,125,507 | -- | 33,201,803,419 | -- | |
| Exchequer Balance, 31 October 1985 | | 3,096,757 | -- | 3,096,757 | -- | |
| Totals | | 4,575,222,264 | -- | 33,204,900,176 | -- | |

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CSO: 3400/549

SOUTH AFRICA

RESERVE BANK ASSETS, LIABILITIES REPORTED

Cape Town GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English 15 Nov 85 p 38

[Text] Notice 735 of 1985
South African Reserve Bank

Statement of Assets and Liabilities on the 31st day of October 1985

| Liabilities | | Assets | |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | R | R | |
| Capital | 2,000,000.00 | Gold | 4,052,255,059.02 |
| Reserve Fund | 42,424,241.17 | Foreign: | — |
| Notes in circulation | 3,737,068,225.00 | Bills | — |
| Deposits: | | Investments | 102,963,858.97 |
| Government | 239,450,949.09 | Other assets | 653,023,929.81 |
| Provincial | | Total gold and foreign assets | 4,808,242,847.80 |
| administrations | 51,269,900.56 | Domestic: | |
| Bankers | 990,881,669.74 | Bills discounted | 863,550,000.00 |
| Other | 1,110,239,967.08 | Loans and Advances: | |
| Other liabilities | 6,151,907,968.79 | Government | — |
| | | Other | 1,020,803,860.66 |
| | <u>R12,325,242,921.43</u> | Securities: | |
| | | Government | 33,214,454.18 |
| | | Other | 560,258,185.75 |
| | | Other assets | 5,039,173,573.04 |
| | | | <u>R12,325,242,921.43</u> |

Ratio of gold reserve to liabilities to the public less foreign assets 65.0 percent.

Pretoria, 7 November 1985.

B.P. Groenewald, General Manager

(15 November 1985)

/8309

CSO: 3400/549

SOUTH AFRICA

TRADE STATISTICS FOR JANUARY-SEPTEMBER GIVEN

Cape Town GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English and Afrikaans 8 Nov 85 pp 29-30

[Text] Kennisgewing 716 Van 1985--Notice 716 of 1985

Preliminary Statement of Trade Statistics of the Republic of South Africa
Released by the Commissioner for Customs and Excise

Remark--The import and export figures reflected in this statement have been
adjusted largely to bring them into line with the requirements for the
compilation of the balance of payments

Period: January-September 1985

Table A. Totals in Millions of Rand According to World Zones and Ships'
and Aircraft Stores

| World Zones | Imports | | Exports | |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| Africa | 322.9 | 310.8 | 1,171.2 | 665.6 |
| Europe | 8,022.8 | 6,992.6 | 6,488.9 | 4,804.2 |
| America | 2,706.0 | 3,045.7 | 2,518.9 | 1,773.5 |
| Asia | 2,449.9 | 2,986.0 | 3,720.6 | 2,394.4 |
| Oceania | 217.3 | 222.8 | 171.1 | 137.4 |
| Other unclassified goods and balance of payments adjustments | 3,393.4 | 2,320.5 | 11,523.9 | 8,083.6 |
| Ships'/Aircraft Stores | — | — | 38.7 | 25.4 |
| Grand total | 17,112.3 | 15,878.4 | 25,633.3 | 17,884.1 |

Table B: Totals in Million Rand According to Sections of the CCCN

| Sections | Imports | | Exports | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| I. Live animals; animal products | 88.8 | 77.7 | 224.0 | 176.8 |
| II. Vegetable products | 452.3 | 763.4 | 504.3 | 429.9 |
| III. Animal and vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal and vegetable waxes | 245.2 | 162.6 | 47.0 | 26.6 |
| IV. Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco | 346.3 | 303.5 | 488.6 | 393.1 |
| V. Mineral products | 358.3 | 255.2 | 3,520.8 | 2,119.7 |
| VI. Products of the chemical and allied industries | 1,713.4 | 1,277.2 | 648.0 | 525.8 |
| VII. Artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers, and articles thereof; rubber, synthetic rubber, factice, and articles thereof | 602.9 | 603.0 | 104.7 | 70.0 |
| VIII. Raw hides and skins, furskins and articles thereof; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and the like; articles of gut (other than silk-worm gut) | 49.9 | 65.0 | 187.2 | 130.1 |
| IX. Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork; manufactures of straw, of esparto and of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork | 86.3 | 99.4 | 70.6 | 43.5 |
| X. Paper-making material; paper and paperboard and articles thereof | 454.9 | 457.3 | 398.2 | 281.8 |
| XI. Textiles and textile articles | 630.1 | 784.5 | 681.9 | 498.9 |
| XII. Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; prepared feathers and articles made therewith; artificial flowers; articles of human hair, fans | 82.2 | 114.3 | 7.6 | 5.1 |
| XIII. Articles of stone, of plaster, of cement, of asbestos, of mica and of similar materials; ceramic products; glass and glassware | 176.7 | 208.6 | 55.6 | 31.0 |

[Table continued on following page]

| Sections | Imports | | Exports | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| XIV. Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, precious metals, rolled precious metals, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin | 113.1 | 111.0 | 1,864.1 | 1,821.3 |
| XV. Base metals and articles of base metal | 868.9 | 781.2 | 2,830.9 | 1,692.7 |
| XVI. Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof | 4,726.0 | 4,623.3 | 368.8 | 206.7 |
| XVII. Vehicles, aircraft, and parts thereof; vessels and certain associated transport equipment | 1,802.3 | 1,913.6 | 235.8 | 124.9 |
| XVIII. Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical and surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments, television image and sound recorders and reproducers; parts thereof | 674.7 | 705.2 | 55.1 | 23.7 |
| XX. Miscellaneous manufactured articles | 141.9 | 159.8 | 27.5 | 11.6 |
| XXI. Works of art collectors' pieces, and antiques | 29.1 | 35.1 | 17.2 | 7.7 |
| Other unclassified goods and balance of payments adjustments | 3,469.0 | 2,377.5 | 13,295.4 | 9,263.2 |
| Grand total | 17,112.3 | 15,878.4 | 25,633.3 | 17,884.1 |

(8 November 1985)

/8309

CSO: 3400/549

SOUTH AFRICA

REVENUE COLLECTED FIGURES RELEASED

Cape Town GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English/Afrikaans 8 Nov 85 p 24

[Text] No 2502

8 November 1985

Statement of Revenue collected during the period 1 April 1985 to 30 September 1985.

Treasury, Pretoria

[Figures on following page]

| Head of Revenue | Estimate | | Month September | | 1 April to 30 September | |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| | 1985/86 | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 | 1984 |
| State Revenue Account | R | R | R | R | R | R |
| Inland revenue: | | | | | | |
| Tax on income | 15,531,000,000 | 1,542,232,818 | 1,076,866,099 | 8,011,289,739 | 5,736,876,632 | 114,003,299 |
| Sales tax | 8,320,000,000 | 672,791,476 | 496,420,055 | 3,890,188,112 | 2,680,182,369 | 17,191,199 |
| Other taxes | | | | | | 840,469 |
| Non-resident shareholders tax | 220,000,000 | 39,965,682 | 22,746,323 | 163,470,862 | 21,281,120 | 2,646,457 |
| Non-residents' tax on interest | 35,000,000 | 2,405,129 | 4,769,493 | 1,840,604 | 1,816,324 | 50,925,321 |
| Undistributed profits | 2,000,000 | 157,669 | 109,848 | 1,238,000 | 1,238,000 | 16,298,834 |
| Donations tax | 4,000,000 | 137,725 | 1,624,712 | 1,816,324 | 1,816,324 | 237,609,729 |
| Estate duty | 100,000,000 | 12,069,487 | 7,854,728 | 62,923,088 | 62,923,088 | 237,609,729 |
| Trade securities | 30,000,000 | 5,503,168 | 2,824,921 | 25,742,808 | 25,742,808 | 237,609,729 |
| Stamp duties and fees | 260,000,000 | 20,085,574 | 17,394,280 | 123,821,057 | 123,821,057 | 237,609,729 |
| Transfer duties | 250,000,000 | 23,735,587 | 25,562,640 | 134,113,807 | 134,113,807 | 237,609,729 |
| Mining leases and ownership | 468,000,000 | 21,784 | 165,178 | 295,550,280 | 295,550,280 | 237,609,729 |
| Interest and dividends | 501,830,000 | 39,421,148 | 37,228,217 | 139,664,082 | 139,664,082 | 237,609,729 |
| Levies | 289,311,000 | 22,328,638 | 4,249,488 | 39,439,292 | 39,439,292 | 20,185,676 |
| Recoveries of loans and advances | 30,960,000 | 6,490,466 | 1,272,940 | 13,510,934 | 13,510,934 | 7,123,577 |
| Departmental activities | 621,245,000 | 56,932,149 | 341,937,745 | 496,200,866 | 496,200,866 | 502,676,293 |
| | <u>26,633,346,000</u> | <u>2,444,278,500</u> | <u>2,041,026,667</u> | <u>13,420,852,975</u> | <u>9,860,353,163</u> | |
| Less: Payments to self-governing national states | 350,300,000 | 30,699,000 | — | 177,783,000 | — | |
| Total: Inland revenue | R 26,313,046,000 | R 2,413,579,500 | R 2,041,026,667 | R 13,243,069,975 | R 9,860,353,163 | |

[Continued on following page]

| Head of Revenue | Estimate 1985/86 | | Month September 1985 | | 1 April to 30 September 1985 | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---|
| | R | R | R | R | R | R |
| Customs and excise duties: | | | | | | |
| Customs duty | 1,590,000,000 | 102,714,624 | 105,366,388 | 585,030,830 | 733,812,664 | |
| Excise duty | 1,889,000,000 | 170,847,513 | 187,822,866 | 879,124,669 | 888,966,472 | |
| Surcharge | — | 17,284,965 | — | 16,866,176 | — | |
| Miscellaneous | 80,000,000 | 11,036,340 | 9,984,886 | 54,021,254 | 38,354,716 | |
| | R 3,559,000,000 | 301,883,442 | 303,174,140 | 1,535,042,929 | 1,661,133,852 | |
| Less: | | | | | | |
| Amount to the credit of | | | | | | |
| Central Revenue Fund | 250,000,000 | 21,000,000 | 21,000,000 | 126,000,000 | 126,000,000 | |
| Payments in terms of Customs | | | | | | |
| Union Agreements | 1,300,000,000 | — | — | 609,764,500 | 581,304,500 | |
| Total: Customs and excise duties | R 2,009,000,000 | 280,883,442 | 282,174,140 | 799,278,429 | 953,829,352 | |
| | R 28,322,046,000 | 2,694,462,942 | 2,323,200,807 | 14,042,348,404 | 10,814,182,515 | |
| National Road Fund | — | — | 14,155,123 | — | 84,092,242 | |
| State Oil Fund | — | — | 24,652,323 | — | 148,759,049 | |
| South African Development Trust Fund | 20,500,000 | — | 6,323,565 | 7,111,870 | 12,400,872 | |
| Sorghum Beer Research Fund | 1,800,000 | — | — | — | Dr. 770 | |
| S.W.A. Territorial Revenue Fund | 1,000 | — | — | — | — | |
| | R 22,301,000 | — | 45,131,011 | 7,111,870 | 245,251,393 | |
| | R 28,344,347,000 | 2,694,462,942 | 2,368,331,818 | 14,049,460,274 | 11,059,433,908 | |
| Appropriation Account: House | | | | | | |
| Inland revenue | 34,000,000 | 3,928,985 | — | 14,347,554 | — | |
| Appropriation Account: House | | | | | | |
| of Representatives | | | | | | |
| Inland revenue | 13,000,000 | 1,045 | — | 27,281 | — | |
| Appropriation Account: House | | | | | | |
| of Delegates | | | | | | |
| Inland revenue | R 1,927,000 | 241,968 | — | 1,542,794 | — | |
| | R 48,927,000 | 4,171,998 | — | 15,917,629 | — | |
| Grand total | R 28,393,274,000 | 2,698,634,940 | 2,368,331,818 | 14,065,377,903 | 11,059,433,908 | |

[Continued on following page]

| Head of Revenue | Estimate | | Month September | | Total 1 April to 30 September | |
|---|----------|---------------|-----------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| | 1985/86 | 1985 | 1984 | R | R | R |
| Reconciliation with statement published by Government Notice 2327 in GOVERNMENT GAZETTE of 18 October 1985: | | | | | | |
| In Transit, 31 March 1985 | — | — | — | — | 82,342,364 | — |
| Overremitted, 31/8/85 | — | 17,808,609 | — | — | — | — |
| Collections as above | — | 2,698,634,940 | — | — | 14,065,377,903 | — |
| | — | 2,680,826,331 | — | — | 14,147,720,267 | — |
| Overremitted, 30/9/85 | — | 4,493,917 | — | — | 4,493,917 | — |
| Received into Exchequer Account R | — | 2,685,320,248 | — | — | 14,152,214,184 | — |

/8309

CSO: 3400/549

SOUTH AFRICA

POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL SERVICES COUNCILS EXAMINED

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 8 Oct 85 p 9

[Unattributed article: "RCS's Can Show Joint Decision Making Is Possible"]

[Text] The concept "Regional Services Council" is a vague and very complex one for many South Africans. Few people know precisely what to expect when the so-called SDR's are established. In the first of two articles Tienie Fourie takes a closer look at the regional services councils.

On 1 January next year a political "experiment" starts in South Africa that will be watched with more than ordinary interest--indeed with deadly seriousness.

For Mr Chris Heunis, minister of political development and planning, the first day of the new year is the target date on which the first regional services councils (the RSC's) go into operation.

Legislation has already provided for it: all local authorities--White, black, colored and Asian--will before long be absorbed by the regional services councils.

According to Mr Heunis the idea is that funds in a given regional services council's area will be "pooled" so that the infrastructure in that particular area can be developed for the benefit of everybody.

In practice it means that Blacks, Whites, Coloreds, and Asians must meet at a single conference table to decide how joint funds should be allocated.

Politicians call it the devolution of power.

The money for regional services councils will be raised by levies on business. Businessmen have already warned that these impositions will simply be passed on to the consumer.

Nonetheless, the success or failure of regional services councils will have a great influence on the progress of political development and, indeed, on the political future of the country. If the different population groups succeed in reaching a consensus on community affairs around the conference table, it will be regarded as proof that there can in fact be joint decision making among the different population groups.

If it does not succeed, the opponents of regional services councils will take it as proof that dialogue cannot succeed.

The forces opposing regional services councils have already been at work for a long time. It is common knowledge that black council members are under tremendous pressure from black activists everywhere in the country. They are branded as "conspirators with the system." Their houses are burnt down; they are murdered.

The aim is clear: wipe out all cooperation, kill all dialogue between population groups, put an end to joint decision making on the lowest level...and joint decision making on the highest level will be hard to achieve.

Are the intimidators succeeding? The answer presumably lies in whether the state of emergency has the desired effect. If the activists are kept in check, the battle is half won.

There are, however, other problems that may scuttle the successful working of the regional services councils. One of these is money.

It is anticipated that in the first year the regional services councils are in operation approximately 1,300 million rands will be collected in levies. It has been ascertained that South African Transport Services has already indicated that it will need some 800 million rands to provide better suburban services, especially in black areas.

There are thus 500 million rands left...and there are people who say it isn't enough. If the levy on local businesses is increased, however, businessmen won't just take it lying down.

Much depends on the attitude of black town councils in particular to regional services councils. If they see in them an opportunity of obtaining money to make up the shortfalls in their annual budgets, R500 million will certainly not be enough.

The government will certainly have to take steps to avoid this. In many black townships, for example, electricity is supplied to the residents at a considerable loss by the local authority involved. ESCOM [the Electricity Supply Commission] continually increases its rates...but the black council member is often reluctant to pass the rate increase on to the consumer out of fear for his life.

In short: the Department of Political Development and Planning will have its hands full ensuring that the money collected by the regional services council is used for the purpose for which it is intended: improvement of the general infrastructure.

There is also political opposition to the regional services councils. In certain country areas, such as at Pietersburg, with its CP [Conservative Party]-controlled town council, there is angry opposition to the RSC's. Many Whites simply don't want to sit around the conference table with non-Whites.

The Council of Deputies--the Indians--rejected the Local Authority Affairs' Amendment Bill in the session of Parliament earlier this year because they are opposed to separate local authorities. Although the bill is not specifically concerned with the regional services councils, it makes provision for the appointment of a delimitation board to determine the boundaries of the SDR's.

The bill was thereafter referred to the President's Council for a decision. This in its turn recommended to the state president that the bill be approved... something that will surely happen soon now.

The delimitation board will have the authority to determine the borders of separate RSC's after consultation with all those concerned. When that has been done, the wheels can be set in motion and the first regional service councils may soon follow.

The question, however, remains: What will the attitude of Whites, Coloreds, Blacks and Asians be to the regional services councils? If that attitude is not honest and sincere, the establishment of these councils may fail.

And it is essential that the "experiment" succeed. It's a way of showing that in this country with its wide variety of people dialogue and negotiation and joint decision making are nonetheless possible.

*See also reports on the congress of the Transvaal Municipal Association on p 10.

12906/12795

CSO: 3401/6

SOUTH AFRICA

KANGWANE COAL MINES TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 8 Oct 85 p 18

[*"Business Picture"* by Stan Valentine, who visited Kangwane last week:
"Kangwane Gets Two Coal Mines"]

[Text] With the settlement of the dispute about the possible inclusion of Kangwane in Swaziland, the reluctance of the South African business world to take part in the economic development of Kangwane is now a thing of the past, say officials of the Kangwane Economic Development Corporation (KEDC).

Mr Vernon Smith, the senior managing director of the KEDC, says that this is clearly apparent from the projects being tackled in various areas of the self-governing state.

The biggest of these projects is the development of the region's mining industry, and especially the coal field that was demonstrated to exist by the KEDC. Exploration has shown that there are about 300,000 million tons of medium- to better-grade anthracite, which is scarce elsewhere in South Africa.

The field is divided into three parts, of which the northern part will be developed by Kangwane Anthracite and the middle part by Nkomati Anthracite. There are as yet no definite plans for the southern section.

The shares of Kangwane Anthracite will be held by the KEDC (40 percent) and Trans Natal/McAlpine (60 percent). Next year a strip mine with a capacity of 450,000 tons a year and an output of 300,000 tons a year will be opened. At the outset it will employ 800 people.

Nkomati Anthracite's shareholders are the KEDC (40 percent) and Messina (60 percent). Its drilling program has also been completed, and mining will take place partly by strip and partly by subsurface methods.

Nkomati already has foreign contracts for its output of coal and will start mining early next year. It will employ about 500 people and produce about half a million tons of coal a year, of which 300,000 tons will be exported.

The opening of the two mines is also expected to provide employment for another 300 workers in ancillary industries, and a livelihood for about 10,000 people will thus be created.

The KEDC now holds all Southern Anthracite's shares and there are no immediate plans to grant mining rights. The quality of its coal may even be superior to that of the other two mines, but there is perhaps a difficulty in that its thick seams--15 meters and more--may create propping problems, Mr Smith says.

A small number of black farmers on the banks of the Komati River will perhaps have to move as a result of the development of the two mines. Other immediate problems anticipated are that bridges and roads in the area will have to be improved to be able to carry the expected heavier traffic.

As far as a rail link to a seaport is concerned, there are two possibilities. Export can either take place via Maputo--but the maintenance of the Mozambique railroad may result in delay--or a connection can be made with the East Transvaal railroad through Swaziland to Richards Bay by means of branch lines.

Maputo is the logical port, and its facilities are now being improved to provide for the bulk handling of coal.

Besides coal, Kangwane is also blessed with asbestos, where the Glencor group's Msauli mine is already making a great contribution not just in providing employment but in revenue for the state treasury in the form of royalties and tax.

Mr Smith says there has also already been great interest in the region in exploration for gold, and there are many existing claims that provide the state with revenue--even if it is only in the payment of the annual registration fees by holders who don't want to lose the right.

12906/12795
CSO: 3401/6

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

MULTIRACIAL EDUCATION COUNCIL MEETS--Pretoria, Nov 25 SAPA--The recently appointed multi-racial South African Council for Education (SACE) held its first meeting in Pretoria today under the chairmanship of Professor Wynand Mouton. At a press conference afterwards, he said discussions had been general and consisted mainly of a "getting to know one another" process. Educationists from all four population groups have seats on the council, which is briefed to advise the newly structured Department of National Education, under the minister, Mr F. W. de Klerk, on general education policy for all population groups. Prof Mouton said the structure of education and education financing had been among the issues raised during the discussions. The council's next meeting would take place in March and it was intended to hold meetings four times a year. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1401 GMT 25 Nov 85] /12640

WORKERS' PROPOSALS ON BETTER RELATIONS--The traditional relationship between South African employers and their servants is set to change, at least in the way they address each other. Carmel Rickard reports. [Rickard] The idea of domestic workers and their employers calling each other by their first names comes from a conference of the South African Domestic Workers' Association [SADWA] held in Durban. Members of SADWA said they felt that this was a move which would help improve relations between employers and workers, and was preferable to the present common practice where domestic workers called their employers and even friends of their employers, Madam or Baas [Master]. SADWA national organizer (Mary Mkhwanazi) said the exclusion of domestic workers from labor legislation was discrimination against the workers. In addition to new legislation, first names between employers and employees would help relations between the two groups. [Text] [Umtata Capital Radio in English 0600 GMT 26 Nov 85] /12640

CSO: 3400/512

ZAIRE

ZAIRIAN ENVOY TO FRANCE CITED ON BLACK LEAGUE

AB261335 Kinshasa AZAP in French 0925 GMT 26 Oct 85

[Text] Paris, 25 Oct [date as received] (AZAP)--Invited by the Eurafican Press Association of France, which organized its periodic debate-lunch on Friday, at the Aeroclub of France, Citizen Sakombi Inongo, Zaire's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, at the request of participants in the debate-lunch, briefed them on the paper he gave in Dakar on 27 September 1985 concerning the League of Black African States and the black question.

Citizen Inongo, who substantially described the actual motives for the project, explained at length--in his exposé and in the answers he gave to the questions put to him later--the various reasons which have made the Zairian head of state, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, propose throughout the African black states the idea of a league bringing together all the black peoples on the earth.

Answering questions put by journalists taking part in the debate-lunch, Citizen Inongo specified that the League of Black African States was not only meant to bring together African and world independent states, but also black entities living within states with white governments, and that it was not aimed at all against any entity whatsoever.

Citizen Inongo also provided specifics on development in the economic situation in Zaire, specifying that the country regularly meets its obligations with its creditors, and that the credibility this confers on Zaire will help to resume investments and continue the industrialization of the country.

It is worth recalling that the League of Black African States continues to raise great interest in the French media circles, if we consider the large number and the quality of those who spoke during the exposé, and the various questions which were put to Citizen Inongo.

/8918
CSO: 3400/513

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

OUTGOING JAPANESE AMBASSADOR--His excellency, Tsuneo Oyake, ambassador of Japan to Zaire, yesterday paid a farewell visit to the state commissioner for labor and social security, Citizen Mbaya Gang. During their discussions, the two officials reviewed issues relating to technical cooperation between the Japanese Government and the Zairian Executive Council, particularly in the field of professional training. [Excerpt] [Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1130 GMT 19 Nov 85 AB] /8918

NEW ENVOY APPOINTED--Kinshasa, 11 Nov (AZAP)--Kashamura Chambu has been appointed Zaire's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Guinea, by Presidential Ordinance No 85-238, according to a communique from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation which was submitted to the press on Monday. [Excerpt] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1242 GMT 12 Nov 85 AB] /8918

SIX AMBASSADORS PRESENT CREDENTIALS--Kinshasa, 15 Nov (AZAP)--MPR Founding Chairman Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko today, at Mont Ngaliema (Kinshasa), received the letters of credence of six new ambassadors from Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. They are Franz Cede from Austria; Hraibe Mustapha from Lebanon; Colonel Ould El Houssein from Mauritania; Milutinovic Zanko from Yugoslavia; Aboul Magid Abd Rahman from Sudan, and Ruben Antio Vila from Argentina. [Excerpts] [Kinshasa AZAP in French 1016 GMT 16 Nov 85 AB] /8918

CSO: 3400/513

ZAMBIA

MUBANGA SAYS UNIP NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 8 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] UNITED National Independence Party (UNIP) is passing through its most difficult phase and needs strengthening, Southern provincial political secretary Mr Martin Mubanga has said.

He said some of the things being said against the Party were despicable.

In a circular to district governors, district political secretaries, district Women's League chairmen and district Youth League chairmen, Mr Mubanga says: "If these things were said by those we know to be all-weather ill-wishers of the Party, I would not personally be unduly worried.

"But one begins to get worried when even some members of the Party start saying that the Party has forgotten them and start behaving differently.

"As it is, I can frankly and courageously say we are a battered if not a beleaguered Party."

He said it was in this regard where "we in the field of Party organisation face our biggest challenge".

"There should be very little room for the faint-hearted. The times call for cool-heartedness and at the same time lion-heartedness on the part of each and every organiser of our Party."

Leaders in the area should appreciate that "we have been riding the crest of popularity and respect for the last 20 years, that our people should begin to doubt our commitment to their cause at this time, I think, is a temporary phenomenon.

"We have the skill and the will to convince them that we mean well even though we might be going about things in a manner which brings suffering to them."

Sacrifice and suffering had their own rewards if people were prepared to work hard.

He appealed to the entire leadership in the province not to exacerbate the already "fluid situation in any way by our personal conduct either in what we say or do."

/13104
CSO: 3400/576

UNIP NATIONAL COUNCIL CALLS FOR EXTRADITION TREATIES

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 9 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] The 20th UNIP National Council has called in Zambia to sign extradition treaties with neighbouring countries as a way of combating crime by foreigners.

The council also called for the establishment of a national co-ordinating agency to speed up the flow of information involving criminals.

The calls are contained in resolutions passed by the just ended National Council conference and released by Chairman of the Elections and Publicity Committee, Mr Fines Bulawayo yesterday.

The council recommended the formulation of better policies on sentencing and treatment of offenders.

"National laws regulating the entry and stay of immigrants in Zambia be expedited so as to effectively control and appropriately punish those immigrants whose presence in the country is unlawful and undesirable."

The council also endorsed the new system under which the exchange rate of the Kwacha would be determined by auction of foreign exchange.

Mr Bulawayo also announced yesterday that the Party would next week send leaders to provinces to explain why Government had decided to auction foreign exchange.

The council also called for a periodical review of the mechanisms for auctioning foreign exchange so that the interests of the low income groups, small-scale industries and agricultural production were safe-guarded.

It was resolved that Government policy should not penalise rural workers and peasants by making them pay for transport costs.

It called on Government to work out an elaborate monitoring mechanism to curb under-invoicing by exporters, over-invoicing by importers and curtailing the illegal importation of goods.

On agriculture, the council called for the construction of grain storage sheds using indigenous technology.

It urged Government to formulate a more sound technical plan and system of maize storage and marketing.

The council also resolved that co-operatives which were able to handle marketing efficiently be allowed to deal directly with millers.

The Party was urged to encourage commercial

banks to put emphasis on investment in agriculture while giving special concessions to peasant farmers.

The council recommended the establishment of a medical fund from the contribution of all workers to improve medical services.

On women's and youth affairs, the council resolved that in view of the need to further strengthen the mass organisations, provisions should be made for them to have greater administrative and operational autonomy.

ZAMBIA

GOVERNMENT RAISES PRODUCER PRICES BY 36 PERCENT

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 9 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Government has increased producer prices for the 1985-86 season by almost 36 per cent and revoked those announced last Monday.

Minister of Agriculture and Water Development, General Kingsley Chinkuli, said yesterday at a Press briefing that the decision to increase the preplaning producer prices has been taken following the auctioning of foreign exchange, which as led to enormous increases in the cost of farm machinery, inputs and labour.

The new prices announced yesterday, with those announced in May in brackets are:

A 90kg bag of maize will now cost K45 (previous price K33); Sunflower K41.95 a bag (K31.70); shelled Chalimbana groundnuts, K131.35 (K110) and shelled Makulu Red groundnuts K90.45 per 90kg bag (K75).

"Unshelled Chalimbana groundnuts will now cost K32.85 (from K27.50); whereas unshelled Makulu Red groundnuts will cost K25.10 (K20.60).

A 90 kg bag of soya-beans will now cost K112.10 (K78); wheat-K55.57 (45.00); wheat-barley K86.40 (from K62); sorghum will be at K42.75 per 90kg bag (from K31.35), and millet will cost K56.25 per bag (K42.80).

A kilogramme of cassava chips will now cost 60n (from 50n), and a kilogramme of cotton seed will cost 99n (from 84n).

Virginia tobacco will now cost K5.12 per kilogramme (from K4.20), while Burley tobacco will cost K3.50 per kilogramme (K3).

The last two cash crops on which the government has fixed the floor prices are cashewnuts, which will cost K1.50 per kilogramme (from K1) and kenaf which will cost K1.60 per kilogramme (K1.50).

The new prices will be subject to further review, in view of the changes which the recently-introduced auctioning of foreign exchange is likely to bring about.

"This decision has been necessitated by some developments in our economy which have led to enormous increases in the cost of farm machinery, inputs and labour," Gen. Chinkuli said.

Since April, the cost of machinery had increased by more than 100 per

cent; diesel by 93 per cent; chemicals by 75 per cent, and crop transport by 75 per cent — all resulting from the reduced value of the Kwacha.

"A combination of these unprecedented developments in our economy has forced the Party and its government to review these prices for the second time within the year."

Gen. Chinkuli said the Party and its government had also decided to change the mechanism for setting the producer price of milk, so that in future, the Dairy Produce Board will have to negotiate with the farmers.

"This change in government policy is intended to make the dairy industry more responsive to changes

in the economic indicators, which has proved difficult under a government controlled pricing system."

It had also been decided to keep the retail price of fertiliser at last season's average price of K26.75, despite the increases in its procurement and distribution.

This was because there would be no time available for farmers to adjust to the new prices, and it was in line with the Party and its government policy to making agriculture the cornerstone of the country's economy.

Last week, the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (CFB) had a meeting with President Kaunda at State House, at which they discussed farmers' problems.

They called for an increase in prices of agricultural produce to match the escalating costs of inputs caused by auctioning of foreign exchange.

Chairman of the CFB, Mr Ben Kapita, said farmers supported the courageous measures the government had taken to tackle the ailing economy, although these had created hardships in other ways.

But Mr Kapita added that despite the temporary hardships created by the auctioning, in the long run, the country would be on a sound financial footing.

The President in turn, called upon the CFB to find ways of helping peasant farmers develop so that the country could produce enough food.

"We have moved from total reliance on copper, to agriculture. This is why it is important that you help the peasant farmers to develop. If there is nothing you can do to help them, I would like to have your honest opinion," he said.

/13104

CSO: 3400/576

ZIMBABWE

CITIZENSHIP ISSUE WORRIES WHITES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Nov 85 p 17

[Text] HARARE. — Every weekday for the past month, long queues have formed in the blazing sun outside a Harare government building in one of the most unusual gatherings of Whites in Zimbabwe since independence five years ago.

They wait in their hundreds, for as much as six hours at a time, to beat a deadline to renounce their claim to foreign citizenship otherwise they will automatically lose their right to Zimbabwean nationality.

Under legislation passed last year, Zimbabwe residents holding dual citizenship were given 12 months from December 1 to decide which one to retain.

Diplomats and officials here estimate that at least two-thirds of the country's 100 000 Whites are "duals", the bulk of them of British descent.

Few acted early, their foreign passports cherished since independence five years ago as a lifeline should their worst fears of Black rule be realised and they be forced to leave.

The right to two passports was enshrined in the constitution of the former White-ruled Rhodesia and essential to the White community during 14 years of rebellion when Rhodesian passports were rejected at border posts almost universally.

But Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government changed that on the grounds it was "not possible for a person to have complete allegiance and loyalty to two sovereign states at the same time".

The legislation caused widespread agitation among Whites, whose numbers reached a peak of 275 000 in 1975, and diplomatic missions here were flooded with enquiries about what to do.

Theoretically it also applies to perhaps as many as half a million Malawians, Mozambicans and Zambians. But they are virtually all farm labourers who crossed into Zimbabwe from the neighbouring countries looking for work and have qualified for citizenship simply by being here more than five years.

Alongside the Britons in crowds queued up outside the Registrar-General's office in Harare's Makombe building, still generally known as the "Drill Hall" despite being renamed this year, there are South Africans, Portuguese, Irish, Greeks, Italians and a smattering of other nationalities.

Inside, they renounce their foreign citizenship before a commissioner of oaths and hand their renunciation form and foreign travel papers to half-a-dozen harassed Black clerks.

For most, their action means little serious loss.

After being surrendered, the passports are returned to the respective diplomatic missions here. The British High Commission, which placed a series of newspaper advertisements explaining the ramifications of the law to dual British-Zimbabwe citizens, will then return the passport to anyone who asks.

The Act specifies that it is an offence for a Zimbabwean to use a foreign passport on pain of being fined 2 000 dollars or jailed for two years or both. It does not make it an offence simply to possess one.

"The signing of the Zimbabwean form of renunciation has no effect in British law," a British consular official said. "They continue to be British citizens in British eyes if not in Zimbabwean law. Because they are Brit-

ish citizens, there are no grounds to deny them their passports if they ask for them back, although we do warn when we return them that the Zimbabwe Government considers it to be a foreign passport."

In British law, citizenship can only be renounced through official British procedures.

Consular officials describe the Act as very reasonable, containing numerous safeguards for those who opt to retain their foreign citizenship.

Under it foreign residents may continue to own property, send children to schools, become apprentices and "generally do all things which are done by a person ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe" except vote or be a Member of Parliament.

But this was not clear to many people outside the Makombe building this week.

Jean Tebaaca (30), a locally-born housewife, said she was renouncing her British citizenship: "I have to, I'm buying a flat."

Basil Longhurst, a 71-year-old retired civil servant who came here from Britain 38 years ago, said he was staying British. "I have no ties here as regards property, only my money. I got rid of all my property. I rather foresaw what might happen," he said. — Sapa-Reuter

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ZIMBABWE

PARTY SECRETARY ADDRESSES ZANU (PF) COMMISSARS ON THEORY

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 17 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Political commissars should chart their course by creating conditions and ways through which socialism can be brought to Zimbabwe.

Addressing about 30 provincial Zanu (PF) political commissars on the relevance of the theory of Marxist-Leninist party organisation at Silveira House yesterday, the party's secretary for the commissariat and culture, Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, called on the commissars to move away from sloganeering and prepare people-oriented programmes that would help bring about a socialist society in the country.

"This is the first step in building a Leninist party and a socialist Zimbabwe," Dr Ushewokunze said.

He called on the party's commissariat to organize and recruit the workers into the party for discussion on how best a socialist society could be created.

"Discuss the composition of party membership and what is the likely direction to be taken by our party and society. Engage all members of the party in concrete work. Be they teaching adult literacy, working as lawyers for peanuts and workers being doctors among the poor or assisting co-operatives in their work. All these are the ABCs of how to embark on a road to build the Leninist party."

He said that slogans, no matter how well they sounded, would not achieve that goal. Action and work would.

Cde Ushewokunze said that leaders and commissars should offer and assist their people in identifying programmes that were people and socialist-oriented.

"They can only achieve this if they interact with the people, otherwise they will create programmes that the people don't need.

"Giving people programmes they don't need is the hallmark of an empty leader, who then does nothing but revert to sloganeering. Socialism is not about slogans. The tendency by some of our party members to concentrate on slogans is completely counter-productive.

"If you call a meeting and spend the time shouting slogans, you will not attract new members. You will also start alienating those who are already members and they will start leaving the party.

Cde Ushewokunze also told the commissars to guard against recruiting reactionary intellectuals into the party as they "become bulls in a china shop and cause confusion within the party as they have no party direction and orientation. It is just like giving party positions to new members. I say they should be screened for at least three years before they can be given positions of responsibility".

He called on participants to recruit progressive intellectuals into the party as they would help with research, write pamphlets and execute its programmes.

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ZIMBABWE

ZCC WARNS AGAINST EVANGELICAL CRUSADES

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 17 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] The Zimbabwe Christian Council last week said it was concerned about the increasing numbers of evangelical crusades establishing offices in the country.

"The church in Zimbabwe takes exception to the establishment of offices in Zimbabwe by its ecumenical partners of any church related organisations, some of whom are known to be openly anti-socialist," the secretary-general of the Zimbabwe Christian Council, the Rev. Murombedzi Kuchera, said last week.

Naming at least four of these organisations he added: "The main reason is that they have considerable financial resources which they are using indiscriminately, retarding efforts of the local people at developing self-actualisation."

Some of these, if not all, he said, insisted that their directors be expatriates. Some used their money to woo membership, ending up as sects. "Some of them are reactionary forces hell-bent against our socialist approach to life. They are therefore not favourable to our Government and its ideals of socialism."

The ZCC had for some time been observing the activities of these evangelical organisations, and it was the findings based on these observations that was the source of concern to the Zimbabwe Christian Council.

The Zimbabwe Christian Council is made up of 24 local Christian denominations - among them the Anglican Church - founded in 1964 to develop "deeper mutual understanding between Christian organisations of differing traditions".

The Rev. Kuchera said that the sources of income of some of the evangelical organisations were doubtful and needed scrutiny. He said that the ZCC preferred these organisations to operate through local partners.

"It is not the church's intention to advise our Government to restrict their activities although we sometimes feel that we have a duty and obligation to do so. However, the church in Zimbabwe may soon find itself advising the

Government to advise the expatriate church organisations to operate through local partners or to be headed by a Zimbabwean."

He warned of the dangers of such organisations to a government committed to socialist transformation, adding that sometimes this could result in the overthrow of a government.

"Some of the evangelical groupings, who come to Zimbabwe in sheep's clothing, leave the people they are in contact with more deserving hell than they found them. They leave their so-called converts in more spiritual confusion than ever.

"It is, the local church which in the long-run has to face such a pastoral problem. The activities of these evangelicals are a major concern to the church in Zimbabwe."

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ZIMBABWE

LARGE FOREIGN-OWNED GROUP SHEDS OVERSEAS CONTROL

Harare BUSINESS HERALD in English 21 Nov 85 p C1

[Article by Lynda Loxton]

[Text] The move towards the Zimbabweanisation of the country's industrial base gained momentum this week with the announcement by one of the large foreign-owned groups, Hunyani Holdings Ltd, that it plans to become locally controlled over the next year.

In an expanded statement on the group's year-end results, chairman Mr Geoffrey Ellman-Brown said a 50 percent plus local shareholding would be more "suited to present-day Zimbabwe." It is currently more than 80 percent foreign owned.

But both he and managing director Mr Alan Paterson stressed this would not mean a lessening of current foreign shareholding, but an increase in local shareholding either through a rights issue or joint ventures with interested local parties, or both. The total local investment required would be in the region of \$15 million.

Not only would localisation of control be in line with Government thinking, but it would also ease access to the increasingly important PTA market and "make us part and parcel of the fabric of the country," said Mr Paterson.

He said the group was currently working out the details of how local equity could be achieved and the final package would have to be approved by the Government and current shareholders.

The group was already heavily involved in identifying possible joint ventures with either the Government or other interested parties. These included the production of Tetrapak liquid packaging and, closely allied with the latter, the proposed chemical pulp and paper mill, which will have to be financed by a consortium because of the sheer size of the project.

Both men underlined the importance of adequate returns of investment in these plans to ensure a return to shareholders at least equal to POSB interest rates and to allow the group to continue expanding its activities.

Mr Ellman-Brown announced that the group had recovered remarkably from its all-time low last year by recording an after-tax profit of \$5,8 million for the year ended September 30 compared to only \$1,8 million the year before.

Dividends for the year total 11,5c (3,5), while return on investment, which indicates profit after tax in relation to shareholders' equity, has improved from 4,4 percent to 13,4 percent.

But Mr Ellman-Brown believed the latter should be in the region of 25 percent to enable the group "to realize its full potential contribution to the economy and to the social development of the nation."

Both men were pleased with the group's results - which are such an improvement on last year that any attempt to make use of percentages is, as Mr Paterson said, to go into "100s of percent, which is totally meaningless."

The group now appears to be back on the growth path of the early 1980s, which was interrupted by the drought, recession and delays in price increase approvals.

Mr Paterson said the improved results were largely due to the increased demand on the domestic market since the end of last year and, despite strong competition from South African manufacturers, a 90 percent increase in export orders to PTA and other regional countries.

But while the weak rand had posed a challenge in the export field, it had benefited the group's imports of unbleached pulp from Swaziland, payment for which was in rands. Favourable transport rates were also negotiated.

But the bulk of this year's profits were attributable to improved volumes in most divisions, with the carton and print section growing the most strongly.

Mr Paterson said this was proof that the group's wide ranging manpower development programmes were paying off together with its policy to keep tight control over working capital.

As to the coming year, the group was in a bullish mood and while it did not see a repetition of the same dramatic growth over the last year, it believed growth would continue at a slower pace.

On the issue of price control, he said he was encouraged to see signs that the Government was considering introducing a number of small regular increases to meet higher costs instead of granting one large increase once a year.

Apart from localisation, another important part of the group's corporate strategy was its intention to spend \$40 million over the next five years on a major re-equipment programme to keep pace with modern developments in packaging and upgrade the quality of products.

The group last year virtually doubled its capital expenditure to \$4,1 million and last week the Deputy Prime Minister, Cde Simon Muzenda, commissioned its

new \$1.6 million AccuRay process control system at the Hunyani Pulp and Paper Mill in Norton. This will enable it to meet international specifications and increase the export competitiveness of its packaging.

Another corporate priority was increasing worker involvement in decision making within the group. It has actively encouraged the establishment of worker's committees in its various divisions and from next month two workers will be included in each divisional management committee.

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ZIMBABWE

HARARE BASE FOR MINERS' FEDERATION

Harare THE HERALD in English 21 Nov 85 p 4

[Text] A FOUR-DAY conference of mineworkers from five Southern African countries ended in Harare yesterday with the formation of the Southern African Miners' Federation.

The federation, to be based in Harare, was a result of a host of resolutions taken at the conference attended by 54 miners from Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

South Africa, which was represented by 25 miners from the powerful National Union of Mine Workers, was elected president of the federation while Zambia and Botswana became first and second vice-presidents respectively.

The Associated Mine Workers of Zimbabwe, which hosted the conference, was elected secretary-general.

The conference also adopted various resolutions on working and living conditions, health and

safety, trade union education, the South African situation and regional and international co-operation of mineworkers.

The conference agreed that total sanctions should be imposed against South Africa and called on the international labour movement to organise the economic boycott.

On the South African regime's threat to repatriate foreign workers from that country which came in the face of threatened sanctions, the conference resolved that: "The Southern African Miners' Federation will resist this measure of the apartheid government and will take concerted milit-

ant action should the regime go ahead with the repatriation policy."

Miners from countries which could not attend the talks were urged to join the newly formed federation. — Ziana.

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ZIMBABWE

NATION LAUNCHES ANTI-CRIME DRIVE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 28 Nov 85 p 17

[Text] HARARE. — The Zimbabwe Government has launched a spirited anti-crime drive, spearheaded by hardline Home (Internal) Affairs Minister Enos Nkala.

Nkala this week ordered a police swoop on shanty towns and hotels to flush out foreigners he blamed for a rising wave of what he called serious crime.

Last month, he ordered police to raid shanties in several towns, including Harare, and to arrest squatters suspected of criminal activities.

Raids

Squatters say they have no land to build permanent homes nor the means for gainful employment. Thousands were rounded up in pre-dawn raids, sent to state farms in remote areas and given land and implements to get on with farming.

The crackdown was widened to include private taxi operators after Nkala said some had been found with spare parts suspected of having been

stolen. Hundreds of drivers who could not prove they owned their car or where they got spare parts had their vehicles impounded.

The so-called emergency taxis augment public transport services that do not adequately cater for the large numbers of city commuters.

Nkala has now decreed that no car can be resprayed without police clearance in an effort to reduce car thefts.

He has also ordered the police to step up measures to combat street crime by questioning any suspicious-looking people and those with rough clothing, unkempt hair or "funny" beards.

Police say crime figures are not available for the period before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, but that there has been a marked rise in crimes such as car thefts and assaults in recent years.

Assaults, some of them serious, increased between 1983 and 1984 from 9 603 cases to 10 188.

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ZIMBABWE

BREAKTHROUGH OF MAZWIKADEI DAM TUNNEL ACHIEVED IN RECORD TIME

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 15 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] After some of the fastest tunnelling work ever done in Zimbabwe, KW Blasting Specialists of Harare have "broken through" the outlet tunnel of the proposed \$29 million Mazwikadei dam in record time.

The planned dam, on the Mukwadzi River, 19km north of Banket, is to supply water to farms in the area. The excavation and lining of the outlet tunnel is the first stage of the project, after which the river will be diverted through the tunnel.

Blasting from each end of the 360-metre tunnel began in mid-July, about three months late, a spokesman for the company said, "We have been working around the clock. Apart from catching up on the months lost, we have also broken through before the original completion date which was the end of November."

The blasting firm has a \$2.6 million contract for the excavation work on the dam, including the tunnelling. The main contractor is the Italian company, Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti.

"We had to complete this vital tunnelling work on time or the whole job could have been delayed a year," the spokesman said. "We feel happy that a local company has undertaken the work so successfully." Fifty-five workers were on the tunnelling job under operations director, Mr Kevin Grove.

The dam, which will take three years to build, is 50% larger than Lake McIlwaine.

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ZIMBABWE

GEOLOGISTS MOVE INTO ZAMBEZI VALLEY SEEKING 'WET GAS'

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 15 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] A team of about 20 geologists, oil specialists and field workers are due to move into a Zambezi valley site east of Chirundu early next year seeking traces of "wet gas", a condensed form of crude oil, in an investigation being sponsored by the West German government at a cost of about \$1,6 million.

Wet gas has previously been found in small quantities at similar sites in on-shore grabens (rift valley faults) and basins in parts of southern Africa where marine sediments were deposited in prehistoric times.

The Chirundu site may contain such sediments and the field team being provided by the Federal Republic of Germany will make preliminary investigations on the ground in April next year, working in cooperation with Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines Geological Survey department.

West Germany is financing the project under a technical cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe.

Mr E Morrison, director of the Geological Survey department, told a Gazette reporter this week that the investigations begin made in the Zambezi valley were in their very early stages and were completely non-economic.

"They could not possibly interest any oil company. But the site is something that we, as geologists, have to investigate and we are indebted to 'West Germany for its technical cooperation and sponsorship in the project,' he said.

Mr. Morrison agreed that substantial quantities of oil or gas deposits throughout the world have only been found in marine sediments, where the sea had once covered land.

Sea Excursion

"Whether these conditions ever prevailed in the Zambezi valley millions of years ago we do not yet know. But we think there was an excursion of the sea into Botswana and Zambia millions of years ago, and there could have been one

into the rift valleys of the Zambezi about the same time," he said. "If so, there could be a chance of finding gas or oil - so we have to look."

A previous air-borne magnetic survey conducted about three years ago had yielded results suggesting that there were unusually deep sediments in the area to be investigated, he said.

"But we don't know anything about the age of the sediments. However, their depth is far greater than we anticipated, and when one finds a very thick pile of sediment then the chances of oil or gas do exist."

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ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

NORAD TO OPEN--The Norwegian international development agency, Norad, will establish an office in Zimbabwe next year. A spokesman for the Norwegian embassy, Mr Knut Vollebaek, said they had found it necessary to open an office here because of their commitment and involvement in rural development. "This is an extension of the embassy because we feel that Norad is an integral part of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we hope to increase our aid to Zimbabwe in the future." The new offices will be manned by staff from Norway who are due to arrive sometime in March. Over the last four years Norway's aid to Zimbabwe amounted to \$78 million. This year \$17 million had been set aside to improve the water development projects in the rural areas with focus on rural poor of whom women constitute a major group. [Text] [Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 17 Nov 85 p 2] /13104

TEAM FOR BULGARIA--Arrangements have been made for a delegation from the council's electricity undertaking to visit Bulgaria to interview suitable engineers for the department. The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development recently told the Town Clerk, Cde Edward Kanengoni, that arrangements had been completed with the Bulgarian government for the council's delegation to visit that country. The council recently agreed that the city electrical engineer and the acting distribution engineer visit Bulgaria to interview electrical engineers for the undertaking. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 20 Nov 85 p 3] /13104

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